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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, a group of researchers from University of California, Los
Angeles released the findings of a study of low-wage workers in New York,
Chicago, and Los Angeles, aimed at assessing the prevalence of workplace
violations in the nation’s three largest cities.1 The result was eye-opening
for lawmakers: federal and state employment laws are not providing
adequate protections to the most critical, and indeed the most vulnerable,
members of the United States (“U.S.”) workforce—immigrant workers.
Among the report’s findings, the fact that two-thirds of the workers surveyed
suffered pay violations, losing roughly $2,600 in annual wages, which is
about fifteen percent of their yearly salaries, is especially alarming.2 This
report, along with others, indicates the need for immigration reform has
reached critical levels.
Regrettably, the political discourse over immigration reform is entangled
in America’s culture wars.3 Anti-immigrant activists maintain that
immigrants come to the United States to take advantage of social welfare
programs, health care services, and birthright citizenship. However, this
anti-immigrant rhetoric does not adequately explain why people actually
pack up and leave their home countries to come to the United States. In
reality, immigrants come to America for one overarching reason: work.4
Commentators, politicians, judges, members of citizen militias, and
others who fear that immigration is threatening our nation’s cultural
and economic integrity believe that undocumented immigrants must be
deported, arrested, or otherwise punished.5 Notably, the Naturalization Act

1. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 16 (2009), available at
http://www.nelp.org/page/-/brokenlaws/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1 (studying
“workplace violation prevalence” among non-managerial and non-professional, “frontline” employees).
2. Id. at 50.
3. See Eve Conant, Razing Arizona, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16, 2010, at 34, 34–35,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/07/razing-arizona.html (assessing
that, similar to the South African culture wars against apartheid, Latino organizations
have rallied to punish the state of Arizona by forming a coalition centered around
cultural identity).
4. See The Hub Nation: Immigration Places America at the Centre of a Web of Global
Networks. So Why Not Make It Easier?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 2010, at 32 [hereinafter
The Hub Nation] (characterizing immigrants as an asset to America because of their hardworking attitude and entrepreneurial spirit).
5. See, e.g., Joseph Lelyveld, The Border Dividing Arizona, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 42 (explaining how Republicans tried to save their majority in
Congress by using the issues of immigration and border security as the main focus of
the 2006 election). Curiously, some of these critics have actually relied on
undocumented workers themselves to their own personal benefit. See, e.g., Michael
Calderone, Report: Lou Dobbs Employed Illegal Immigrants, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 7,
2010, 9:04 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_upshot/20101007cm_yblog_upshot/
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of 1790, which restricted citizenship to white persons serves to
adequately illustrates the role that fear has historically played in the
immigration debate. Yet, despite this long-held fear that the the United
States is being overrun by immigrants, which historically manifested the in
discrimination of southern European, Chinese, and other immigrant groups—
the U.S. is a nation of immigrants.6
Immigration is a social and political issue that generates strong
emotional feelings. On one side of the debate, we hear calls for sealing
the borders and deporting undocumented immigrants. On the
other side of the debate, we hear a call for the full inclusion of
undocumented immigrants into broader society. No matter which
passions are
invoked when debating the issues, immigration
reform is vital because without large-scale immigration the United States
cannot field a competitive workforce.7 This Article argues that, in the
absence of a competitive workforce, the current standard of living in the
United States will erode, and the nation’s long term economic growth prospects
will diminish.8
As a matter of economic policy, there is no other option but to undertake the
task of reforming our immigration laws. Central to this undertaking is an
analysis of the operative nexus connecting the American immigrant
demographic to the needs of the economy and to federal and state wage and
hour laws.
II. THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF IMMIGRATION REFORM
Following the Enron and WorldCom scandals of the 1990’s and the
more recent mortgage crisis, it is not surprising that the primary concern
of the average American in today’s society is the restoration of the health
and well-being of the U.S. economy. The effects of the Great Recession
have been so devastating that leading economists, the U.S. government, and
much of the public rightly feared that we just stood at the precipice

report-lou-dobbs-employed-undocumented-immigrants (reporting that Lou Dobbs, a
celebrated anti-immigrant talk show host, relied on undocumented laborers for the upkeep
of his multimillion-dollar estate and for tending to his private stable of horses).
6. See A Better Way: Utah May Offer a Better Model Than Arizona for Dealing
with Illegal Immigrants, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 2010, at 25, 26 (observing that while the

people of Utah have a strong anti-immigrant sentiment, they still rally around an
identity originating from the nineteenth century, when the success of the state was
highly dependent on the labor of Irish and Chinese immigrants).
7. See infra Part II (comparing Brazil, India, China, Japan and Germany’s economies
and populations to that of the United States).
8. See infra Part II (proposing that because of the decline in the rate of native-born
U.S. citizens, the U.S. will struggle to keep up with emerging economies).
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of an economic depression.9
Upon entering office, President Obama assembled an all-star lineup of
economists to tackle the floundering economy.10 These economists looked
to the unprecedented interventionist policies of the U.S. government during
the Great Depression.11 After all, it was the implosion of the American
economy in the 1930’s that gave license to the Roosevelt Administration to
beat back the predatory and rapacious form of capitalism that had come to
dominate the market.12 The Roosevelt Administration, and many members of
Congress understood that the country had veered away from a free market
balance in which capital and labor were rationally and prudently deployed
in the best interest of the nation.13
Both the Great Depression and the Great Recession were preceded by
an accumulation of wealth in the hands of ever fewer individuals.14 On
both occasions, the drive for immediate, short-term profits created an
overheated financial services sector whose meltdown resulted in large-scale
destruction of American economic productivity.15 A fundamental law
of economics is that profits cannot increase indefinitely.16 Specifically,
an economy focused on short-term profits generated by the financial
9. See, e.g., The Great Stabilization: The Recession Was Less Calamitous Than
Many Feared. Its Aftermath Will Be More Dangerous Than Many Expect, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 19, 2009, at 15 (stipulating that without the drastic economic intervention of the
government, the recession would have turned into a depression).
10. See Off to Work They Go: Barack Obama Has Stacked His Cabinet with Clever
Economists, but Can They Work Together? And What Will They Do?, ECONOMIST, Nov.
29, 2008, at 31 (crediting Obama’s economic team members—Larry Summers, Peter
Orszag, Christina Romer, and Paul Volcker—as some of the best economists, with
extensive and impressive economic experience).
11. See How New a Deal?: Comparisons Between Barack Obama and FDR Are
Misguided, ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 2008, at 46 (indicating that Obama’s closest advisors
consider the government intervention led by Roosevelt during the Great Depression an
important area to study possible remedies to the recent recession).
12. See Michael Hirsh & Daniel Gross, The Wisdom of Crowds: When Populist Rage
Leads to Smart Policy, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8, 2010, at 26, 28–29 (explaining that during
the Great Depression, an enraged general public focused on capitalist institutions—
such as Wall Street and banks—and Roosevelt was able to heavily regulate those
institutions because intervention was required to quell the public outrage).
13. See Irving Howe, When America Entered the 20th Century, N.Y. TIMES, Sep.
28, 1986, at 3, 46 (emphasizing that the strong rhetoric Roosevelt used to attack the
high concentration of wealth and power also allowed him to persuade Congress to
shift from a capitalist focus to a humanitarian one).
14. See ROBERT B. REICH, AFTERSHOCK: THE NEXT ECONOMY AND AMERICA’S
FUTURE 22–27 (2010) (noting that “[t]he share of total income going to the richest [one]
percent of Americans peaked in both 1928 and in 2007, at over [twenty-three percent]. The
same pattern held for the richest one-tenth of one percent . . . . And . . . for the richest [ten]
percent . . . .”).
15. See id. at 25–26 (identifying in both eras a working class engaged in
performing services that, once credit ran out, reduced spending—ultimately forcing
business to reduce spending through mass layoffs).
16. See id. at 23 (“[I]t is an iron law of economics, as well as physics, that
expanding bubbles eventually burst.”).
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services sector—at the expense of a production-based economy—is
predisposed to predatory investment schemes that destabilize the workforce.
In both economic downturns, the full weight of the economic destruction
came crashing down upon the American middle class.17 The recent financial
downturn has left the U.S. economy struggling with high unemployment,
rising poverty, and lost opportunity for individual advancement.18
Meanwhile, at the same time, the productive capacity of emerging economies,
like Brazil, India, and China, is expanding.19 These emerging market countries
have young, large populations;20 China and India, for example, have
populations of about 1.2 billion, and Brazil is home to nearly 200 million
people.21 Meanwhile, the populations of Japan and Germany,
the developed world’s first and second largest economies
after
to
the
United
States,
are
aging
and
shrinking.22
Despite the declining birth rates of native-born U.S. citizens, the
population of the United States continues to grow because of

17. See John Wheeler, The Great Recession Has Hit the Middle Class the Hardest,
BIZNETCENTRAL (Dec. 28, 2010), http://biznetcentral.com/2010/12/28/the-greatrecession-has-hit-the-middle-class-the-hardest (explaining that the middle class has
been hit the hardest by the current recession, in large part as a result of drastic declines
in home equity); cf. Reich, supra note at 14, at 23 (observing that a broad swath of
Americans suffered during the Great Depression).
18. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 194 (2011),
available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat1.pdf (reporting a rise in unemployment
from 5.8% in 2008 to 9.6% in 2010); Erik Eckholm, Recession Raises
Poverty Rate to 15-Year High, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/17/us/17poverty.html (reporting the percentage of
Americans living in poverty in 2009 at 14.3 percent—the highest since 1994).
19. Cf. Nipping at Their Heels: Firms from the Developing World are Rapidly
Catching Up with Their Old-World Competitors, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2011, at 80,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/17957117?story_id=17957117 (tracking
the resilience of businesses in Brazil, Russia, India, and China following the financial crisis
as compared with the more sluggish multinationals from developed nations ).
20. See, e.g., Jeff Schlegel, Rebuilding with BRICS: The Big Four of
Emerging Markets are Back in Favor, FIN. ADVISOR MAG., July 2009, available at
http://www.fa-mag.com/component/content/article/4269.html?issue=110&magazineID=1
&Itemid=73 (attributing much of India and China’s growth to their young population and
growing middle classes).
21. Shamim Adam et al., Evergreen Rises on Lure of $100 Billion
China-India Trade: Freight Markets, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 07, 2011, 11:00 AM)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-07/fedex-maersk-add-shipping-routesfor-china-india-prize-freight-markets.html;
Brazil,
CIA
WORLD
FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html (last visited
Mar. 1, 2011).
22. See WARREN SANDERSON, CTR. FOR INTERGENERATIONAL STUDIES, LOW
FERTILITY AND POPULATION AGING IN GERMANY AND JAPAN: PROSPECTS AND POLICIES
5 (May 2, 2008), available at http://cis.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/Japanese/pdf/shoushika/
SandersonWorkshop.pdf.
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immigration.23 For the U.S. to remain economically preeminent, its
population must remain one of the largest in the world.24 Equally important
is a balanced demographic ratio between young and old. Population growth
is crucial to America’s long-term economic security.25
In 1930, the U.S. population was 122,775,046,26 with about forty
percent of the population under twenty years of age,27 and immigrants
compring just over eleven percent of the total population.28 Today, the U.S.
population stands at 308,700,00029 with less than twenty-eight percent
under the age of twenty.30 Immigrants, however, still comprise merely
twelve percent of the U.S. population.31 Population growth is projected to

23. See Sharon Jayson, CDC: Birthrates Decline Overall, USA TODAY, Dec. 21,
2010, available at http://www.usatoday.com/yourlife/parenting-family/babies/201012-22-birthdata22_ST_N.htm (reporting that birthrate levels are at record lows in the
United States); Mark W. Nowak, Immigration and U.S. Population
Growth: An Environmental Perspective, NEGATIVE POPULATION GROWTH,
http://www.npg.org/specialreports/imm&uspopgrowth.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2011)
(“[Sixty percent] of the population increase in the United States between 1994 and
2050 will be attributable to immigration and the descendants of immigrants.”).
24. See Population: Growth Is Good, ECONOMIST: FREE EXCH. (Dec. 23, 2010,
2:11 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/12/population (arguing
that slow population growth may lead to greater government debt).
25. See Adam Ozimek, A Strange Model of the Economy, MODELED BEHAVIOR
(Dec. 22, 2010), http://modeledbehavior.com/2010/12/22/a-strange-model-of-theeconomy/ (observing that an aging population requires governmental support and that
it becomes a greater burden without a significant working population to generate that
financial support).
26. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1930, at 9
tbl. 2 (1933).
27. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1931, at 5 (1931) (recording that in 1930 about nine percent of the population was
younger than five years of age, twenty percent was between five and fourteen years of
age, and more than nine percent was between the ages of fifteen and nineteen).
28. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2000, § 1, at 8 (2001) [hereinafter PROFILE OF FOREIGN-BORN
POPULATION] (recounting immigration data from the 1930 census, in regards to
immigration, for purposes of comparison to immigration data from the 2000 census).
29. Haya El Nasser, et al., 2010 Census: Slowest Growth Since Great Depression,
USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 2011, available at http://content.usatoday.net/dist/custom/gci/
InsidePage.aspx?cId=tallahassee&sParam=41887628.story.
30. United
States—Age
and
Sex,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-qr_
name=ACS_2009_1YR_G00_S0101&-ds_name=ACS_2009_1YR_G00_&-_lang=en&redoLog=false&-state=st&-CONTEXT=st (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Age
and Sex Statistics].
31. Jeanne Batalova & Aaron Terrazas, Frequently Requested Information on
Immigrants and Immigration in the United States, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE, (Dec.
2010), http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=818 (reporting
immigrants to comprise 12.5 percent of total U.S. population).
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continue, reaching 439 million by 205032 with eighty-two percent of this
growth coming from immigration.33 While the percentage of foreign-born
residents of the United States is no greater today than it was nearly eighty
years ago,34 the national percentage of younger individuals has declined
significantly.35 This portends substantial economic challenges for the
economy as the country grows ever older.
Currently, roughly thirty-three percent of immigration into the United States
comes from Asia and Europe, with less than fifty-seven percent arriving from
Mexico and Latin America.36 Nearly sixty-six percent of immigrants in the
United States are either naturalized citizens or legal, permanent residents, while
undocumented immigrants account for thirty percent.37 The employment
rate for male, undocumented workers is ninety-six percent—substantially
higher than that of their legal, immigrant counterparts.38 Not surprisingly,
undocumented workers earn considerably less than U.S. citizens.39
It is against the backdrop of the Great Recession, with competitive pressures
from emerging markets, and an anti-immigrant climate, that the rights of
the American laborer must be defended. In hindsight, it is clear that the
challenges presented by the Great Depression necessitated the enactment
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) as a means to protect the health
32. See Press Release, Robert Bernstein & Tom Edwards, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
An Older and More Diverse Nation by Midcentury (Aug. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.uscentralonline.net/uploadedfiles/An%20Older%20and%20More%20
Diverse%20Nation%20by%20Midcentury-US%20Census%20Bureau%20article%20v2.
pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (predicting that the United States will be both older and
more ethnically diverse by 2050).
33. Adriana Garcia, Whites to Become Minority in U.S. by 2050, REUTERS, Feb. 12,
2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/12/us-usa-populationimmigration-idUSN1110177520080212. Forecasts also indicate that by 2050, nonHispanic whites will no longer constitute a majority of the U.S. population. Id.
34. See PROFILE OF FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION, supra note 28, at 8 (providing
that according to the 2000 U.S. Census, the percentage of foreign-born individuals
living in the U.S. was the highest since 1930).
35. Compare Age and Sex Statistics, supra note 30, with BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1931, supra note 27, at 5 (providing
that in 2009, only twenty-seven percent of the population was under twenty years old,
as compared to thirty-eight percent in 1930).
36. ROBERT SHAPIRO & JIWON VELLUCCI, NEW POLICY INSTITUTE, THE IMPACT OF
IMMIGRATION REFORM ON THE WAGES OF AMERICAN WORKERS 1 (2010), available at
http://ndn.org/paper/2010/impact-immigration-and-immigration-reform-wages-americanworkers.
37. Id. (providing that while just one-third of all workers earns less than twice the
minimum wage, two-thirds of undocumented workers earn that amount).
38. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, ET. AL., URBAN INST., UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS:
FACTS AND FIGURES 1 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=1000587
(noting that on average, the higher participation in the work force of immigrant
workers is due to the younger average age of undocumented men and a reduced
likelihood of undocumented workers opting out of work force participation due to
disability, retirement, or schooling).
39. Id.
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and welfare of the U.S. workforce.40 Likewise, the pressures created by the
current economic crisis necessitate legislation to protect the U.S. immigrant
workforce.
III. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
A. The FLSA and Undocumented Immigrants
The FLSA is the preeminent civil rights legislation protecting workers’
pay. The objective of the FLSA is the elimination of “labor conditions
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard[s] of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers . . . . ”41
So, what does the FLSA have to do with immigration reform? In short, the
answer is quite a lot.
It is often said that immigrants perform jobs that Americans will not.
Without questioning the validity of this assertion, the United States has
not shut its doors to immigration because native-born Americans refuse to
perform certain jobs. The door to immigration has been open
since Colonial America because the U.S. economy relies on the
manpower of immigrant laborers to remain competitive.
While immigrants fill all types of jobs in the United States,
undocumented immigrants typically perform intensive manual labor in
industries like construction, agriculture, and food service.42 Without the
manpower resources of the undocumented immigrants who reside in the
United States, many if not all, American business enterprises would suffer
substantial and adverse economic consequences.
While most employers comply with the FLSA, many take advantage of
the undocumented status of immigrant laborers. One Government
Accounting Office study found that non-profit and government agencies
across the country reported that “day laborers complained at least once a
week about nonpayment of wages.”43 The failure to compensate
undocumented immigrants in accordance with the federal and state wage

40. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201–219 (2006 & Supp. IV
2010) (providing that private sector employers shall provide employees, among other
protections, a baseline minimum wage and overtime).
41. See id. at § 202(a) (providing that the absence of minimum standards for
workers obstructs the national economy and “constitutes an unfair method of
competition in commerce”).
42. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, A PORTRAIT
OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES fig. 5 (2009), available at
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1190/portrait-unauthorized-immigrants-states.
43. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-925, WORKER
PROTECTION: LABOR’S EFFORTS TO ENFORCE PROTECTIONS FOR DAY LABORERS COULD
BENEFIT FROM BETTER DATA AND GUIDANCE 14–15 (2002) (reporting that over half of
day laborers do not receive the wages that are due to them under state and federal law).
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and hour laws is widespread and frequent, extending well beyond day
laborers.44
Nowadays, just as during the Great Depression, workers are forced to suffer
the twin evils of overwork and underpay. It was amidst the unprecedented
economic challenges of the Great Depression that Congress enacted the
FLSA “to protect ‘the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full
measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others.’”45
In enacting the FLSA, Congress intended to eliminate substandard
working conditions by establishing a minimum wage and requiring
employers to pay an overtime premium of one and one half times an
employee’s regular hourly rate for work exceeding forty hours per week.46
President Franklin D. Roosevelt heralded the FLSA as “the most farreaching, far-sighted program for the benefit of workers ever adopted here
or in any other country.”47
By design, the FLSA’s purpose is “remedial and humanitarian.”48 To
effectuate its goals, the FLSA requires courts to interpret its application
broadly.49 For instance, the FLSA “defines the verb ‘employ’ expansively
to mean to ‘suffer or permit to work.’”50 This definition of employ is “the
broadest definition that has ever been included in any legislation.”51
Moreover, the Supreme Court has directed courts to expansively construe
the term “employee;” which, under the FLSA, is defined as “any individual

44. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS:
VIOLATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 5 (2009) (finding
that foreign-born workers are victims of the highest incidence of FLSA violations
compared to even native-born minority groups within the United States).
45. Benshoff v. City of Va. Beach, 180 F.3d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Tenn.
Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944)).
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (declaring that the policy considerations contained in the
FLSA including the maintenance of worker well-being required Congressional
regulation of industry); § 206 (requiring employers to pay minimum wages to
employees covered under the FLSA); § 207(a)(1) (stipulating overtime compensation if
a worker’s workweek is longer than forty hours).
47. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Party Primaries (Jun. 24, 1938),
reprinted in 1938 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT:
THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE FOR LIBERALISM 391, 392 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed.,
1941).
48. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597
(1944), superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat.
84 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 254 (2006)).
49. Id.
50. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(g)).
51. United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 n.3 (1945) (observing the
broad reach of the term “employee” that Congress intended under FLSA is based, in
part, on Senator Black’s statements on the Senate floor during the congressional debate
of the FLSA (citing 81 CONG. REC. 7657 (1937) (statement of Sen. Hugo Black))).
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employed by an employer.”52
There is no enabling language contained in the FLSA that extends its
provisions to undocumented immigrants.53 However, FLSA coverage
has been extended to undocumented immigrants by the courts as consistent
with congressional intent and U.S. immigration policy.54 If the protections
of the FLSA were not afforded to undocumented immigrants, a perverse
economic incentive for employers to seek out and hire undocumented
immigrants at rates lower than the minimum wage would emerge. Such a
policy would stimulate an inflow of undocumented immigrants and put
downward pressure on the wages earned by all Americans. The end
result would be the denigration of the health and welfare of the entire
American workforce. Thus, enforcing the wage and hour laws on behalf of
undocumented immigrants—a substantial portion of the American
workforce—is sound economic policy.
It is no accident that courts have interpreted the FLSA’s definition of
employee to extend “to citizens and aliens alike [irrespective of] whether
such aliens are documented or undocumented . . . .”55. Some courts have
gone so far as to hold employers liable for retaliation if they report an
undocumented laborer to immigration authorities for asserting their rights
under the FLSA.56
Despite the right of undocumented immigrants to avail themselves of the
FLSA, studies show that undocumented immigrants are reluctant to report a
variety of labor and employment law violations because they feel insecure
about their immigration status.57 As one court explained:

52. 29 U.S.C.§ 203(e)(1). See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728
(1947) (confirming that the FLSA’s definition of “employ” is broad and reiterating that
this breadth is conferred to the determination of who is an “employee” for purposes of
the Act).
53. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 202–218(c) (providing no jurisdictional bar (or
grant) based on an employee’s immigration status).
54. See, e.g., Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding
that extension of FLSA coverage to undocumented workers actually furthers the goals
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 because without FLSA coverage
for undocumented immigrants, employers would be incentivized to hire undocumented
workers in an effort to skirt federal wage and hour regulations).
55. In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987). See Patel v. Quality
Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1988) (“FLSA’s coverage of undocumented aliens
is fully consistent with the [Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986] and the
policies behind it.”).
56. See, e.g., Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokerage Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d
1053, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (denying the defendant employer’s motion to dismiss an
undocumented immigrant’s claim, alleging retaliation for filing a claimed violation of
the FLSA against her employer).
57. See Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 667, 676–79 (2003) (reporting the statistics of a survey that found that about
thirty percent of workers did not inform Occupational Safety and Health
Administration about their employer’s violations because they feared deportation).
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Many of these workers are willing to work for substandard wages in our
economy’s most undesirable jobs. While documented workers face the
possibility of retaliatory discharge for an assertion of their labor and
civil rights, undocumented workers confront the harsher reality that, in
addition to possible discharge, their employer will likely report them to
the [immigration enforcement authorities] and they will be subjected to
deportation proceedings or criminal prosecution . . . . As a result, most
undocumented workers are reluctant to report abusive or
discriminatory employment practices.58
Knowing that undocumented immigrants are vulnerable, unscrupulous
employers willfully ignore immigration status during hiring and save
money assembling a workforce that is unlikely to report violations of
employee rights.59 While these employers choose to circumvent
the immigration laws at the time of hiring, they callously threaten their
undocumented workers with the same laws if they complain.60
These unscrupulous employers are not only “gaming the system,” but
they are also undermining U.S. labor and immigration policy objectives. To
balance the leverage that employers have over undocumented immigrants,
it is essential that FLSA enforcement take priority over immigration
enforcement. By excluding a worker’s immigration status from the FLSA
enforcement calculus, undocumented workers are less likely to forgo
reporting wage and hour law violations or shy away from joining FLSA
litigation.61
Experience shows that when an employer fails to properly pay wages to
one employee, the employer is likely to operate under a common scheme,
practice, or policy of paying all similarly situated employees less than their
due wages. At the heart of the FLSA’s remedial attributes is the permissive
joinder device of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), which prescribes the issuance of
notice to a collective class of similarly situated employees for the joint

58. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal
citations omitted) (“The aliens themselves are vulnerable to exploitation because they
cannot complain of substandard working conditions without risking deportation.”
(quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975))).
59. See id. at 1072.
60. See Montoya v. S.C.C.P. Painting Contractors, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750
(D. Md. 2008) (couching the need for preventing employers from collaterally
defending alleged FLSA violations on the grounds of the plaintiffs’ immigration status
as being necessary to “the effectiveness of the FLSA”); see also Rivera, 364 F.3d at
1065 (speculating that allowing an employer to inquire into a worker’s immigration
status would allow it to threaten the worker that raises a legal claim against the
employer with deportation).
61. See Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192–93
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that injury that potentially would befall an FLSA claimantworker far outweighs any need for its disclosure during the litigation of alleged FLSA
violations).
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prosecution of statutory wage violations.62 The mandate given to a plaintiff
to bring suit on his own behalf or on behalf of similarly situated employees
is perhaps the greatest remedial aspect of the FLSA, aimed at preserving the
health and welfare of laborers industry-wide for the benefit of the American
public.63
Marroquin v. Canales,64 brought by CASA de Maryland65 on behalf of a
group of undocumented day laborers, illustrates the interplay between the
needs of the economy, the treatment of undocumented day laborers, and
the remedial attributes of the FLSA. In Marroquin, the defendant employer
hired about 150 Latino immigrant men of limited education, income, and
resources as day laborers to perform debris removal work in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina.66 The day laborers were hired in Maryland and
transported by vans to Mississippi, where they were promised lodging and
ten dollars per hour for their work.67 The day laborers began work
immediately upon their arrival at dawn and were housed in tents, trailers, and
apartments.68 Between twelve and sixteen people were lodged in each trailer
with four to six people sleeping in each room.69 In the lawsuit, the laborers
claimed that defendants failed to pay them federal minimum wage and overtime
wages. They sought collective action certification of the lawsuit pursuant
to § 216(b) on their own behalf and on behalf of similarly situated
employees.70 In certifying the collective action and authorizing notice to
similarly situated plaintiffs, the court held that the “notification effort is
warranted in light of the testimony produced, the importance of adequate
notification in an ‘opt-in’ regime such as this, the nature of this population
and the defendants’ apparent failure to maintain adequate records.”71

62. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 167, n.1, 170
(1989) (demonstrating that any employee may bring an action on behalf of similarly
situated groups of employees as long as she has their written consent implying that they
have received accurate and timely notice of the proceedings under § 216(b)).
63. See Id. (stating that the FLSA aims to facilitate notice
and remedy to all those affected by the claim and to expedite the
judicial process).
64. 505 F. Supp. 2d 283 (D. Md. 2007).
65. CASA de Maryland, Inc. is the largest immigrants’ rights organization in the
state of Maryland. The organization runs five worker centers throughout the state and
offers a number of services to the community including education, vocational training,
financial literacy, social services, health access and promotion, and legal services.
History, CASA DE MARYLAND, http://www.casademaryland.org/about-mainmenu-26/
history-mainmenu-63 (last visited June 21, 2011).
66. Marroquin, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 287–88.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 288 & n.3.
69. Id. at 288, n.3.
70. Second Amended Complaint at 3, Marroquin v. Canales, 505 F. Supp. 2d 283
(D. Md. 2007) (No. CCB-05-3393), 2005 WL 4678916 at *1.
71. Marroquin v. Canales, 236 F.R.D. 257, 262 (D. Md. 2006).
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In 2005, a New York Times article drew attention to the rampant wage
and hour law violations affecting the 2.3 million people who work in the
janitorial services industry.72 The root causes of these statutory violations
were attributed to the fact that “cleaning contractors frequently hire
immigrants, often without proper papers and at low wages, trying to
squeeze out profits as they submit rock-bottom bids to win business. The
immigrant workers dare not complain about safety or minimum-wage
violations for fear of being fired—and possibly deported.”73 At that time, it
was estimated that ninety percent of the janitors in Los Angeles alone were
immigrants and, of these, half were undocumented.74
The widespread employment of undocumented immigrants in the
janitorial services industry at substandard wages resulted in liability for
these statutory violations to several well-known companies. For instance,
in 2005, Wal-Mart agreed to an $11 million settlement with the Department
of Justice after twelve Wal-Mart contractors pleaded guilty to employing
350 undocumented workers as janitors in stores across twenty-one states.75
Similarly, a Target contractor entered into a $1.9 million settlement after
the Department of Labor discovered that 775 immigrant janitors in several
states had been refused overtime pay.76 In addition, the largest supermarket
chains in California settled with 2,000 janitors—many of whom where
undocumented—for $22.4 million over allegations that many of the
affected workers received substantially less than minimum wage while
working seven nights a week.77
These examples illustrate the realities of many undocumented laborers
who work in the shadows of our society, performing the sort of backbreaking physical work that makes the lives of most Americans more
comfortable and far more affordable. When walking into our homes, our
supermarkets, or our big-box retailers, it is not at the forefront of our minds
that the foundations have been laid, the floors have been cleaned, and the
food has been processed and packaged by immigrant laborers.
In the examples cited above, employers assembled workforces that
relied extensively on undocumented immigrants. These undocumented
immigrants uncharacteristically asserted their rights under the FLSA. Yet,
for every FLSA wage claim brought, dozens more go unasserted.

72. See Steven Greenhouse, Among Janitors, Labor Violations Go with the Job,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005 at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/13/
national/13janitor.html?pagewanted=all.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (reporting that the janitors were receiving an hourly rate of just $3.50).
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The importance of the FLSA as a tool in promoting the health and
welfare of the U.S. economy cannot be overstated. If the courts and the
Department of Labor vigorously enforce the wage and hour laws on behalf
of undocumented immigrants, the ability of unscrupulous employers to
exploit U.S. immigration policy and undermine the health of the U.S.
workforce will be dramatically curtailed. Violations of wage and hour laws
result in huge costs to public coffers since the full amount of taxes due
are not paid to state and federal authorities.
To combat the rampant flouting of the FLSA, plaintiffs’ lawyers are
empowered to act as “private attorneys general” in the enforcement of
wage and hour laws and earn their fees under the FLSA’s fee shifting
provisions.78 By empowering the individual laborer to assert claims on
behalf of similarly situated employees and by awarding attorneys fees, the
FLSA’s permissive joinder provisions operate like similar provisions of
Title VII.79 By acknowledging the undeniable reality that immigration
is essential to the growth and prosperity of the U.S. economy and by
recognizing that the vast majority of undocumented immigrants are
gainfully employed, we can accept that zealous enforcement of the
FLSA in favor of undocumented immigrants is essential to the health and wellbeing of the of the U.S. economy.
B. The Role of Legal Service Organizations.
The most important public service provided by legal service
organizations like CASA de Maryland is community education.80
Considering the limited resources available to organizations that focus their
efforts on legal advocacy for immigrant workers, the task of defending

78. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006) (“Any employer who violates the provisions of
[the FLSA] shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be,
and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages . . . [including] a reasonable
attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and the costs of the action.”); cf. Rivera v.
NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a similar provision
contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows alleged discriminatees to
act as “private attorneys general” in effectuating the purpose of Title VII).
79. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“An action . . . may be maintained against any
employer . . . by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves
and other employees similarly situated.”); cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974) (“[T]he private right of action remains an essential means of
obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII . . . . In such cases, the private litigant not
only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against
discriminatory employment practices.” (alterations in original)).
80. CASA de Maryland’s legal staff provides “Know Your Rights” presentations
to groups of day laborers, domestic workers, and tenants’ associations on a range
of topics including wage and hour law, workers’ compensation, employment
discrimination, and general housing issues. Know Your Rights, CASA DE MD.,
http://www.casademaryland.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=743&
Itemid=126 (last visited Mar. 15, 2011).
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the rights of those who have been wronged by their employers cannot be
accomplished if the worker community is not empowered to advocate on
its own behalf. Therefore, enabling workers to recognize when their rights
are being infringed upon and to take the necessary steps to preserve their
ability to seek legal remedies is a critical component of a grassroots
immigrant’s rights mission.
Far too often, aggrieved workers come to CASA with stories of
employers who acknowledge their unlawful acts with impunity because of
the workers’ inability to pay for legal representation or current unlawful
immigration status.81 Despite the fact that the right to recover wages does
not depend on immigration status or legal representation, the threat of
reporting a particular worker or group of workers to law enforcement
authorities is commonplace and plays a significant role in deterring lowwage workers from reporting workplace abuse.82
At times, the physical and psychological abuse suffered by low-wage
workers extends far beyond the failure to pay appropriate wages. In one
instance, a female grocery store clerk who initially complained of wage and
hour violations later revealed that her employer had also sexually assaulted
her. The employer forced her to engage in sexual acts and threatened to have
her deported and separated from her young daughter if she refused. Due to
a lack of physical force in the assault, her complaint with the police was not
investigated and her only recourse was to seek a peace order, temporarily
restricting her assailant’s ability to contact her. This story illustrates the
harsh realities of living in a state of perpetual fear and unchecked
vulnerability. Viewed through this lens, it is easy to understand how so
many unscrupulous employers formulate “wage chiseling” business
models.83
IV. CASE STUDY: MARYLAND WAGE AND HOUR LAWS
Maryland boasts two of the strongest employment laws in the
country: the Maryland Wage and Hour Law84 and the Maryland Wage

81. See CASA OF MARYLAND, WAGE THEFT: HOW MARYLAND FAILS TO PROTECT
RIGHTS OF LOW WAGE WORKERS 5–7 (2007) [hereinafter WAGE THEFT], available
at http://www.casademaryland.org/storage/documents/wagetheft.pdf (documenting six
pervasive practices by employers that deny immigrant workers their employment and
labor rights).
82. Cf. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1064-65 (noting the reluctance of undocumented
workers to report employers, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation and substandard
working conditions).
83. See WAGE THEFT, supra note 81, at 4 (“Thus while it is incredibly difficult to
get by, let alone support a family on the minimum wage, any wage violations that
chisel away at already-low take-home pay make survival even harder.”).
84. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL., §§ 3-401–3-431 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp.
2010).
THE
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Payment and Collection Act.85 Perhaps the most impressive statutory
protection provided by these laws is the provision that allows for an award
of treble damages in cases where a defendant is found to be delinquent on
wage payments to employees.86 Maryland’s Governor, Martin O’Malley,
recently signed into law a bill clarifying the state’s definition of “wage”
as including overtime pay.87 In doing so, he expanded the reach of the
Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Act by allowing employees to sue
for unpaid overtime wages and permitting judges to award treble damages
in the absence of a genuine dispute over the payment of wages.88
Theoretically, the treble damages provision, which is more severe than
the standard double damages provision found in the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act, provides a convincing deterrent to unscrupulous employers
that seek to exploit low-income workers and rob them of their hard-earned
wages. Unfortunately, in this case, theory and practice fail to align. Lack of
enforcement mechanisms and extremely limited access to resources make
participation in the legal process and self-advocacy virtual impossible
for the low-wage worker community.
These barriers are exacerbated when immigrant workers lack sufficient
English language skills. In addition, the fact that most of these individuals
are unaware of their rights—or of the avenues of relief that may be
available to them should those rights be violated—results in millions of
workers left exposed and unprotected. Aggressive, predatory employers
take advantage of these enforcement shortcomings and turn wage theft and
exploitation into a common business practice. Low-income workers often
“attest to the devastating effects of wage theft” on their efforts to overcome
their marginalized status in society.89 These workers struggle “to cover
basic expenses for rent, food, and medical costs, and [are frequently unable
to remit wages] overseas to families who depend on that income for
survival.”90 Yet, wage theft largely remains a consequence-free practice for
employers.
Assuming that an aggrieved employee is aware of her rights to a
minimum wage and overtime and has been refused payment by her
employer, what can she do? Many low-wage immigrant workers feel as if
there is not much available to them in terms of legal redress. Although
a worker may have the right to take a claim for unpaid wages to court, the

85. LAB. & EMPL., §§ 3-501–3-509.
86. LAB. & EMPL., § 3-507.2(b).
87. 2010 Md. Laws 1158–60.
88. LAB. & EMPL., § 3-507.2(b) (providing employees the ability to recover three
times their actual damages for willful employer violations of Maryland Wage and Hour
laws).
89. WAGE THEFT, supra note 81, at 1.
90. Id.
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reality is that there is a high likelihood that the employer is judgment proof
or will not respond to a court summons. This may be because the employer
is truly destitute or, more likely, has put its assets in someone else’s name,
making collection on a judgment almost impossible.
For these immigrant workers, taking time off to prepare testimony
and later attend a court hearing can be a costly proposition as well as
discouraging if the employer, cognizant of the legal pitfalls, does not show up
to court. The chance in these cases is slim of either collecting back wages or
finding available resources to aid the immigrant worker’s collection efforts.
From the perspective of the unscrupulous employer, there are no incentives to
appear before a judge and explain why wages were withheld in the first place.
The resources available at the state level are equally inefficient. The
Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (“DLLR”) is
the state agency tasked with investigating and resolving unpaid wages and
other employment disputes in conjunction with the Attorney General’s
Office.91 In order to file a claim for wages, an employee must fill out a
form, available online in English and Spanish, and submit that form and
any supporting documentation to the state agency by mail.92 Complaints
may also be made over the phone, but Spanish-speaking complainants are
often discouraged by long, automated messages in English that they cannot
understand.93 Additionally, due to lack of funding from the State, the size
of DLLR’s investigatory staff is well below what is necessary to address
the overwhelming number of complaints received each year.94 This staffing
shortage is further complicated by the very limited number of Spanishspeaking investigators in an area where many of the victims of the most
egregious “wage chiseling” practices are only able to communicate in
Spanish.95

91. See MD. DEP’T OF LAB. LICENSING & REGULATION, THE MARYLAND GUIDE
PAYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS 5 (2010) [hereinafter MD. WAGE
& EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS], available at http://www.dllr.state.md.us/
labor/wagepay/mdguidewagepay.doc (describing the Employment Standard Service’s
investigation process and the possibility of criminal charges brought on behalf of the
employee by the Attorney General).
92. MD. DEP’T OF LAB. LICENSING & REGULATION, WAGE CLAIM FORM, available
at https://www.dllr.state.md.us/forms/essclaimform.doc (last visited Feb. 17, 2011)
[hereinafter WAGE CLAIM FORM].
93. MD. WAGE PAYMENT & EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS, supra note 91, at 5.
94. WAGE THEFT, supra note 81, at 10 (discussing staffing cuts, from a high of
twenty investigators to six or fewer in recent years, making it impossible to sufficiently
investigate the claims received).
95. See id. at 15 (asserting the need for the Employment Standards Division to
provide information on rights in various languages to accommodate the large population of
non-English speakers in the Maryland workforce).
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Once all of these hurdles are overcome by a worker seeking to collect
unpaid wages, the process of investigating a particular claim can take as
long as, or even longer than, filing a claim in district court. At times,
claimants have waited a year or longer to receive a response from state
investigators.96 Even then, many of the same collection problems persist.
When DLLR is unable to resolve a claimant’s case during the
investigative process, the case will be referred to an Assistant Attorney
General (“AAG”) for review.97 If the AAG concludes that the case has
merit and is ripe for litigation, an official claim will be filed in court.98 At
this point, months after the initiation of a claim by a worker dependent on
his earnings for basic survival, the case heads to court. However, if the
employer fails to appear and a default judgment is entered against him, the
worker is back to square one with his available resources fading fast.
V. CURRENT PROSPECTS FOR IMMIGRATION REFORM
th

The 110 and 111th Congress failed to pass substantial immigration
reform legislation. While the House passed the Development, Relief and
Education for Alien Minors (“DREAM”) Act during the lame duck session
in the 111th Congress, the Senate failed to pass it.99 The DREAM Act,
if enacted, would provide a pathway to citizenship for “a small child
smuggled in [his] mother’s arms . . . [to] the United States” who graduates
high school with no serious criminal record and either completes two years
of college or serves in the military.100 It is hard to imagine that Congress
could undertake any movement toward immigration reform if it could not
pass the DREAM Act.

96. See id. at 8–10 (attributing shortcomings in investigations to decreases in funding
for wage enforcement agencies, leading to a failure to address large amounts of worker
claims).
97. See MD. WAGE PAYMENT & EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS, supra note 91, at 5
(stating that if the Employment Standards Service of the Maryland Division of Labor
and Industry fails to resolve the dispute after an investigation is conducted and efforts
to settle the case are attempted, the agency may then pursue a court remedy); see also
MD. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 3-507(a) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010) (providing
that the Commissioner of Labor and Industry may, after finding a violation, refer the
case to the Attorney General to bring an action on behalf of the aggrieved employee).
98. See WAGE CLAIM FORM, supra note 92 (detailing the process followed to
establish an unpaid wages claim against an employer by an employee).
99. See Michael Winerip, Dream Act Advocate Turns Failure into Hope, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2011, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/
education/21winerip.html (characterizing how a young activist witnessed the success of
the bill in the House of Representatives and its demise in the Senate after it failed to
receive the sixty votes needed in December 2010).
100. Roger Simon, Congress Displeases on DREAM, POLITICO, Dec. 21, 2010,
available at http://politico.com/news/stories/1210/46633.html (characterizing the
intended beneficiary of the DREAM Act).
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The longer Congress remains deadlocked over immigration reform,
organizing efforts at the grassroots level to continue the fight for social
and political equality to empower a community of workers conditioned
to tolerate abuse and expect injustice becomes increasingly critical. Changing
that mindset of tolerance and inspiring trust and confidence in a system
that has consciously turned its back on millions of people in need of help
will not be accomplished overnight, nor will it be accomplished by a single
individual or organization. Immigrants’ rights groups and other grassroots
organizations cannot shoulder this responsibility on their own, and it would
be unwise to make such an attempt.
Legal protections for immigrant workers will continue to fall short so
long as the immigrant workers themselves do not join the national
discourse on immigration reform. Hopefully, immigrant workers
would then capture the attention and garner the support of
community leaders, judges, and Congress.
Yet, more than compassion, hope, and optimism drive the need for
immigration reform. Prejudice offers indefensible reasons for opposing
immigration reform, and the facts compel the need for reform. The facts are
that immigrants are far more likely to contribute to society than to burden
its coffers. and studies show immigrants are thirty-percent more likely to
start new businesses than native-born Americans.101 Studies also show that
immigrants have a net positive effect on the federal budget.102 Bringing
undocumented workers out from the shadows and the cash economy will
increase the state and federal tax base and the public coffers.
Moreover, in the realm of global commerce and innovation, immigration
benefits the United States by providing “legions of unofficial ambassadors,
deal-brokers, recruiters and boosters. Immigrants not only bring the best
ideas from around the world to American shores, but they are also a conduit
for spreading American ideas and ideals back to their homelands, thus
increasing their adoptive country’s soft power.”103 Without question,
immigration reform is a matter of economic necessity, and, to the extent
that both business interests and immigrant workers demand relief from
outdated immigration laws, Congress will be forced to address this intractable

101. See, e.g., SHAPIRO & VELLUCCI, supra note 36, at 1 (expanding upon the
benefits of immigrants pointing to the success of even uneducated immigrants as
entrepreneurs).
102. See, e.g., id. at 3 (distinguishing between the short and long term effects of
immigration on government budgets indicating that, while immigration produces a
small net cost in the short term, it provides a net profit over the course of an
immigrant’s lifetime).
103. The Hub Nation, supra note 4, at 32.
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problem.104 Nonetheless, with the current political climate and the recent
refusal by Congress to support passage of the DREAM Act, the much
needed overhaul of our immigration laws remains an uphill battle. In the
meantime, it is incumbent upon federal and state authorities to support the
low-wage worker community—and the public coffers—by expanding their
prosecution of “wage chiseling” employers.

104. See Green-Card Blues: A Backlash Against Foreign Workers Dims Business
Hopes for Immigration Reform, ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 2010, at 33 (speculating that
President Obama might find bipartisan support for one of his legislative proposals in
immigration reform because both Republicans and Democrats have an interest, albeit
different ones . . . in reform).
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Since its enactment in 1982, courts have consistently misinterpreted the
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”),
and the Eleventh Circuit Courts are no exception to this misconstruction.
Migrant workers are among the hardest-working and lowest-paid laborers
in America, and they do not receive adequate legal protection. Congress,
in enacting the AWPA, intended to make farmers and growers liable for
abusing and breaching the AWPA. However, the judicial system has allowed
them to create loopholes to escape liability. In order to break the cycle of
abuse placed upon migrant workers, Florida must pass new legislation to
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If new legislation is not enacted, Florida will become a slave labor state
because the lack of protection will ultimately turn back time and create an
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is five thirty in the morning in a parking lot in Immokalee, Florida,
where hundreds of laborers wait for a bus to take them to the tomato fields.
Sadly, these workers may have to leave without being paid for their time if it
rains while they are in the field.1
Even though Florida has a $62 billion agricultural industry, migrant
workers, like the ones in the tomato fields of Immokalee, earn about fortyfive cents for every thirty-two pound bucket of tomatoes they pick.2 Laborers,
including agricultural workers in Florida, earn an average of $200.00 per
week, comprising a segment of an unregulated system established to keep the
cost of food down, while keeping Americans’ plates full.
The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”)3
is the federal law designed to shield migrant farm workers from exploitative
working conditions, and to protect vulnerable migrant and seasonal
1. Bernie Sanders, The Harvest of Shame, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2008, 11:01
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/the-harvest-of-shame_b_96759.
html.
2. See Christine Evans et al., Modern Day Slavery, PALM BEACH POST (Dec. 7, 2003),
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/moderndayslavery/content/moderndayslavery/reports/
day1_main1207.html.
3. The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1801–1872 (2006), succeeded the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of
1963 (“FLCRA”), Pub. L. No. 88-582, 78 Stat. 920 (repealed 1983), which was designed
to regulate independent contractors who supplied laborers for farms across the nation. The
AWPA’s scope is broader than that of the FLCRA. See Sherylle Gordon, Note, Michigan
Housing Laws Should Apply To Migrant Farm Workers, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1849, 1857
(1995) (arguing that farm labor contractor status is no longer the sole qualification to trigger
liability under the AWPA). Gordon asserts that, “instead, the AWPA requires the following
categories of persons to adhere to certain worker protection requirements: (1) farm labor
contractors, (2) agricultural associations, (3) agricultural employers, and (4) any persons
who own or control farm worker housing.” Id.
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agricultural workers from abuse.4 In Florida, migrant workers’ rights have
not been adequately protected because Florida courts—specifically in the
Eleventh Circuit—have not effectively enforced the AWPA.5
This Article addresses the misinterpretation of the AWPA and the failure
to enforce basic worker protections. Part II lays out common defenses used
by fruit and vegetable growers to avoid liability under the AWPA, based on
whether a migrant worker is an “employee” of the grower under the statutory
definition.6 Part III touches on the AWPA’s joint employment doctrine, which
provides that workers may be considered employees of both a grower and
a crewleader—the intermediary—who recruits, transports, and supervises
migrant and seasonal workers.7 Part IV focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit
has misinterpreted the AWPA by incorrectly applying the joint employment
test and holding that a migrant worker is solely an employee of the
crewleader and not of the grower—as exemplified by the decision of Aimable
v. Long & Scott Farms.8 This section will also address the consequences
of that decision, which has left migrant workers with no recourse because
crewleaders are often judgment-proof.9 Finally, Part V suggests that the
Florida legislature should correct this problem by requiring crewleaders to
have a surety bond to ensure that migrant workers are compensated when
crewleaders violate the AWPA.10

4. See Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act § 1801 (stating
that the purpose of the AWPA is to regulate activities detrimental to migrant and seasonal
agricultural workers).
5. See, e.g., Renteria-Marin v. Ag-Mart Produce, Inc., 537 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th
Cir. 2008) (finding that the plain language construction of the terms “controls a facility”
does not include supervising crew leaders because the statute, by referring to the person
owning or controlling the facility, targeted the persons who “effectuat[ed] the maintenance
of, inter alia, plumbing, electricity, sanitation, fire safety equipment and cleanliness in
compliance with applicable federal and state standards.”).
6. See discussion infra Part II.B (stating that because the term employ within the
AWPA is based on an ambiguous definition in the FLSA, the relationship between a grower
and a migrant worker often requires a detailed analysis of caselaw).
7. See discussion infra Part III (defining agricultural association, employees and
farm labor contractors under the AWPA).
8. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B, Part V (analyzing the courts decision that even
though the grower had contracted with a farm labor contractor the farm labor contractor
was the sole employer).
9. See discussion infra Part IV.A (arguing that because the 11th Circuit misapplied
the AWPA in Aimable, in order to protect immigrant workers, it must require surety bonds
for crewleaders .
10. See id.
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THE LEGISLATURE’S ANSWER TO THE MIGRANT WORKERS’ QUANDARY
A.

Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act

In 1982, testimony before the House Committee on Education and Labor
described patterns of abuse and exploitation of farmworkers, and led to the
enactment of the AWPA.11 The AWPA was passed in 1983, and repealed the
Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963 (“FLCRA”).12 The FLCRA
provided limited protection to agricultural workers from the “low wages, long
hours and poor working conditions” that have long plagued the industry.13
The FLCRA imposed certain requirements, particularly on crewleaders rather
than on the growers that own or operate the farm.14 For example, this Act
required crewleaders to register with the Department of Labor (“DOL”) by
providing information regarding their methods of operation as contractors.15
Additionally, crewleaders had to provide proof of public liability insurance, or
proof of financial responsibility, for all vehicles used in the business.16
Similarly, the AWPA provides for wage, employment, and safety protections
for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers.17 Like the FLCRA, the AWPA
defines the DOL registration requirements for farm labor contractors and also
requires farm labor contractors and their employees to obtain a certificate of
registration from the DOL before starting any farm labor contracting activities.18
The AWPA, however, was adopted for the broad purpose of protecting
migrant and agricultural workers, and it regulates many more aspects of

11. H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 4547, at 4548
(“Evidence received by the Committee confirms that many migrant and seasonal agricultural
workers remain today, as in the past, the most abused of all workers in the United States . .
. . Congress found that the [FLCRA] was largely ignored and not adequately enforced . . .
testimony before Congress has shown that the Act of 1963 has failed to achieve its original
objectives.”).
12. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801–
1872 (2006); Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act (“FLCRA”), 7 U.S.C. § 2041,
repealed by Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-470,
§ 523, 96 Stat. 2600 (1983).
13. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 1; accord 7 U.S.C. § 2041. The Committee on
Education and Labor concluded, “as a result of direct evidence, that the Farm Labor
Contractor Registration Act, as amended, has failed to reverse the historical pattern of
abuse and exploitation of migrant and seasonal farm workers and that a completely new
approach must be advanced.” H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 3.
14. H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 2 (finding that ten years after its passage, evidence
shows that the same abuses the FLCRA addressed continued unabated).
15. 78 Stat. at 921.
16. Id.
17. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1822, 1841 (2006). Under the AWPA, a migrant
agricultural worker is “an individual who is employed in agricultural employment of a
seasonal or other temporary nature, and who is required to be absent overnight from his
permanent place of residence.” § 1802(8)(A). A seasonal agricultural worker is a person
who is “employed in agricultural employment of a seasonal or other temporary nature and
is not required to be absent overnight from his permanent place of residence.” § 1802(10)
(A).
18. § 1811.
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the employment relationship, by establishing employment standards related
to wages, transportation, disclosures, and record keeping.19 Furthermore, it
provides that if housing is furnished, it must meet specific safety and health
standards.20 Workers must be provided with written statements of earnings
and deductions.21 If transportation is provided, vehicles used must be safe and
properly insured.22 And most importantly, the AWPA provides enforcement
provisions, including a provision granting aggrieved migrant workers a private
right of action to sue for violations.23
B.

Growers’ Defenses to Avoid Liability under AWPA

A grower is responsible to a migrant worker under the AWPA only if
the grower employs the migrant worker under the statutory definition of
“employ.”24 Because the definition of “employ” is based on an unclear
definition from the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), determining whether
a grower employs a migrant worker requires a detailed analysis of case law.25
In enacting the AWPA, Congress acknowledged that agricultural-type labor
often creates distinctive employment relationships.26 The most common of
these types of relationships is a triangle between the grower, the crewleader,
and the worker.27 Congress predicted that growers would deny responsibility
for AWPA violations by categorizing crewleaders as independent contractors,
not as employees of the agricultural employer or association, and categorizing
farmworkers as employees solely of the crewleaders.28 Indeed, growers have

19. §§ 1811, 1821, 1822, 1831, 1832, 1841.
20. § 1823.
21. § 1821.
22. § 1841.
23. See § 1854.
24. § 1802(2), (5).
25. § 1802(5); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006 & Supp.
IV 2010) (defining employ as “to suffer or permit to work”).
26. H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4553
(giving examples of many types of possible employment relationships between employees,
employers, and contractors).
27. Id. at 6, 7 (explaining that this issue often arises where an “employer/association
asserts that the worker in question was not an employee but an independent contractor or
in the alternative that such worker was solely an employee of an independent contractor/
crewleader”).
28. Id.
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often been successful in using those two defenses to escape liability under
AWPA.29
When a court holds that a crewleader or worker is an independent contractor,
the crewleader is directly liable to the migrant worker, but the grower is not.30
In other words, the crewleader can be found to be the sole employer of the
farmworker.31 Yet, crewleaders typically do not have the financial resources
to pay farmworkers’ judgments in a lawsuit, frequently making it impossible
for the farmworker to recover damages against the crewleader.32 This lack of
legal recourse places an economic burden on migrant farmworkers, “who are
underpaid in the first instance and who cannot realistically recover unpaid
wages from a crewleader who is undercapitalized and nowhere to be found.”33

29. See, e.g., Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, Inc., 20 F.3d 434, 445 (11th Cir. 1994)
(finding that absent a clear showing of both the regulatory and non-regulatory factors that
the migrant workers were economically dependent on the grower, the crewleader remains
the sole employer of migrant workers), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 351 (1994); Howard v.
Malcolm, 852 F.2d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the crewleader was the sole
employer of migrant corn pickers because he hired them, arranged for their housing and
transportation, bargained for corn price with grower, and set their wages); Donovan v.
Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1120 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that migrant pickle harvesters were
not employees but independent contractors because of their ability to perform a similar task
throughout Michigan); Charles v. Burton, 857 F. Supp. 1574, 1581–82 (M.D. Ga. 1994)
(invoking the AWPA’s legislative history to show there will always be situations where a
farmer is not held to be a joint employer of a crewleader’s employees, especially where the
farmer exercised only cursory supervision, did not determine the wages, did not have the
authority to hire or fire, and could not modify the individual conditions of employment, and
was not responsible for the preparation of the payroll).
30. A crewleader is also known as farm labor contractor (“FLC”). See AWPA, 29
U.S.C. § 1802(7) (defining the term “farm labor contractor” as “any person, other than
an agricultural employer, an agricultural association, or an employee of an agricultural
employer or agricultural association, who, for any money or other valuable consideration
paid or promised to be paid, performs any farm labor contracting activity”); see also
Bertrand v. Jorden, 672 F. Supp. 1417, 1419 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (establishing that the
defendant employer “ha[d] worked as a farm labor contractor, or ‘crewleader.’”).
31. See, e.g., Aimable, 20 F.3d at 445 (conducting a multi-factor regulatory and nonregulatory analysis and concluding that the crewleader was the sole employer because the
employee was found to be economically dependent on the crewleader).
32. Telephone interview with Gregory Schell, Managing Attorney, Fla. Rural Legal
Svcs. (Sept 19, 2008) (on file with author). See Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 930
(11th Cir. 1996) (attributing agricultural workers’ inability to reverse patterns of abuse to
crewleaders’ tendency to be insolvent and transient).
33. Jeanne M. Glader, Note, A Harvest of Shame: The Imposition of Independent
Contractor Status on Migrant Farmworkers and its Ramifications for Migrant Children,
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1455, 1472 (1991) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Maldonado v.
Lucca, 629 F. Supp. 483, 489 (D.N.J. 1986)).
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THE JOINT EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE

There are three principal classes of regulated persons under the AWPA:
agricultural associations, agricultural employers, and farm labor contractors.34
Growers have limited obligations under AWPA, and are liable under the
Act only if their relationship to the agricultural workers meets the statutory
definition of “employ.”35 If the grower is not found to be a joint employer of
the migrant or the seasonal worker, she avoids liability under the AWPA.36
Under the AWPA, the term “agricultural employer” means “any person
who owns or operates a farm, ranch, processing establishment, cannery,
gin, packing shed or nursery, or who produces or conditions seed, and who
either recruits, solicits, hires, employs, furnishes, or transports any migrant or
seasonal agricultural worker.”37 The term “employ” under the AWPA has the
same meaning as under the FLSA: “to suffer or permit to work.”38 Congress’s
deliberate adoption of the broad definition of employ from the FLSA was the
“central foundation” of the AWPA and “the best means by which to insure that
the purposes of [the AWPA] would be fulfilled.”39
Despite claims by growers that crewleaders are the farmworkers’ sole
employer, and thus are solely responsible for compliance with the AWPA,
courts sometimes look beyond this label and hold growers and crewleaders
liable as joint employers of farmworkers.40 The term joint employment means

34. “The term ‘agricultural association’ means any nonprofit or cooperative
association of farmers, growers, or ranchers, incorporated or qualified under applicable
State law, which recruits, solicits, hires, employs, furnishes, or transports any migrant or
seasonal agricultural worker.” AWPA, 29 U.S.C. § 1802(1).
35. § 1802(2). Growers only have to take reasonable steps to determine that the farm
labor contractor possesses a certificate of registration. See § 1842. See also Antenor, 88
F.3d at 929 (“The grower’s liability under the FLSA and the AWPA depends on whether
they ‘employed’ the farmworkers furnished by [the independent labor contractor].”).
36. § 1802(2). See 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5) (2011) (incorporating into the AWPA
the definition of joint employment relationship contained in the FLSA); see also Antenor,
88 F.3d at 929-30 (discussing the liability of a grower if involved in joint employment
relationship).
37. § 1802(2) (emphasis added).
38. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006 & Supp. IV
2010);AWPA, 19 U.S.C. § 1802(5). See S. Rep. No. 89-1487 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002 (1982) (discussing how the 1966 amendment would extend minimum
wage protection to 390,000 agricultural workers). Congress passed the FLSA in 1938 to
correct and eliminate those “conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”
The FLSA establishes minimum wage; regulations concerning maximum hours; recordkeeping and reporting requirements; child labor provisions; and a system of civil and
criminal penalties for violations of the FLSA. Although the original version of the FLSA
excluded agricultural workers from its minimum wage protection, Congress amended the
FLSA in 1966 to extend minimum wage protection to some agricultural workers. Id. See
generally, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
39. H. Rep. No. 97-885 at 7.
40. See, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 756 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that the farmer and independent contractor jointly employed the worker in
light of the level of control the farmer exercised over the workers).
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“a condition in which a single individual stands in the relation of an employee
to two or more persons at the same time.”41 A finding of joint employment
requires a case-by-case fact-based analysis.42 “If the facts establish that two
or more alleged employers are completely disassociated with respect to the
employment of a particular employee, a joint employment situation does not
exist.”43
Whether an employment relationship exists between the agricultural
employer or association and the agricultural worker, depends on whether
the worker is economically dependent upon the agricultural employer or
association.44 This economic dependency test used by courts to determine
whether a migrant or seasonal farmworker is jointly employed does not appear
in the AWPA.45 In the legislative history of the AWPA, Congress expressly
stated that, for joint employment purposes, the factors used in case law
interpreting FLSA violation claims should be the controlling approach used
by courts interpreting AWPA violations.46 Congress specifically endorsed
several factors used by courts construing FLSA claims in determining joint
employment. These elements include but are not limited to:
(1) Whether the work was a “specialty job on the production line,”47
(2) Whether responsibility under the contracts between a labor
contractor and an employer pass from one labor contractor to another
without “material changes,”48

41. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5) (2002).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 500.20(h)(5)(iii).
45. Rather, the economic dependency doctrine is a judicially constructed device
developed by several courts in finding whether a worker is jointly employed by an
entity under FLSA claims. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722,
729 (1947) (finding that the workers were employees of the slaughterhouse since they
were economically dependent upon the factory because the workers used the factory’s
premises and equipment, because the workers had no independent business organization,
and because the workers’ contracts were not individually tailored and never materially
altered); Real, 603 F.2d at 756 (concluding that the strawberry farmer’s supervision,
control over fertilization of plants, and provision of strawberry plants rendered the
workers economically dependent upon the farmer and therefore finding an employeremployee relationship between the farmer and workers); Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835
F.2d 1529, 1538 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988) (asserting that the
migrant workers were economically dependent on the farmer’s land, agricultural expertise,
equipment and marketing and accordingly were employees for the purposes of the AWPA);
Beliz v. McLeod, 765 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1985) (determining that an employer-employee
relationship existed between the crewmembers and the agricultural producer because the
agricultural producer controlled and supervised how the work was to be performed and set
the piecework rates); Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 850 (1983).
46. H. R. Rep. No. 97-885 at 7.
47. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730; Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of
McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1973).
48. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730.

2011]

THE AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROTECTION ACT

287

(3) Whether the “premises and equipment” of the employer are used
for the work,49
(4) Whether the employees had a “business organization that could or
did shift as a unit from one worksite to another,”50
(5) Whether the work was “piecework” and not work that required
“initiative, judgment or foresight,”51
(6) Whether the employer exercised control over the employees’
work.52
In analyzing the existence of a joint employment relationship, the Supreme
Court in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb utilized the economic reality test
in the context of a FLSA claim.53 In Rutherford, the DOL sought to enjoin a
slaughterhouse and meat packing company from violating FLSA wage and
hour provisions.54 The Court looked at the economic reality of the relationship
between meat deboners, the slaughterhouse operator, and slaughterhouse
owner.55 The Court sought to determine whether workers who deboned meat
in the slaughterhouse were independent contractors or employees of either
Rutherford Food Corporation (the slaughterhouse operator) or Kaiser Packing
Company (the slaughterhouse owner).56 The Court proceeded to look at the
broader circumstances of the deboners as they related to all the activities in the
slaughterhouse, and concluded that the workers were employees of the owner,
49. Id.; accord Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at 237; Real, 603 F.2d at 754 (considering
the alleged employees’ “investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his
employment of helpers”).
50. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730.
51. See id. (noting that providing a financial incentive to encourage greater output
from the workers by lining payment to output does not result in any independent initiative
on the part of the workers, but is more similar to piecework thereby resulting in the worker
remaining economically dependent upon the deboning factory); see also Real, 603 F.2d at
754 (considering “whether the service rendered requires a special skill”); Griffin & Brand,
471 F.2d at 236 (defining piece rate as the amount paid per basket picked and stating that
the piece rate varies with the size of the particular vegetable or fruit being harvested).
52. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730; see also Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d at
237 (indicating that the farmer exercised control over the crew leaders and harvest workers
when the farmer assigned what row or patches to harvest each day and the rate at which
crew leaders should pay the harvest workers, including whether an hourly or piece rate is
appropriate).
53. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 727 (finding that because the FLSA sought to
improve labor conditions for workers, the standard it uses to define an “employee” should
also be used in AWPA cases).
54. See id. at 723 (examining whether there was a violation of the FLSA because the
factory failed to keep proper records and pay appropriate overtime).
55. See id. at 726 (following the Circuit Court of Appeals’ departure from the common
law test of determining the definition of an “employee” and looking at the “underlying
economic realities”).
56. Id. at 724, 727. Rutherford owned 51% of Kaiser stock. Because Kaiser was
operating at a loss, Rutherford advanced money for Kaiser’s operation. In 1943, Rutherford
leased the Kaiser slaughterhouse and took over its operations. This arrangement lasted
until 1944. Id.
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Kaiser, as they were performing a specialty job on the production line.57 The
Court considered Kaiser’s ownership of the plant and most of the equipment as
well as Kasier management’s close supervision of the workers’s performance.58
The job was essentially piecework because the deboners’ compensation did
not actually depend on their own initiative, judgment, or foresight, as it would
for a typical independent contractor.59 Therefore, the Court concluded that the
employer could not label the deboners independent contractors in order to
escape compliance with the FLSA.60
AWPA’s legislative history indicates that the absence of any one or more
of the six factors listed above does not preclude a finding that an agricultural
association or agricultural employer is a joint employer along with a farm labor
contractor.61 Additionally, Congress recognized that the agricultural economy
contains varied employment relationships.62 These relationships often involve
a combination of employers, contractors and employees. In the enactment of
the AWPA, Congress wanted to make clear that, under the construction of the
joint employer concept, it envisioned situations in which a single employee
may have the required employment relationship with not just one employer,
but simultaneously with an employer and an independent contractor, or with
several employers, with or without the inclusion of an independent contractor.63
The focus of each inquiry, therefore, must be each employment relationship as
it exists between the parties.64
Whether a worker is an employee does not depend on technical or
“isolated factors but rather on the circumstances of the whole activity.”65 It
depends not on the form of the relationship but on the economic reality, and
whether the employee is dependent upon that person for his livelihood.66

57. See id. at 730 (determining that assessment of the relationship between the
deboners and the slaughterhouse does not hinge on isolated factors, but rather on the
entirety of the circumstances).
58. See id. (considering the ownership of the premises and the equipment factory
a when finding an employer-employee relationship and proving that the de-boners were
dependent on the managers and were therefore employees).
59. See id. (holding that linking pay to worker output can constitute piecework which
does entail initiative or judgment by the worker).
60. See id. (reasoning that the deboners could not constitute independent contractors
since they did not work as a unit, they did piecework, and they relied on the slaughterhouse
management equipment).
61. H. R. Rep. No. 97-885 at 7.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 8.
65. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730.
66. Id. (looking at the entire work relationship including the extent of employee
organization, payment structure, and managerial oversight).
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THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MISINTERPRETATION OF THE AWPA
A.

How the Eleventh Circuit has Interpreted the AWPA

The joint employment doctrine is a judicial mechanism used by courts to
determine whether a farm labor contractor and agricultural association or
employer jointly employ a migrant or agricultural worker for purposes of
AWPA violations.67 In assessing the existence this relationship, the Eleventh
Circuit has used the economic reality test promulgated in Title 29 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) and interpreted by several judicial decisions.68
AWPA violations have also been found using the factors outlined in decisions
construing FLSA violation claims in determining the existence of joint
employment.69
Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms is the seminal case in the Eleventh Circuit
interpreting the joint employment doctrine under the AWPA.70 In Aimable,
a grower had contracted with a farm labor contractor that would provide
laborers to harvest its crops. The Eleventh Circuit had to decide whether the
grower was the joint employer of those laborers for purposes of the FLSA
and AWPA.71 The plaintiffs, 206 migrant and seasonal farm workers, were
67. Id.
68. 29 C.F.R. 500.20(h)(5)(iii). See, e.g., Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633 (9th
Cir. 1997) (assessing whether a joint employment relationship exists by examining the
“economic reality”—looking at the nature and degree of control of the workers, the degree
of supervision, the power to determine methods of payment of the workers, the right to
fire or modify employment conditions and the preparation of payroll and the payment
of wages); Howard v. Malcolm, 852 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding joint employment
because the farmer arranged the housing, transportation, the piecework rate, tax and
maintained work records); Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1536-38 (7th
Cir. 1987) (looking at the control of supervisors, profit and loss, capital investment and
degree of skill required to perform the work to assess the economic reality); Beliz v. W.H.
McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1327 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that control
of the farmer over the workers is key in assessing the economic reality and the “critically
significant” factors are how specialized the nature of the work and whether the individual is
“in business for himself”); Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 185–93 (5th Cir. 1983); Real v.
Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing employees
from independent contractors by examining the employer’s control of the workers, the
worker’s opportunity for profit or loss, the worker’s investment in the equipment or
materials, whether the service requires a special skill, the degree of permanence of the
working relationship, and whether the service rendered is an integral part of the employer’s
business).
69. See, e.g., Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that
the concept of “employ” used in the AWPA includes the joint employment principles
applicable under the FLSA); Antenor v. D&S Farms, 88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996) (viewing
the AWPA definition of “employ” as the same as the FLSA definition); Aimable v. Long &
Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 438 (11th Cir. 1994) (referring to the FLSA principles to define
concept of “joint employment” in the context of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection); accord Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21636 (N.D. Ga., March 18, 2008) (construing that both the AWPA and the FLSA define
“employer” as any entity that “suffers or permits” an individual to work).
70. See Aimable, 20 F.3d at 436 (examining the district court’s summary judgment
that the farm was not the laborers’ joint employer).
71. Id.
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alleged to have been employed by John Miller, Jr., the farm labor contractor,
to harvest crops grown by Long & Scott Farms—the owner and operator
(grower) of a vegetable farm in Florida.72 One of the grower owners, Frank
Scott, managed the day-to-day activities of the farm.73 Miller, the farm labor
contractor, had been recruiting and supplying Scott with migrant workers for
his farm for twenty-five years.74 Throughout their relationship, Scott never
used any contractor other than Miller.75 Scott would pay Miller a flat rate
for each quantity of produce picked and Miller compensated the workers on
a piece-rate basis.76 The farmworkers sued both the grower and farm labor
contractor to recover unpaid wages—alleging that the defendants were liable
as joint employers for violations of the FLSA and the AWPA for not paying
them minimum wage and keeping proper records of their pay.77
At the trial court, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida held that the farm labor contractor was the sole employer of the
farmworkers for purposes of the FLSA and the AWPA.78 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld these findings.79 The Eleventh Circuit used factors
formulated by other courts to determine whether a joint employment relation
exists under the FLSA, including:80

72. Id. at 437.
73. Frank Scott owned one-half shares in the Long & Scott farm.
74. Id. at 437.
75. Id.
76. Piece rate is a payment system where employees are paid according to how much
they produce. For example, farmworkers are paid a predetermined amount per bucket of
vegetables or fruits picked.
77. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 437
78. Id. at 436.
79. Id.
80. Congress recognized that in each case interpreting joint employment under the
FLSA, courts give a slightly different description of the five or six factors used in making
the determination of whether joint employment exist. Additionally, Congress suggested
that the factors are not exhaustive. Id. at 438. See Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand of McAllen,
Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 1973) (using a five-part test to examine the employeremployee relationship under the FLSA); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S.
722 (1947); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979)
(adopting FLSA factors to determine whether a joint relationship exists by looking at
the degree of the employer’s control, the employees’ opportunity for profit or loss, the
employees’ investment in equipment, the special skills required, the permanence of
the working relationship, and whether the service is an integral part of the employer’s
business).
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(1) The nature and degree of control of the workers;
(2) The degree of supervision, direct or indirect, of the work;
(3) The power to determine the pay rates or the methods of payment of
the workers;
(4) The right, directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or modify the
employment conditions of the workers; and
(5) Preparation of payroll and the payment of wages.81
In interpreting the five factors, the court concluded that Long & Scott were
not the joint employers of the farmworkers based on five key findings.82 First,
the court found that the farm labor contractor, not Long & Scott, controlled the
number of workers employed to work on the farm; the farm labor contractor
hired and fired specific individuals, and selected specific workers to do specific
jobs.83 Second, supervision by Long & Scott was de minimis, although Long
& Scott employees came out to the field on a regular basis and occasionally
gave Miller commands that were, in turn, relayed to the workers.84 Third, Long
& Scott had no direct or indirect power to set or increase the workers’ wages,
although plaintiffs argued that Long & Scott controlled the amount Miller
received and Miller controlled the amount the workers received and therefore,
Long & Scott controlled the amount the workers ultimately received.85 Fourth,
Long & Scott never commanded that a particular individual be hired or fired
and never decided whether the workers would be paid hourly or piece-rate
wages.86 Lastly, Miller, not Long & Scott, was responsible for calculating and
paying each farmworker his wages.87

81. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 438 (finding that none of the first three factors—the three in
dispute—supported a finding of joint employment).
82. See id. at 443-44. However, the court continued its analysis by addressing six
additional factors proposed by the plaintiff farmworkers. In its examination, the court
determined two issues: “whether the factors were relevant to this particular case; and if
so, whether the factor supported a finding of joint employment.” The court held that, in
this case, only two of the six factors were relevant. Thus, the court created its own unique
six-factor test for joint employment as follows: (1) Investment in equipment and facilities;
(2) The opportunity for profit and loss; (3) Permanency and exclusivity of employment;
(4) The degree of skill required to perform the job; (5) Ownership of property or facilities
where work occurred; and (6) Performance of a specialty job within the production line
integral to the business. Id.
83. Id. at 441 (making such a determination even though the court also recognized
that Long & Scott made all planting decisions, including which crops to plant, how much
to plant, and how to grow the crop (e.g., decisions regarding tilling, fertilization, and
irrigation)).
84. Cf. Hodgson, 471 F.2d at 238 (holding that supervision is present whether orders
are communicated directly to the laborer or indirectly through the contractor).
85. See Aimable, 20 F.3d at 442 (explaining the indirect control Long & Scott
possessed over the appellants).
86. See id. (illustrating how the fourth regulatory factor favors a finding that no joint
employment existed).
87. See id. at 442-43 (showing how the fifth regulatory factor does not support a
finding of joint employment).
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The court concluded by stating that the farmworkers were economically
dependent upon Miller, not upon Long & Scott.88 Moreover, taking the five
factors in isolation, “the result is inescapable: Miller alone was appellants’
employer; no joint employment existed.”89
B.

Why the AWPA does not Protect Migrants in Florida

The legislative history of the AWPA demonstrates that Congress intended
to have growers ensure compliance with the AWPA.90 During the debate, Rep.
Miller noted that: “Agricultural employers . . . will for the first time be sure
of their duties to migrant workers. Agricultural employees will, in turn, know
who is responsible for their protections, by fixing responsibility on those who
ultimately benefit from their labors—the agricultural employer.”91 Section
1842 of the AWPA provides that “[n]o person shall utilize the services of
any farm labor contractor . . . unless the person first takes reasonable steps to
determine that the farm labor contractor possesses a certificate of registration
which is valid and which authorizes the activity for which the contractor is
utilized.”92
Additionally, the legislative history of the AWPA states that Congress’s
purpose in enacting the AWPA was to reverse the historical pattern of abuse
and exploitation of migrant and seasonal farm workers.93 According to Gregory
Schell, a leading AWPA attorney who has represented many migrant workers in
AWPA violation cases, “the courts simply are not enforcing AWPA against the
growers.”94 He went on to say that “when Congress enacted AWPA, it meant
to regulate the crewleaders.”95 But, he further stated, “The law is doing what it
is supposed to do, protecting migrant workers from crewleaders’ violations.”96
The crewleaders, however, do not usually have very much money.97 Even
when a migrant worker wins a lawsuit against a crewleader under the AWPA,

88. See id. at 445 (holding that when the court examines all of the non-regulatory
factors in light of the five regulatory factors, each of which demonstrates that the
farmworkers were economically dependent upon Miller).
89. See id. at 443 (establishing that Aimable is still the law in the Eleventh Circuit);
accord Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636, at *29 (finding
no joint employment where the wholly-owned subsidiary hired and fired workers and the
parent company purchased and sold the produce).
90. See 29 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (2006) (“The term ‘agricultural employer’ means any
person who owns or operates a farm . . . and who either recruits, solicits, hires, employs,
furnishes, or transports any migrant or seasonal agricultural worker.”).
91. 128 CONG. REC. 26,008 (1982) (statement of Rep. Miller).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 1842 (2006).
93. H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, at
4549.
94. Telephone interview with Gregory Schell, Managing Attorney, Fla. Rural Legal
Servs. (Sept. 19, 2008) (on file with author).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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the migrant usually cannot collect the damages.98 Thus, “when a person is
riding on the back of a crewleader’s truck that is not insured, the person is just
out of luck if he is injured [because] he has to pay his own hospital bills.”99
Furthermore, Schell also stated that the crewleaders deduct social security
insurance from the workers’ paychecks, but the Internal Revenue Service will
never see a dime, as many of the workers do not have valid social security
numbers with which to collect social security payments.100 The same is true for
alleged worker’s compensation payments collected by the growers.101
In another Eleventh Circuit AWPA decision, Charles v. Burton,102 the
court had to decide whether the growers were liable for actual damages to
the farmworkers for the growers’ failure to verify the farm labor contractor’s
registration and insurance.103 In Burton, the farm labor contractor’s uninsured
truck overturned on the highway while driving the workers to the growers’
farm, killing and seriously injuring several farmworkers aboard the truck.104
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that the growers’
failure to check the farm labor contractor’s certificate of registration precluded
the workers from having access to insurance coverage.105 In reversing, the
court reasoned that if the growers had utilized a farm labor contractor with a
valid certificate of registration, there would have been insurance coverage for
the workers’ physical injuries.106 Thus, the court concluded that the growers
violated the AWPA and therefore were liable for the workers’ lost wages and
medical care.107
The district court’s ruling in Burton shows some courts’ refusal to hold
growers liable under the AWPA, even where the grower blatantly violated the
act by not checking the farm labor contractor’s certificate of registration.108
The decision had to be reversed on appeal in order to hold the grower liable.
During a phone interview, Gregory Schell explained why such decisions are
so common:

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 1999) (failing
to check worker’s certificate of registration).
102. Burton, 169 F.3d at 1322.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 1842 (2006) (requiring farm labor contractor to possess the certificate
of registration); § 1841(b) (requiring vehicles used for transporting migrants to carry
insurance or a liability bond).
104. Burton, 169 F.3d at 1326.
105. Id. at 1335 (explaining that the trial court found that checking the farm labor
contractor’s license was too far removed from the type of harm the workers suffered).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1336.
108. Id.
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[N]obody cares about these people. The fact is the majority of
these workers are undocumented which saves the company
that hires them a lot of money because the labor is cheap.
The government does not care about them either, because
they are minorities. They don’t pay taxes; they don’t pay
campaign contributions, and therefore [they], are not [a] priority
on anyone’s list. [This is why] so many bills intended to protect
them fail—the migrants are powerless.109
V.

FLORIDA SHOULD REQUIRE CONTRACTORS TO HAVE SURETY BONDS

In enacting AWPA, Congress adopted the joint employment doctrine to aid
courts in enforcing AWPA violations.110 At the same time, when a worker is
found not to be an employee of the agricultural association or the employer,
the farmworker is often left without recourse for his injuries.111 Still, enacting
stricter penalties will likely not remedy the problem of judgment-proof farm
labor contractors. Congress has already attempted this by repealing the AWPA’s
predecessor, the FLCRA, and adopting standards that are more stringent for
growers and farm labor contractors.112
The author of a Note entitled, Picking Produce and Employees: Recent
Developments in Farmworker Injustice, suggests that Congress should amend
the AWPA and create a per se rule that migrant farmworkers are employees of
agricultural businesses.113 The article reasoned that adopting a per se rule would
make it impossible for large growers to avoid liability under the AWPA.114 The
author further noted, “this per se rule should begin in the courts as a signal to
growers that judges will no longer be fooled by the veil of a mere contractual
agreement with a crewleader.”115 However, as with the joint employment
doctrine, a per se rule would still be subject to judicial construction. Notably,
inconsistent judicial construction is one of the weaknesses of the AWPA, as

109. Telephone interview with Gregory Schell, Managing Attorney, Fla. Rural Legal
Servs. (Sept. 19, 2008) (on file with author).
110. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 8 (1982).
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2006 & Supp. 2008). Overwhelmingly, migrant
and seasonal farmworkers do not have social security numbers and are not employees
of the grower. Therefore, they cannot collect worker’s compensation and unemployment
benefits when they are out of work. Many migrant farmworkers come to the United States
under the H-2A program, authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”),
which permits U.S. employers to bring temporary foreign workers into the United States to
perform seasonal agricultural work. Id.
112. H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 13. Farm labor contractors, agricultural employers,
and agricultural associations that recruit workers must provide the workers with a written
disclosure statement informing them of the wage rates, the period of employment, where
the employment will take place, and what it will involve, as well as whether housing,
transportation or other benefits are provided.
113. Jeanne E. Varner, Note, Picking Produce and Employees: Recent Developments
in Farmworker Injustice, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 433, 469-71 (1996).
114. Id. at 435.
115. Id. at 470.
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courts do not apply the factors of the joint employment doctrine uniformly, and
each court may develop its own factors where applicable.116 Thus, the per se
rule is a dilemma with no end.
A.

California and Oregon: Additional Protection for Migrant Workers

In order to remedy the problems created by the joint employment loophole,
Florida should require that crewleaders obtain a surety bond upon registering
as a farm labor contractor.117 Such regulation already exists in at least two
states—California and Oregon—both of which require that farm labor
contractors be bonded before employing migrant workers. 118
Both California and Oregon statutes provide agricultural workers added
protections in addition to the ones already offered by AWPA.119 Whenever
federal statutes confer certain rights and benefits to individuals, states can
always provide even greater benefits to their citizens.120 Typically, where a
person brings a cause of action under the federal statute, that person may sue
under the state statute as well.121 This is because state statutes often replicate
federal statutes pertaining to particular rights.122 In addition to the protections
offered by the AWPA, California and Oregon agricultural workers enjoy added
benefits.

116. See, e.g., Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 436 (11th Cir. 1994)
(affirming that the grower had no control over workers where the farmer gave the farm
labor contractor general instructions as to which crops to harvest at a particular time); see
also Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 1999) (ruling the the grower
had control where growers determined the particular fields that they wanted the workers to
cultivate, determined when workers would begin picking each field, and supplied workers
with boxes); Antenor v. D&S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 937-38 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding the the
growers did have control over workers where growers told FLC how many farmworkers to
bring each day, the growers’ foremen determined the precise moment when picking would
commence each day, and the growers were free to directly delay or stop the workers from
continuing their work).
117. A surety bond is an insurance policy that pays injured parties for losses suffered
from the bondholder’s failure to perform under a contract. 30 FLA. JUR. 2D Insurance § 27
(2011).
118. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1684(a)(3) (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. §
658.415(3) (2009).
119. 29 U.S.C.A § (1)(H) (1983). For example, AWPA does require that farm labor
contractors carry an insurance policy or liability bond. However, the grower has to verify
coverage. Insurance is not a requisite to be a licensed farm labor contractor.
120. Cf. William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (discussing the capacity for state constitutions to
help protect individual liberties in a manner separate from the role of federal law and the
United States Constitution).
121. Cf. id. at 503 (stating that the “very premise of the cases that foreclose federal
remedies constitutes a clear call to state courts to step into the breach.”).
122. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 280 (Cal. 1976) (“We pause . . . to
reaffirm the independent nature of the California Constitution and our responsibility to
separately define and protect the rights of California citizens despite conflicting decisions
of the United States Supreme Court . . . .”)
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The California Labor Code provides that a person shall not act as a farm
labor contractor until the California Labor Commissioner licenses that
person.123 The California Labor Commission must investigate an individual’s
character, competency, and responsibility before it issues or renews his license
as a farm labor contractor.124 The statute also requires that a person deposit with
the Labor Commissioner a surety bond in an amount based on the size of the
person’s annual payroll for all employees.125 For payrolls up to $500,000.00,
a $25,000.00 bond is required.126 In addition, a $50,000.00 bond is required
for payrolls of $500,000.00 to $2,000,000.00.127 For payrolls greater than
$2,000,000.00, a $75,000.00 bond is mandated.128 Furthermore, the law
requires that where a farm labor contractor is subject to a final judgment in
an amount equal to the bond requirement, he must deposit an additional bond
within sixty days.129
Additionally, farm labor contractors in California must take a written
examination to measure their knowledge of the current laws and administrative
regulations concerning farm labor contractors.130 A farm labor contractor
needs a score of at least eighty-five percent on the examination to pass and
be licensed.131 Moreover, a person may take the examination no more than
three times in a calendar year.132 The statute also mandates that a person who
wishes to become a farm labor contractor enroll and participate in at least eight
hours of relevant educational classes each year, chosen from a list of approved
classes prepared by the California Labor Commissioner.133

123. Under the California Labor Code, a farm labor contractor is any person who,
for a fee, employs workers to render personal services in connection with the production
of any farm products to, for, or under the direction of a third person, or who recruits,
solicits, supplies, or hires workers on behalf of an employer engaged in the growing or
producing of farm products, and who, for a fee, provides in connection therewith one
or more of the following services: furnishes board, lodging, or transportation for those
workers; supervises, times, checks, counts, weighs, or otherwise directs or measures their
work; or disburses wage payments to these persons. See § 1682 (2011). See § 1684(a)(6)
(“[a] person has registered as a farm labor contractor pursuant to the federal Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (29 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), when registration is
required pursuant to federal law.”).
124. § 1684(a)(1)(A).
125. § 1684 (a)(3) (2006).
126. § 1684 (a)(3)(A).
127. § 1684 (a)(3)(B).
128. § 1684 (a)(3)(C).
129. Id.
130. § 1684 (a)(5). The exam taker is assessed on his knowledge of the current laws
and regulations regarding wages, hours, and working conditions, penalties, employee
housing and transportation, collective bargaining, field sanitation, and safe work practices
related to pesticide use in agricultural employment setting.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. § 1684 (b)(2).
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Similarly, under Oregon’s Revised Statute, a person may not act as a farm
labor contractor unless first licensed by the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Labor and Industries.134 Oregon requires that farm labor contractors carry
surety bonds for the protection of its migrant workers.135 In contrast, Oregon
provides farm labor contractors the option of making a cash deposit if they are
unable to obtain the surety bond.136 While, the bond in California is based upon
the amount of one’s payroll, in Oregon it is based on the number of employees
a farm labor contractor has.137
Any person may file an application for a license to act as a farm labor
contractor at any office of the Bureau of Labor and Industries.138 However,
every person who acts as a farm labor contractor must furnish proof of insurance
for any vehicles that will be utilized to transport agricultural workers.139 In
addition, each farm labor contractor applicant has to provide and maintain
proof of financial ability to pay the wages of employees and other obligations
that may arise under this statute.140 Proof of financial ability to obtain and
carry a corporate surety bond of a company licensed to do such business in
Oregon is necessary.141 Where a farm labor contractor cannot purchase the
requisite surety bond, that person may establish a cash deposit or deposit
the cash equivalent through a savings account at a bank in the name of the
Commissioner.142
The Commissioner acts as trustee for the employees of the farm labor
contractor and others as their interests may appear. The farm labor contractor,
in turn, has to deliver proof of the account and the ability to withdraw the
funds for the Commissioner under the terms of a bond approved by the
Commissioner.143 The amount of the bond a farm labor contractor is required
to carry depends on the number of workers the contractor employs.144 For
example, a $10,000 bond is required if the contractor employs up to twenty
employees, and a $30,000 bond is required if the contractor employs over
twenty workers.145 The statute further provides that any person who suffers lost
wages or any other loss because of an agricultural association or the private
nonprofit corporation as a farm labor contractor shall have a right of action
against the surety bond or against the bank deposit.146 In addition, any person

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415(1) (2007).
OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415(8) (2007).
§ 658.415(3) (2007).
Id.
Id.
§ 658.415(2)(a) (2007).
§ 658.415(3) (2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
§ 658.415(3)(b) (2007).
§ 658.415(8) (2007).
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who knowingly uses the services of an unlicensed farm labor contractor shall
be personally, jointly, and severally liable along with the person acting as a
farm labor contractor.147
In addition, Oregon makes any person jointly and severally liable with a farm
labor contractor if that person knowingly uses the services of an unlicensed
farm labor contractor.148 Consequently, this provision seems to indicate that
even if a court finds that an agricultural association or owner is not a joint
employer of a migrant worker for AWPA violations, the owner or association
could still be liable under the this statute.149 For instance, in Burton, the growers
violated AWPA by not verifying that the farm labor contractor had a valid
certificate of registration. So long as the owner or association knowingly uses
the services of an unlicensed farm, they are liable for the workers’ claims.150
Under this approach, a court does not even need to define joint employment
in order to hold a grower liable under Oregon law for AWPA violations. The
grower would be jointly and severally liable if it fails to verify the farm labor
contractor’s certificate of registration.
Requiring farm labor contractors to take an exam holds the individuals to a
greater standard, as contractors should know the laws that can potentially affect
their status as farm labor contractors.151 The exam ensures that before someone
even applies to be a licensed farm labor contractor, that person already knows
the standard to which he must conform.152 Requiring farm labor contractors to
carry surety bonds ensures that workers are compensated for injuries suffered
from farm labor contractors’ non-compliance with AWPA and the California
Code.153
B.

Florida Should Follow Oregon’s Surety Bond Law

Often, migrant workers cannot collect on civil judgments won under AWPA.
This is because farm labor contractors usually do not have the financial
ability to pay the judgments, and the growers who have the economic ability
to pay are found not to be the employer of the migrant worker. In order to
further AWPA’s statutory purpose, the Florida legislature should enact a law
similar to Oregon’s—requiring crewleaders to carry surety bond. The statute
should require proof of surety bond before a person can become a farm
labor contractor. And in the event a grower fails to verify that the farm labor
contractor meets this requirement, the grower would be jointly and severally
liable to the migrant workers for any injuries sustained. The Oregon law

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See § 658.419.
§ 658.415(7)(a) (2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
§ 1684(a)(3)(C) (2006).
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provides more protection and flexibility than the California law. For instance,
in Oregon the farm labor contractor can have a bond or a cash deposit.154
Furthermore, Oregon makes any person jointly liable under the act for known
violations.155 Moreover, just like Oregon, Florida should make the amount of
bond based on the number of personnel a farm labor contractor employs. In
addition, Florida should establish a commission that would oversee and act as
trustee for any bonds paid and maintained. By enacting this legislation, Florida
migrant workers would finally have the much-needed protection they lack in
the event of incidents like the one in Burton.156 For example, under current
law, if a migrant worker incurs bodily injury or death while being transported
by a farm labor contractor and the contractor does not have liability insurance,
the migrant worker does not get compensation for medical expenses or lost
wages.157 Under this new recommended law, whether a farm labor contractor
is underinsured or uninsured, the surety bond would help pay for the medical
expenses and lost wages of the migrant worker.
While the AWPA states that a farm labor contractor should not transport
workers in its vehicle unless insured, contractors often break this rule.158 The
AWPA does not require that farm labor contractors first obtain insurance
in order to obtain their farm labor contractor status. The Oregon law deals
precisely with this issue, requiring a person who wants to apply to be a farm
labor contractor to first have a surety bond approved by the Commissioner of
Labor.159
This mandatory policy would aid migrants like the ones in Burton.160 In
Burton, since the farm labor contractor’s truck was uninsured and the migrants
could not get medical care or compensation for lost wages.161 Burton would
have ended differently had Florida required the crewleader to have a surety
bond, which would have compensated the migrant workers for the injuries
sustained in that crash. Additionally, the grower would be jointly and severally
liable for its failure to validate the farm labor contractor’s valid certificate of

154. § 658.415(3) (2007).
155. § 658.415(7)(a) (2007).
156. Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that farmworkers
were unable to obtain medical care and compensation for lost wages because the farm
labor contractor did not have a valid certificate of registration and therefore no insurance
coverage on the vehicle).
157. See generally Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434 (11th Cir. 1994)
(discussing the factors used to determine joint employer status, as well as related
responsibilities).
158. Burton, 169 F.3d at 1326.
159. OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415(3) (2007).
160. Burton, 169 F.3d at 1322, 1326.
161. See Burton, 169 F.3d at 1325-26. Although beyond the scope of this paper, a
number of migrant workers may be eligible for workers compensation, insurance paid for
by an employer, which provides cash benefits and medical care if an employee sustains
job-related injury or illness. On the other hand, a person has to be an employee in order to
file a worker’s compensation claim, which brings back to the table the joint employment
doctrine discussion.
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registration. The uncompensated damages suffered by the migrants were the
result of the farm labor contractor’s truck’s lack of insurance.
By mandating that crewleaders carry a surety bond, migrant and agricultural
workers will be less likely to suffer from the grave economic hardship like
that suffered by the workers in Burton. The surety bond would provide some
relief so that the migrant workers can be compensated if they win a claim
against the farm labor contractor. Moreover, this statute would eliminate the
need for the joint employment doctrine because migrant workers would have
some expectation of compensation for injuries suffered.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The AWPA provides many necessary protections for migrant workers.
However, these protections are only available if the farmworkers are found to
be employees under the statutory definition.162 When courts, like the Eleventh
Circuit in Aimable, misapply the joint employment doctrine and find that
migrant farmworkers are not employees of the growers on whose land they
work—it is as if the AWPA does not exist. If courts do not hold growers liable
for AWPA violations, the migrant workers have almost no hope of recovering
the damages to which they are entitled if their farm labor contractor does not
have the funds to pay. Courts and Congress must provide an incentive for
growers to comply with the AWPA by implementing a surety bond requirement
and finding them jointly and severally liable with the farm labor contractor
where the grower knowingly uses the services of an unlicensed, non-bonded
farm labor contractor. Growers would therefore not try to dodge the joint
employment doctrine. Aimable and Burton demonstrate that without this
type of monetary incentive, unprincipled crewleaders will continue to abuse
workers and laws while growers look the other way.163
Migrant workers have no political voice and little power to organize for
their own protection. They are part of an eager yet oppressed work force that
enables Americans to purchase a half-gallon of fresh orange juice for just $3.39
and a pound of tomatoes for only $1.29 while they earn as little as $200.00
a week. As major contributors to Florida’s $62 billion agricultural industry,
these workers should get more in return.

162. Compare Burton, 169 F.3d at 1336 (finding that appellants were employees
under weighing factors, leading to a determination that employer appellees were liable
for violating AWPA) with Aimable, 20 F.3d at 436 (finding that the weighing factors to
determine employee status of farmworkers was insufficient to determine their employer).
163. Compare Aimable, 20 F.3d at 436 (determining joint employment doctrine did
not apply because appellants could not establish sufficient economic dependency on
appellees), with Burton, 169 F.3d at 1336 (contending Burtons’ use of appellants’ services
established joint employer relationship).
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E-VERIFY:
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING
ANNOTATED TRANSCRIPT
PETER ASAAD: I’d like to welcome everyone to this informative program
entitled E-Verify and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.1 I’d like also to thank
our panelists for volunteering their time today and we would like to extend
our appreciation to American University Washington College of Law, the
Immigrants’ Rights Coalition, and the LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM
who put a lot of time and energy into organizing today’s panel.
Before we get started with our panelists, I will provide a brief history and
introduction to the topic.
For the first time ever, in 1986, Congress made it illegal for employers to
knowingly hire, recruit, or continue to employ undocumented workers through
the Immigration Reform and Control Act, otherwise known as IRCA.2 Since
1986, controlling illegal immigration by regulating who is entitled to work in
the United States has been a key component of the U.S. immigration policy.
For the first time, IRCA required all employers to examine documents to verify
their employees’ identity and citizenship or immigration status and to attest to
the verification on the paper-based I-9 form. President Reagan described the

1. In a 5-3 decision, with the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts,
the Court held that the Legal Arizona Workers Act—that provides for the suspension and/
or revocation of the business license of Arizona employers who knowingly or intentionally
employ unauthorized aliens—is not preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and
Control Act. Additionally, the Court held that Arizona’s requirement to mandate the usage
of the E-Verify system preempted federal law. 131 S. Ct. 624 (2011).
2. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359.
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I-9 provision3 as the keystone of IRCA in 1986.4
Under the paper-based I-9 scheme, the employee offers identity documents,
such as a driver’s license, and an employment eligibility document, such as
a social security card. The employer then looks at these documents, and the
employer is presumed safe if the documents reasonably appear authentic
on their face. This is the so-called good faith defense. The employer is then
in the clear unless there is evidence that the employer knowingly hired the
unauthorized worker.
In 1994, a unanimous recommendation was made by the bipartisan U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform to institute an electronic employment
verification system. Our panelist today, Representative Morrison, was on
that commission. It wasn’t until 1996 that a more mechanized system of
employment verification was introduced through the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, otherwise known as IIRIRA.5 But,
even then, the program was only authorized as a pilot program which, after one
year, became the Basic Pilot Program.
In 1997, the Basic Pilot Program allowed employers, on a voluntary basis
and only in five states, to electronically verify the work eligibility of a new
hire. Congress extended the program to all fifty states, but it continued on a
pilot and voluntary basis. Now, in 2007, the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) changed the name of the Basic Pilot Program to E-Verify, and, the
same year, the Office of Management and Budget instructed federal agencies
to utilize the E-Verify system for all new employees.
E-Verify is an Internet-based system designed as a tool for employers to
electronically verify employment eligibility. E-Verify is a complement to the
I-9 paperwork process; it doesn’t replace it. Specifically, E-Verify compares
employee information required by the I-9 form against more than 455 million
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) records, more than 122 million
Department of State passport records, and more than eighty million [DHS]
immigration records. So it’s pinging these databases to verify both identity and
employment eligibility, using the information that was put into the I-9 form
upon hire.

3. The I-9 is a paper-based form through which employees record identification
documents demonstrating employment eligibility. Employers must examine the
identification documents and keep records of compliance with the I-9 paper-based,
employment eligibility verification system. See Ariz. Contractors. Ass’n, Inc. v. Napolitano,
526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (D. Ariz. 2007).
4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.
Ct. 624 (2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/scotus10chamber1208.pdf (last visited July 28, 2011).
5. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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Expanding yet again, beginning September 8, 2009, federal contractors and
subcontractors became required to participate in E-Verify pursuant to federal
regulation.
Then in January 2008, Arizona enacted the Legal Arizona Workers Act,6
requiring all public and private employers to check the employment eligibility
of new employees through E-Verify. This Arizona law is the subject of current
litigation before the U.S. Supreme Court in a case entitled Chamber of
Commerce v. Whiting.7
Now, stepping back and looking at IRCA, Congress developed this as a
comprehensive scheme to prohibit unauthorized employment. Congress was
focusing on balancing at least three difficult problems: first, minimizing burdens
on the employer; second, minimizing discrimination against people who are
permitted to be hired—so this isn’t supposed to be a system that discriminates,
this is supposed to be a mechanism that eliminates discrimination; and third, it
is supposed to minimize the hiring of people who are not permitted to be hired.
The resulting IRCA scheme is a careful and delicate balance. It imposes
both a fine for illegal hiring and a fine for discrimination. The Legal Arizona
Workers Act provides that if an employer hires an unauthorized worker, the
employer loses its license to do business, instead of merely being fined.
As Justice Breyer noted during the U.S. Supreme Court oral argument
on June 8, 2010, that scheme amplifies the incentive to terminate those who
appear unauthorized to work because it’s actually silent as to the disincentive
to discriminate. He explains, “If you’re a businessman, every incentive under
that law is to call close questions against hiring this person.” In contrast, “[u]
nder the Federal law, every incentive is to look at it carefully [so as not to
discriminate].”8
The Legal Arizona Workers Act also requires businesses to use E-Verify,
and, if they fail to do so, they cannot receive any grants, loans, or performancebased incentives. As one of our panelists, Dr. Marc Rosenblum, explains in his
recent report on E-Verify,9 fourteen other states also require certain employees
in the state to be checked using E-Verify, including four states—Alabama,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Utah—which similar to Arizona, require all
employers to participate in E-Verify.
Mandatory use of E-Verify has been a subject of proposed federal legislation
for years. In 2005, a bill, passed in the House by a vote of 239 to 182,

6.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-212 (2011).
7.
Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010), cert. granted, 78
U.S.L.W. 3762 (U.S. Jun. 28, 2010) (No. 09-115).
8.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.
Ct. 624 (2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/scotus10chamber1208.pdf (last visited July 28, 2011).
9. MARC ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., E-VERIFY: STRENGTHS,
WEAKNESSES, AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (2011).
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sought to make employment verification a requirement for all employers.10
Both major pieces of proposed legislation on comprehensive immigration
reform in 200611 and 200712 also contained provisions to mandate electronic
employment verification by employers. In addition to the mandatory use of
E-Verify, it was also the subject of the [Secure America Through Verification
and Enforcement Act ] (“SAVE”) Act,13 a bill in the 110th Congress that almost
garnered the requisite number of signatures for a successful discharge petition
in the House of Representatives. Finally, in the new Congress, leaders in the
new Republican majority have actively voiced their interest in making E-Verify
mandatory for all employers.
It is becoming clear that the expansion or mandatory use of E-Verify is
potentially on the horizon. Our panelists today will not only help us understand
the legal battle currently before the Supreme Court in Chamber of Commerce
v. Whiting, but also help us understand the policy implications of any
expansion of the use of E-Verify. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting represents
the possibility that states and even local municipalities may have the ability
to make E-Verify mandatory for employers in their jurisdiction—creating a
patchwork of rules nationwide. Some states require E-Verify, whereas other
states may not.
Furthermore, statements by Representative Gallegly, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee’s Immigration Panel, and many other Republicans
as well as many Democrats and Obama Administration officials, represent a
willingness to make E-Verify mandatory. So we’re looking at both what’s
happening in the Supreme Court and what could happen in the states as well
as on the federal level.
First, there is the issue of effectiveness, which our panelists will speak
of, in catching unauthorized workers. Independent analyses of the E-Verify
program by the Government Accountability Office and a Maryland research
group known as Westat shows that if an unauthorized worker presents genuine
identity and employment eligibility documents that are borrowed or stolen,
E-Verify will erroneously confirm them as an authorized worker. The report
estimated, in 2009, that fifty-four percent of unauthorized workers screened
through E-Verify were erroneously approved as work authorized. That means
that E-Verify failed to do the job it is intended to do more than half the time.

10. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control of 2005, H.R.
4437, 109th Cong. (2005).
11. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006).
12. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007).
13. Secure America Through Verification and Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R. 3308,
111th Cong. (2009).

2011]

E-VERIFY: CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING

309

Now the supporters of E-Verify will say, “Well, so it’s not perfect. So what?
At least it does something. At least it catches some of them.” Well, there’s
another issue that our panelists will discuss, which is the harm it does to
lawful workers. The mandatory use of E-Verify does not mean employment
authorization inquiries are only for foreign workers. When it’s mandatory, it’s
mandatory for all workers. Obviously you can’t decide who’s the worker that
you’re going to check. It’s a check on all workers.
Thus, a federally commissioned study of E-Verify14 showed that over
ninety-six percent of workers queried through E-Verify were approved as
authorized workers. However, while E-Verify’s accuracy rates have increased,
the [DHS] and Social Security Administration databases, upon which E-Verify
relies, contain errors. So how do those errors affect U.S. workers? Well,
for example, workers who naturalize through marriage or have multiple or
hyphenated surnames may receive erroneous results from E-Verify. When
problems are found, employers are required, to notify workers of a tentative
nonconfirmation, known as a “TNC,” and give the employee an opportunity to
contest the initial finding.
The Westat report finds that 0.8 percent of authorized workers were shown
to be unauthorized. So authorized workers were shown to be unauthorized.
Another report by Los Angeles County15 showed that error rate to be as high as
2.7 percent. But let’s say that if it’s made mandatory, even if the error rate were
only one percent, that would be one percent of 163 million, if we’re looking at
163 million workers in the United States. Well, 1.6 million authorized workers
would be unable to work until they could verify their work authorization status.
More troubling is the incentive to terminate that Justice Breyer mentioned,
under the Arizona Legal Workers Act. A survey of immigrant workers in
Arizona found that 33.5 percent of those found tentatively unconfirmed
initially through the system, had been unlawfully fired. They weren’t given
the chance to correct their tentative nonconfirmation; to fix the database; to
say, “I’ve changed my name since I was married.” And as a result, if we look
at whether it’s made mandatory with an error rate of one percent of authorized
workers shown to be unauthorized and if a third are terminated without being
notified of the tentative nonconfirmation to contest and seek corrections to
those databases, we’re looking at over 536,000 work authorized people per
year who will lose their jobs. You can extrapolate that there will be that type of
discrimination that authorized workers will lose their jobs.

14. WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE E-VERIFY® PROGRAM EVALUATION (2009), http://
www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/E-Verify/Final%20E-Verify%20 Report%2012-16-09_2.
pdf (last visited August 18, 2011).
15. COAL. FOR HUMANE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS OF LOS ANGELES, ANALYSIS: E-VERIFY
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY (2009), http://www.chirla.org/sites/default/files/E-Verify.pdf.
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Third, there’s a financial cost which I will let our guests speak on—for
example, Bloomberg News Service said that making E-Verify mandatory
would cost $2.7 billion a year and would also burden businesses.16 There’s the
issue of prescreening—using E-Verify before someone is even employed—
which raises issues as well, which our guests will speak of. Some businesses
lack the resources to even use E-Verify.
Then, there’s the elephant in the room. I-9 is a compliance mechanism.
E-Verify is also a compliance mechanism, but somewhere along the way, it
became confused with a deportation strategy. Calls for mandatory E-Verify
tend to portray the program as the solution to our illegal immigration problem
and a way to generate jobs for unemployed Americans. The elephant in the
room is that significant portions of the U.S. economy depend on documented,
immigrant, foreign labor. Not only that, but looking at E-Verify as becoming
mandatory, individuals are focused on it as the solution to the immigration
problem without looking at comprehensive immigration reform and
understanding the needs of our employers.
CONGRESSMAN MORRISON: First of all, thank you all for coming.
It’s a pleasure to have a chance to talk to people who may get to resolve this
problem in their professional careers. I’ve been working on it for twenty-five
years and we’re not there yet, so we probably have plenty to do in this field—if
you’re interested in it.
I’d like to suggest that it’s very important to put this discussion in a context,
and the context is, how does the United States operate a successful legal
immigration regime that has credibility with the American people? I think I’m
the only person on this panel who has ever actually had to vote on legislation
generally, and legislation in this area, and so I bring to this discussion the
perspective of the people who have to be persuaded about what the right thing
to do is about these difficult questions. And I think it’s very important, if you
believe in immigration as a central part of the American story, that we need to
find a way to have that be something that has credibility and support among
Americans.
And everybody is against illegal immigration. The issue isn’t whether we
should have a system that is not conforming to law, the challenge is how to
you actually have a system that operates within legal standards and is not beset
by the problem we currently have with so many millions of people here on an
unauthorized basis.
Some people want to use this debate about E-Verify to advance the undoing
of the mistakes of the past, undoing the fact that there are eleven million people
here illegally and that somehow, there’s some technological fix that’s going
to fix that. I think that’s wrong-headed. What we can do, however, is create a
16. Jason Arvello, ‘Free’ E-Verify May Cost Small Businesses $2.6 billion: Insight,
BLOOMBERG, Jan. 28, 2011.
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legally-conforming future, and that’s really what this discussion ought to be
about—how we do that.
Now there really is no new policy being debated here. Congress, in 1986, set
a policy that still appeals to people on an intellectual level of what you have to
do if you are interested in preventing people from coming to the United States
in substantial numbers and remaining illegally, whether they entered legally or
they entered illegally. That is, most people who come here illegally initially or
who come legally and overstay either, initially have the intention of coming
here to work or, in order to stay here without legal status, have to work; so that
employment is at the center of the sustenance of any substantial population of
people who are unauthorized.
That’s what Congress decided in 1986, that if there was going to be a
legal regime—and at that point, we were debating two million, three million,
whatever number you wanted to accept—with two or three million people
present in the United States on an unauthorized basis. Obviously, measured
that way, the 1986 law was a total failure. But the idea at the center of it
was that this isn’t a border problem—you can only do a certain amount at the
border—but this is a workplace problem and, if you’re serious about it, you’ve
got to deal with the workplace.
I don’t think anything’s changed about that policy decision. What we’re
debating is how to do something at the workplace, and there are no easy and
simpleminded solutions because, if there were, even with all our political
problems as a country, we would have done them. We’ve thrown billions of
dollars at this problem and I don’t know how many trees have been sacrificed
in pursuit of the debate, but we are not much closer to a solution than we were
in 1986.
So 1986, to me, is the time when we got the policy right and the twenty-five
years in between is when we’ve gotten the implementation wrong. So, it’s in
that perspective that I think you should think about this and not get too hung
up in all the technical arguments without answering this question: how do
we solve this problem? Because, if we do not have a way to prevent people
from being employed if they’re unauthorized, then there will be millions of
unauthorized people here. It’s a simple economic fact. The border will be
breached in many ways. Many of the people who are here unauthorized came
legally and then overstayed. It isn’t a problem that’s going to be solved at the
border. It’s a problem that is either going to be solved at the workplace or not
at all.
And that really is the question that people have to struggle with; how much
burden and on whom are we willing to accept at the workplace, in order to
prevent the presence of large numbers of unauthorized workers? It is a very
simple question to state and a very hard question to resolve. And most of
what you hear in the discussion of all the technicalities of E-Verify tend,
sometimes, to obscure that fundamental question, because that’s the choice.
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The other thing I’d say, putting it in context, is there are a lot of people
in Congress who will feel themselves politically better off for voting for an
expansion of E-Verify or a mandatory E-Verify without regard to all of the
niceties that you’ll hear discussed on this panel about fixing this or fixing that.
The political momentum is in favor of enforcement. Billions on the border,
much of it wasted; billions for the workplace, much of it wasted. The politics
are pushing away from a rational solution to this problem, a careful solution
to this problem. The longer this is a debate and not a kind of problem-solving
implementation, the more likely that we’ll just get all of the downsides and
miss the upsides, as we did in 1986.
So, I have just a few other observations. First, I’d like to talk about the
workplace initiative as a prevention strategy. I think when it’s talked about
as enforcement, it gets confused about what is the objective. In my opinion,
the objective is not to use a worksite program to get rid of the eleven million
people already here. The question of what to do about the eleven million people
is really a separate policy judgment. I have my opinions on that, but that’s not
the purpose of this discussion.
If you see the worksite prevention being confused with fixing the problem
that we created over the last twenty-five years, well you’re never going to get
any agreement on preventing what might happen in the future. And I actually
think the American people are very open to some reasonable resolution of the
mistaken eleven million if they can believe that the future is not the creation
of a new eleven million. So I think it’s very important to think in prevention
terms.
If you think in prevention terms, the last thing you would ever do—which
is something that the Bush and Obama Administrations did—is to go back
and check existing employees. Because once you go back there, you’ve really
changed this from a preventing the incentive to come and get a new job into
some kind of prior enforcement regime, and that was done in the contractor
regulation. Despite the litigation, which was unsuccessful, the 1986 law forbids
the use of the current I-9 E-Verify scheme to get at existing employees, but it’s
the law now for federal contractors.
So prevention is important. Let’s think about how this becomes a
disincentive to come in the future. No system screening people at the worksite
will be perfect, number one. And any system will make it more attractive to be
employed off the books. So there’s two parts to this problem. The one part is
the compliant employer. Most employers are compliant. They obey laws that
they don’t agree with everyday. Most employers just follow the law because
that’s the way to do business. Obviously, publicly-traded corporations are at
great risk for violating the law, but most business people obey the law; they
withhold the taxes, they send the taxes in, etc. They may or may not agree
with it. So there’s a compliant community. And then there’s a noncompliant
community. We can argue about how big the two of them are, but I think the
first is much bigger than the second.
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But there is now and there will be, during any enforcement regime, any
prevention regime, an off-the-books problem. There’s an off-the-books
problem right now with American citizens, without regard to people who are
unauthorized to work. If we’re serious about this problem and some other
problems, we should have a much increased focus on enforcing labor laws
and insisting on on-the-books employment throughout our economy. We don’t
even enforce the wages and hours laws effectively right now.
So that’s a part of this, and anybody who wants any of this to work needs to
recognize this. The Joint Tax Committee said it would cost seventeen billion
dollars over ten years if you made E-Verify mandatory, and the reason for that
number they said was a number of taxpayers would go off the books. Whether
that number is right or not, it’s directionally correct; that is, you will get more
of it. Now finally, just a few things about E-Verify itself.
My colleague Paul Donnelly, who’s here, and I have been working on
this going back to the Jordan Commission. He was also a staff member
of mine when I was in Congress and [assisted with] the 1990 Act.
So we’re old and gray and rather cranky about the subject. But we found the
Westat report in plain sight on the DHS website. Nobody was talking about
it and everybody was talking about false negatives; that is, people who are
misidentified as unauthorized, which is a number that has been shrinking. But
what we found really interesting in the Westat report were false positives. The
fact that, essentially, over half the time, a person who is not authorized could
be found to be authorized because of impostor documents. And that’s like
flipping a coin.
So the whole point of this system is not to catch American citizens. The
whole point of this is to prevent employment of people who are not authorized.
So, if half the time that group is misidentified, then this system is failing. And
it won’t succeed unless, in some fashion, the identity of people is actually
verified, as opposed to numbers that they give or documents they present. I-9
is a document system. E-Verify is a number and document system. It is easy to
get impostor documents and an impostor identity and beat this system. When
the Swift Meatpacking Company was raided, they had about 6,000 employees;
1,300 of their employees, all of whom had been run through E-Verify, were
carted off as unauthorized. This is a serious problem, and hiding from this
problem won’t get us a solution.
So the impostor problem is very serious and the problems of what it takes to
verify identity are full of trade-offs between privacy and prevention. And you
can get into a long discussion about all of those, but I think, at the end of the
day, we either are going to solve those problems in some way or we’re going
to give up on it, and then we’re going to have lots of people here unauthorized,
plain and simple. Some people think if you have enough legal visas, that you’ll
solve the problem. But the fact is, illegal employment is always cheaper than
legal employment, so there’ll still be a lot of incentives in the economic system
if you don’t have any enforcement on the worksite end.
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Two final things. One, paper raids—which is the new, humane Obama plan
instead of real raids—actually is the biggest breeder of going out and getting
impostor documents you could ever imagine. People are being fired for having
inadequate documents. Where do you think they go next? To buy impostor
documents from the black market that provides them. So, this problem is being
made worse, not better, by paper raids, although they’re more humane, for
sure.
And then, finally, with respect to how we’re going to get at this problem,
I think that the scariest thing we might do is to spend billions more dollars
expanding E-Verify without solving the identity problem and the other tradeoffs that have to be met. But the Supreme Court is going to decide this question
as to whether the states can go ahead and the states are going ahead, and they
will continue to go ahead. Now, Arizona was very smart in what it did in this
piece of legislation. And no other state has actually done exactly what it did.
Arizona took the 1986 law, which has a very specific exemption to preemption
having to do with business licenses, and they took that language and made that
the centerpiece of its requirement that E-Verify and other verification be done.
Whether the Supreme Court will find that it is enough to overcome other
arguments about preemption or not, I won’t try to guess. But the reason that
the law passed muster in the Ninth Circuit was because of that very clever
drafting. And if that’s upheld, then I predict that many states in the country
will pursue that, and some people have said, “Well, losing a business license is
capital punishment, so that clearly can’t be compared to a fine.” But Congress
may have opened the door to that by the language employed in 1986, so that’s
a very interesting question to watch. But the people who drafted this were not
stupid. They knew exactly the channel they were trying to drive through.
PETER ASAAD: Now we turn to Dr. Marc Rosenblum.
DR. ROSENBLUM: Well, thank you for coming, everybody and including
me on this prestigious panel. It’s a tough act to follow and an honor to follow
Congressman Morrison. But I’ll reiterate a couple of points and maybe expand
on a couple of points. I’ll also tell you that I brought copies of my recent
E-Verify report and it’s back on the back table, so please pick that up.
Let me first, to reiterate, tell you that this program has been around since
1997. It’s really only been in use since 2005. In 2005, there were still just
5,000 employers using the system. But it’s grown exponentially, as in literally
exponentially; it’s doubled every year since 2005. And currently, there are
200,000 participating employers, which is about four percent of all employers
in the country, and about fourteen million verifications were run last year,
which is about a quarter of all hires in a typical year.
So that exponential growth means that most of what we know about
E-Verify is based on very recent experience, and we don’t still know exactly
how the system works, partly because most of this growth has occurred during
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the recent economic downturn. So, we still have a lot to learn as this program
continues to expand in terms of how it affects labor markets and hiring. And
certainly, we don’t know how it would work in the context of a different
immigration system that did a better job with matching supply and demand.
Although, certainly there’s no perfect way to do that, and you’ll always have
compliant employers and non-compliant employers.
But, I agree that it’s very important as we think about how to make E-Verify
work and how to put it in the context of the broader immigration debate,
to have in mind these two different populations of employers; the majority
of employers who intend to comply and then a subset of employers who
knowingly—or at least suspect that they’re hiring unauthorized workers. And,
there are employers now who do that in the I-9 context, and there are employers
in mandatory E-Verify states who knowingly, or more or less knowingly, hire
unauthorized workers because they feel unable to find U.S. workers or because
they prefer to hire unauthorized workers since they can pay them less for a
variety of reasons.
Designing a system that makes it easy for willingly-compliant employers
to comply accurately is a different task than designing a system to prevent
willfully-noncompliant employers from finding a way around the system. And
clever employers, with office workers who are looking for employment, have
a lot of resources to look for ways around the system. So it’s really different
tasks going after those two different problems.
I believe that E-Verify is a very powerful and important tool to build on the
I-9 process and to address what we know is the big flaw in the I-9 system, which
is that the I-9 system is a document-based system and it is very vulnerable to
document fraud. The employer has the responsibility to look and see if identity
documents on their face are genuine and prove work eligibility. Anybody can
go down to the flea market and buy a fake ID that looks genuine on its face,
so E-Verify was designed to prevent a certain type of fake ID by making sure
that the name and the number on the ID match data in DHS and Social Security
databases.
Looking at the data that DHS has made available, E-Verify probably
prevented about 166,000, unauthorized workers from obtaining employment
in 2009 by successfully non-confirming fake IDs. But there are two different
vulnerabilities. One is that while E-Verify can identify fake IDs that don’t have
a genuine name and number on them, it’s vulnerable to identity fraud when an
unauthorized worker uses a borrowed ID or a stolen ID or a fake ID that has a
real name and number on it that are available on the black market.
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The system has almost no mechanism designed to prevent this. There are a
couple of tools that USCIS17 has been experimenting with to try to cut down
on identity fraud, but for the most part, there is no defense against it right now
in E-Verify. The one defense that exists on a small scale is that for certain
types of IDs, USCIS has a photo-matching tool, which means that if you use
a green card or a passport or an employment authorization document as your
identity document and you’re using E-Verify, then the employer, in addition
to getting the confirmation that the name and number are in the database, will
also get a copy of the picture that’s on the original ID that was issued and the
employer can then match that picture to the ID that they’re presented with and
make sure that it’s not a fake ID with a real number on it and somebody else’s
picture. But only about two percent of hiring uses those documents. Most
hiring uses driver’s licenses to prove identity. So the identity fraud issue is
one vulnerability and the off-the-books employment is the other vulnerability.
With employers who intend to comply, they are vulnerable to being victims
of the identity fraud problem. And so what that means is that employers who
use E-Verify and are doing their best have no guarantee that they have a legal
workforce. And that’s a major disincentive to employers to take on the hassle
of using E-Verify because, even if you do everything right, you may not have
a legal workforce. And so employers really don’t get anything out of using
E-Verify. They don’t get a legal safe harbor and if [Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement]18 does an audit, they may lose their whole workforce. So there’s
really nothing in it for employers right now.
The off-the-books problem and the identity fraud problem is also an issue
for willfully-noncompliant employers because employers can conspire with
workers to use identity fraud in a variety of ways and they can just either
employ their workers off the books or use E-Verify selectively for some
workers and not others or just not use E-Verify even though they’re required
to do so.

17. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) is the government agency
that oversees lawful immigration to the United States. See About Us, USCIS, http://www.
uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2
af29c7755cb90 10VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=2af29c7755cb9010
VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD.
18. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) is the principal investigative
arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. See ICE Overview, ICE, http://www.
ice.gov/about/overview/.
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As it has been pointed out, [the Congressional Budget Office]19 estimates
that requiring all employers to use E-Verify without creating an opportunity to
legalize their workforce would result in seventeen billion dollars in lost taxes
over ten years as a result of existing workers being moved off the books or
workers who would be hired on the books being hired off the books instead.
There are limits to E-Verify’s ability to do its job. The other point that Peter
referred to is that the system also sometimes non-confirms legal workers, and
we estimate that happens about one percent of the time; being 0.8 and 2.0
percent of the time—depending on what survey you look at. If all employers
were required to screen all new hires, that would be about between 600,000
and 1.2 million workers a year, legal workers who would be wrongly nonconfirmed. And between 60,000 and 280,000 workers would lose their jobs or
lose some period of employment or somehow face adverse consequences from
their employer during that period.
But the other issue with those false non-confirmations is that it creates a
lot of uncertainty for employers during the hiring process. In that one to two
percent of the time, employers by law have to treat all non-confirmations as
tentative non-confirmations and keep workers on the books, treating them as
if they were legal workers until workers are given the opportunity to correct
those errors. That raises the cost of using the system for employers because
most of the time, those workers end up being non-confirmed.
Therefore, to be compliant, employers have to keep workers on their
payrolls and train them even though they end up getting non-confirmed.
So, it increases the cost of using the system pretty significantly in those
cases of non-confirmation. And even though most U.S. workers, most
legal workers, are immediately confirmed, about a quarter of the time that
people are non-confirmed, those are mistakes. So, it’s a significant number
and would be a much more significant number in a universal system.
As we think about expanding E-Verify, let me just make a couple of points.
One is that all of the problems that exist—identity fraud, identity theft, workers
having adverse consequences—all these problems will not only increase
absolutely as the system gets bigger but also proportionally, and the reason is
that, in a mostly voluntary system like we have now, most E-Verify users are
federal contractors and/or large firms.
Nationwide, about ninety percent of employers are small firms with fewer
than twenty employees; only about thirty percent of E-Verify users have fewer
than twenty employees. So, almost all of the growth that we have ahead of us is
among small firms who have less internet access [and] smaller [human resource
(“HR”)] departments. Using E-Verify and using it correctly is a much larger

19. The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) is charged with providing nonpartisan
analyses to aid in federal budget decision-making and the Congressional budget process.
See About CBO, CBO, http://www.cbo.gov/aboutcbo/.
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expense for these small firms than it is for large firms with HR departments
who still struggle to use it correctly. So it’s quite likely that existing error rates
and existing noncompliance rates will increase as a different demographic of
employers are required to use the system. That’s one point.
A second point I want to make is that the photo-matching tool that USCIS
uses and the other major innovation that USCIS has implemented in the last
few years, which is its own sort of electronic auditing of employers to look
for cases of employer misuse and to look for identity fraud, have limited
ability to address these weaknesses in the system and misuse by employers
through electronic monitoring and through existing photo-matching tools. And
basically, the reason is that most off-the-books employment and most identity
fraud don’t show up through long-distance electronic auditing. There’s no sort
of footprint in the electronic record that shows if you’re selectively screening
your workers. We don’t have that sophisticated of an electronic monitoring
tool.
It goes very much to the point that [Congressman] Morrison raised of who
is going to bear the costs of making this system work. Because, anything that
we do to prevent false confirmations, to make sure that the system does a better
job of preventing unauthorized employment, must create additional costs for
employers, and, especially, must create additional costs for legal workers. And
the likeliest tool, or one of the tools that we might think about to do that is to
create a biometric system. A biometric system would be much less vulnerable
to identity fraud, but the way we would—the steps we’d have to take to create
a biometric system—include all U.S. citizens and all legal workers would have
to give their biometrics to the government to create a biometric database that
could check against and all employers would have to capture biometrics when
they hire somebody. So, they’d have to have fingerprint-scanning technology
at the worksites or use subcontractors who are going to do that scanning, which
raises liability issues.
But, in any event, this is a major expansion beyond what E-Verify does now.
But those are the kinds of who bears the costs of fixing the system questions
that we have to raise as we think about, especially if we think about using this
as an enforcement tool rather than sort of a compliance tool.
So let me just finally mention that having raised this issue of biometrics and
the costs associated with biometrics, I also want to put in a pitch for a couple
of pilot programs that USCIS is initiating that I think should be explored as
alternatives to biometrics and as alternative strategies for strengthening this
system. And one of them is further expansion of the photo-matching tool to
include state drivers licenses. To do that likely would require congressional
action to mandate that states participate, and the debate over the Real ID Act20
has shown how difficult that is. But that would be a powerful tool to help

20.

REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005).
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employers who want to comply do so successfully. It’s not going to do anything
against the intentionally noncompliant employers but a powerful potential tool
for employers who intend to comply.
And then the other tool that I think is quite important is a self-check tool
which would allow workers to check their own E-Verify records and to
confirm themselves in the system before they go to get employment. This
is an important tool because it should—for workers who use this—greatly
reduce false non-confirmations and employer misuse of the system or the
consequences of employer misuse of the system. But it’s also potentially a
powerful anti-fraud tool because, although this is not how USCIS is piloting it
initially, in principle, it creates the opportunity for workers to lock their own
social security numbers and to prevent people from using their number without
their knowledge. So I think it’s potentially a way to substantially reduce fraud
without having to resort to biometrics, which may be desirable both from a
cost perspective and from privacy and civil liberties perspectives.
PETER ASAAD: Miss Tulli, your organization has produced several reports
highlighting many of the concerns raised in our panel discussion today. And
to prevent reiteration of that same discussion, I wanted to ask more about a
report that your organization produced, about how errors in E-Verify databases
impact U.S. citizens and lawfully-present immigrants. There are cases cited
where authorized workers, lawful permanent residents and U.S. citizens, had
difficulty clarifying denials of work authorization under E-Verify. Can you
discuss with us some of these cases you and others have seen at [the National
Immigration Law Center (“NILC”)]21 and how they were handled? Can you
walk us through the path to the resolution where they ultimately resolved?
How long did it take? What was the cost to the employers?
EMILY TULLI: As Peter mentioned, at NILC we have a policy advocacy
wing but we also provide technical assistance to worker advocates and workers
who are going through a variety of immigrant and workplace-related issues
and specifically with E-Verify.
I think it may be useful to ground our discussion today a little bit in a real
worker’s saga. So, I’m just going to talk a little bit about Jessica. She was
born and raised in Florida, and she took a job at a major telecommunications
company in Florida [during the] fall of this year. And as we think through her
story, I think it’s useful to consider—as the panelists have set up for us—if
E-Verify was to become mandatory and all workers were input into this system.
So, as we all do, she began employment there; she filled out typical I-9
paperwork, and her employer ran her through E-Verify. She wasn’t aware of
what she was being run through. They ran her through the system—that’s what
21. About Us, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., http://www.nilc.org/nilcinfo/index.
htm (last visited July 28, 2011).
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they told her. And, after a day of work, they came back to her and said, “You’re
showing up as not authorized to work. You need to go and resolve this.” And
she was confused—[she was] born and raised in Florida.
So, as a first step, she went home, and she got some more vital documents,
identity documents, and brought them back to her employer to try and resolve it.
Well, that didn’t work so the employer issued her a tentative nonconfirmation,
as they’re supposed to under the program rules, and she went to her local
Social Security office to try and resolve the issue.
Now, when she went to her local Social Security office—and remember,
she’s taking unpaid time, at this point, so she’s not working; she’s an hourly,
low-wage worker. [The Social Security Administration (“SSA”)] is open in her
area between 9:00 [a.m.] and 4:00 [p.m.], so she had to go during those hours.
And Social Security inputs her information and says, “You’re fine. We can see
here that you’re work authorized. Go back to your employer. They’ve made a
mistake.” So she’s now excited. She goes back to her employer, being told by
the SSA that she’s work authorized, which she knew, and the employer tells
her, “Nope, you’re still not coming up in our system;” again, not specifying the
system, not giving her any information.
At this point, she’s beside herself. She’s frantic. She had been unemployed
before she got this job. So she decides to start Googling and she calls legal
services organizations in Florida. After talking to an attorney at a legal services
organization, they sent her to the regional [Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”)] office. So everybody here knows that EEOC is most
likely not going to have jurisdiction over E-Verify issues in this sense. But she
very dutifully goes to the EEOC office to try and resolve the complaint and at
this point she’s been issued that [f that people are talking about. So as she’s
trying to resolve it, she couldn’t resolve it within the seven days; now she has
that final nonconfirmation, she’s been terminated.
At the EEOC, they listened very patiently and told her, “Well, you don’t
have a discrimination claim but maybe you should call E-Verify.” This is the
first time this worker who has been fired has heard the word E-Verify and
knows anything about it. It’s from the EEOC, which doesn’t have jurisdiction
over her claim.
So she went online and she called a USCIS hotline number. Again, she called
that hotline number between 9:00 [a.m.] and 5:00 [p.m.] because that’s when
they’re available and, luckily, she speaks English. At this point, the hotline
is only available in English and Spanish, so if she spoke another language
it would be difficult to get some help. She waits on the line for over an hour
and then finally talks to a representative and what do they tell her? “Well,
you’re in our system fine. You’re work authorized. Go back to your employer,
who you’ve now been terminated from, and just tell them that you’re work
authorized. We can see here that you’re work authorized.”
So she says, “OK, great. This is exciting. USCIS is telling me that they have
me in their system. This is going to be fixed. Can you send me a piece of paper
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indicating that, that I can then take to my employer?” “No, we can’t do that.”
Though USCIS does offer to call the employer. And USCIS calls her employer
and tries to work it out.
Now in this interim, it took about a week of USCIS talking to her employer;
her following up with the employer and the employer still saying, “We can’t
figure out what the problem is. We know USCIS is calling us. We understand.
We can’t figure out what the problem is.” In the interim of this period, when
she’s not hearing back, she starts job searching. And I probably didn’t do a
great job laying out the timeline but she was unemployed from the time she
received the FNC and was terminated until she found another position, not at
this employer. She was unemployed for three months. She decides that she’s
just not going to go back to the employer. Whether they can figure it out with
USCIS or not, she doesn’t want to go back because they use E-Verify and she
doesn’t want to have to go through that again. So at that point, she’s now taken
another position. The USCIS and her original employer, the telecommunications
company, have figured out what the problem was and now they’re willing to
take her on now that she’s gotten another position which, of course, is for
two dollars less an hour. I think that is a really sort of compelling narrative
and I think what’s important to underscore is that Jessica, who I’ve talked to
numerous times, is actually incredibly capable. She’s young, she’s Internet
savvy, she is culturally competent. She’s not a work-authorized immigrant
worker; she was born in this country, so she has some understanding of how
U.S. government works. She has a family who supported her. So for her, three
months without employment didn’t mean an eviction, utilities off, all those
other things that come with the reality of working in a low-wage industry; but
instead, she had a family that could support her, provide her with a space to
live.
JON FEERE: What was the error?
EMILY TULLI: The error was actually on the employer’s part. [She had]
a two-part last name and they were putting two spaces instead of one space
between the name, and that caused the non-confirmation.
JON FEERE: And that was an employer who tried to do everything right
and help the worker, and that’s the other thing that doesn’t always work right.
EMILY TULLI: Yes.
PETER ASAAD: And this is a story about a non-savvy, if you will,
employee who doesn’t understand the ins and outs of the system. But there’s
also the story of Traci Hong, who is—who’s been on the House Immigration
Subcommittee for several years. And when she was first hired, there was a
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requirement of all federal government employees to go through E-Verify. Well,
she certainly knows the ins and outs more than just about any of us, but there
was a mismatch. I’m sure Marc knows a little bit more about this. There was a
mismatch in her case and it took her quite some time and quite some difficulty
to go through that system and fix the database error.
But I just want to proceed a little bit to Mr. Feere. Your organization, the
Center for Immigration Studies,22 has produced reports showing the benefits
of E-Verify and it’s really important to understand those arguments. Would
you provide us some of those conclusions; why your organization has reached
those conclusions?
JON FEERE: Alright. Well, first off, let me just say I might be the only
panelist up here who can say that my organization uses E-Verify. I don’t
know if any of you guys do, but we do. We’re a small nonprofit and, like all
nonprofits, we’re always pinching pennies to make sure that we can maintain
our staff. And despite what some opponents of E-Verify say, it hasn’t been
some sort of financial disaster. We aren’t closing up shop because of E-Verify.
It’s very straightforward, our manager has no problem with it, and it’s working
to make sure that anyone who’s in our office is legally employable.
Couple of things I wanted to mention as far as statistics go. Right now, about
a thousand businesses sign up for it every week, some willingly, some because
they’re in a state that requires it. And from the research we can see, it means that
over one out of every four new hires actually is run through E-Verify. Ninetynine percent of eligible workers are confirmed to work instantaneously; three
to five seconds you get a response back. Fewer than one percent of eligible
workers need to update their records to be confirmed. Certainly there are still
some errors in the system. As you mentioned before, if you had changed your
last name or if the employer screwed up, then certainly it has to be corrected.
But for the most part, things are correct. We just heard the example of the
staffer; she was able to correct it.
Now we do view this as part of the solution to illegal immigration, as did the
commissions in the [19]90’s. And if we go back to 1986, when we had the first
large-scale, comprehensive amnesty bill, the bill was sold as a two-part deal;
it was legalization for those were here illegally and it was also the promise of
future enforcement of immigration laws. It also, as we heard, criminalized the
hiring of illegal immigrants.

22. About CIS, THE CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, http://www.cis.org/About (last
visited July 28, 2011).
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Well it wasn’t until a decade or so later that we finally were provided some
opportunity to determine whether or not their employees—or their potential
employees—were legally authorized to work and that was what eventually
became the E-Verify system. And what concerns us is that here we are now,
twenty-five years later—a quarter of a century out from the 1986 amnesty—
and we’re still seeing a lot of effort by those who supported the amnesty to try
and stop the growth of any type of workplace verification system.
And I think Americans are concerned about that as well. I think people, by
and large, distrust the federal government’s willingness to enforce immigration
laws and the idea—I’ve heard it mentioned kind of subtly a couple of times
here that we need another pathway to citizenship for employees who are here
legally. But what would that do? What would that solve? We already know that
if you were to legalize illegal immigrants with promises of future enforcement
or promises of some new type of verification program, it’s going to be another
twenty-five years or so before it ever gets enforced and during that time,
there will be lawsuits to try and prevent it. Some of the groups that have filed
lawsuits against using E-Verify are groups that, years ago, supposedly were in
favor of making sure there was workplace compliance.
So the idea, for us, is that mass legalization, as the Congressman said, was
a failure. We tried it in [19]86. If the goal was to reduce illegal immigration,
clearly it didn’t work. People are suggesting we try it again. It’s not going to
work without enforcement. The other option that we often hear from advocates
of mass legalization is that if we don’t do that, the only other option is mass
deportation. And of course, no one’s calling for mass deportation either.
And that’s why we think the middle ground is the policy of attrition, where
you slowly shrink the illegal immigrant population over time by sending the
message that if you come legally, we’ll help you out. In fact, there should
be a warmer welcome for those who are admitted legally. But if you are not
coming here through proper channels, we’re not going to accommodate you
as easily. You’ll not be able to find a job. And that’s really what we’re talking
about, is the jobs magnet; that’s what encourages illegal immigration. And the
way you turn off that magnet is by requiring businesses to use programs like
E-Verify. Is it 100 percent perfect? Of course not. There aren’t any government
programs that are 100 percent perfect. Is it ready for prime time? I don’t think
the government necessarily thinks it is but we’re certainly getting there. And
as was mentioned, there is the policy of adding photo IDs to E-Verify, which
would reduce the fraud rates that much more. You should know that about
ninety-eight percent of illegal immigrants use a social security number—a
fake ID with their name but a fake number. And E-Verify can catch that very
easily because they’re going to match the name and the number and realize,
“Well, there’s no match here,” or the number is not even legitimate. And that’s
ninety-eight percent of the problem; ninety-eight percent of illegal immigrants
do that. The remainder, of course, are using black market IDs which are very
expensive and very difficult to come across. And for that, the photo ID process,
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if it is attached and if there’s support for it, could certainly rule that out.
But as far as the fallout goes from not doing anything, I mean there’s a very
high cost to cheap labor that I think people tend to forget. We’re talking about
exploitation here. We’re talking about child labor; young kids being worked
many hours at a lot of these meatpacking plants, for example, that were the
focus of ICE raids that we heard about earlier. You can put an end to this if
there’s a serious commitment to workplace enforcement. And so far, I just
don’t think that there is. And I haven’t heard much in the way of solutions
rather than additional legalization programs.
Let me give you one quick example here and I’m going to close. There’s
a company that was the focus of an ICE raid in 2006. It was a meatpacking
company, Swift & Company. We found—this is well-known—that there were
1,300 illegal immigrants who were found to have been working at six different
meat processing plants. I’m not certain if all of them were E-Verify. I know
there’s some claims that they were. We do know that the business owners were
instructing the employees on how to get around the system, where to buy fake
IDs. The business wasn’t trying to uphold the law.
About twenty-three percent of Swift’s production workers were illegal
immigrants. Now government data—and this is just so troubling to me—
government data shows that the average wages of meatpackers in 2007 were
forty-five percent lower than what they were in 1980, and that’s adjusting for
inflation.23 That’s a significant problem and it’s the result of not just porous
borders but a lack of enforcement at the workplace.
Well guess what. After the raid occurred, after the illegal immigrants were
removed from the jobs, people lined up around the corners to take those jobs.
And in fact, we found—or our Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who works
for us found—that wages and bonuses rose, on average, eight percent with the
departure of illegal immigrants. I think that’s a good thing. I don’t know who
can say that it’s not a good thing.
I’ll leave it there.
PETER ASAAD: Thank you so much, Jon Feere, for that perspective as
well. Now Mr. Hampe, you’re a partner of Baker & McKenzie. You represent
clients. You’ve also worked on legislative efforts and you understand the
dynamic of how clients such as the Chamber of Commerce represents many
clients that are against E-Verify and we were talking a little bit about solutions
to the whole problem. How do you see E-Verify? Is it a solution, a solution to
what? Can you put that in your perspective as far as representing clients and
understanding legislation as well?

23. Jerry Kammer, The 2006 Swift Raids: Assessing the Impact of Immigration
Enforcement Actions at Six Facilities (Mar. 2009), http://www.cis.org/2006SwiftRaids.
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CARL HAMPE: Sure. I think the question properly focuses on the point
Bruce Morrison made at the start, which is if you’re serious about having an
immigration system with robust legal immigration numbers that the American
public can support—which there’s sort of mixed support for at the moment—
then you simply do have to address the problem of unauthorized employment.
It’s just a given. So if one is to conclude, as Congress did in 1986, that employers
are the entry point and the incentive, that U.S. employment is the incentive
for people to come here without authorization, in most instances, then what
should employers do; how much should the burden be on employers? And I
think employers have responded by saying, in most instances, they are willing
to take reasonable measures, as long as they are effective. And that’s kind of
the rub.
You will find a diversity of opinion among employers. The Chamber
has opposed the Arizona statute. I think they wouldn’t oppose it under all
circumstances. They’re certainly willing, I understand, to discuss a federal
statute that preempts a patchwork of state statutes and says “Here is the rule,”
as long as the system in place was effective. And I think when you talk about
the large companies that I counsel, that’s really the key. Employers want to
minimize risk in all aspects of what they do so they can go about doing what
they do, which is providing goods, services, and attempting to make a profit.
Immigration is a risk factor to the extent the proposals, such as E-Verify, can
reduce the risk involved in the hiring and employment process; then they’re
positive, as long as the requirements are economically rational.
E-Verify is, to some employers, too much, and to some employers, too little
and it kind of depends on where you sit. Small employers who may rely on,
shall we say, sketchy pools of labor, would probably be uneasy about having
E-Verify required of them. Large employers, particularly those with large
numbers of unskilled workers and especially those that are publicly traded,
have long ago crossed that threshold. They do E-Verify. That’s not going to
change. They read the ICE best practices. They do as many of the additional
best practices that ICE suggests would be undertaken by a compliant employer.
And they are constantly looking for a way to reduce their immigration risk.
Obviously, if you’re a meatpacker or a chicken processor, you’re at very high
risk and so you undertake most, if not all, of the ICE best practices and you
attempt to do it in a way that is compliant with all laws, including the antidiscrimination laws.
So employers are looking for practical solutions. E-Verify is here to stay
without question and, at the same time, it doesn’t resolve enough of the risks
that employers see on all sides of the aisle. Employers don’t want to be raided
by ICE, they don’t want to unfairly deny employment to someone who’s
authorized, they don’t want to be the subject of anti-discrimination suits; they
simply want to go about doing their business. And the immigration system, at
the moment, at the new employment transaction point and thereafter, simply
isn’t sufficient.
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And the debate, the healthy diversity of opinion you’re seeing on this panel
merely indicates how challenging it is for the politicians and policymakers,
to come up with the systems that would make the risk that employers face
in the employment transaction go down. I think employers would like to see
legislation that worked but, of course, that’s the question: can it happen.
PETER ASAAD: Appreciate the perspective very much of the employer.
Now sliding over to Professor Vladeck, you’re a professor who understands
federal jurisdiction and constitutional law. If you would, what you think will
happen in the Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting case. Now the District Court
sided with the Arizona workers; so did the Ninth Circuit. And there have been
oral arguments and there’ve been some comments based on the oral argument
questioning from the justices. Where do you see it going and what do you see
the consequences being?
PROFESSOR VLADECK: Well, I guess I should preface it by saying
I hate guessing how the Supreme Court is going to rule because I’m either
wrong or I’m right for the wrong reasons. No one actually knows.
That being said, I think one can read your argument here, I think somewhat
reliably, to suggest that the Court’s inclined to affirm the Ninth Circuit and to
thereby hold that IRCA does not preempt the Legal Arizona Workers Act, but
Arizona mandating E-Verify actually is permissible.
What I think is going to be interesting is not what the result is, but how the
Court writes that opinion. Because I think there are a couple of different ways
they can go and how they do it will have, I think, far greater consequences than
[merely just affirming].
So let me just sort of briefly elaborate and then throw it back to some of you.
The only legal question is what IRCA means when it exempts state laws related
to licensing or other similar laws from its expressed preemption provision. So
this is not, for example, like the SB 1070 case24 where the preemption is based
on a sort of more general, and less textual, conflict between state and federal
law. Here you actually have a case of expressed preemption or not, depending
upon whether the Legal Arizona Workers Act is, or is not, a licensing law. And
indeed, most of the oral argument was about that very question: is it a licensing
law.
And what the Justices really struggled with was the notion that they could
really tell Arizona that by saying, “We will revoke business licenses if you fail
to comply with E-Verify,” that that somehow wasn’t a licensing law. It may be
a sort of troubling licensing law, it may be a licensing law that we might not
have enacted, but it’s about licenses.
Now the argument that Carter Phillips made on behalf of the Chamber of
24. S.B. 1070, 49th Legis., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
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Commerce is that licensing law means, more specifically, laws that go to the
conferral on a license and not just the revocation of a license. I don’t think it
strains credulity to suggest that that’s a thin reed on which to rest this entire
case, and I think some of the Justices’ questions went in that direction.
So I think one way out is for the Court to just hold narrowly that, because
the Arizona law specifically imputes, as the sanction, that a business license
is revoked—clearly a licensing law within the meaning of 1324a(h)(2)25—we
don’t have to decide anything else.
What’s really interesting, though, is throughout the oral argument, on both
sides—well, three sides because the federal government argued, too—Justice
Scalia kept coming back to this notion that the rules might be different when
you have federal policy that is underenforced by the executive branch. And I
have to say, I can’t think he means it. And the reason why is because if you
guys remember [ ], it was Justice Scalia writing for the Supreme Court who
basically said, “Article II of the Constitution protects the executive’s discretion
to enforce federal law.” And so, just as Congress cannot command how the
president exercises his discretion, nor can Congress make an end run around
that by enlisting the states in requiring the enforcement of certain federal laws.
If that logic makes any sense, then it should also hold for states; that
states cannot tie the hands of the federal Executive. In other words, underenforcement, although problematic as a policy matter, has no actual bearing on
the constitutional analysis; it has no actual bearing on the preemption analysis.
I think that has to be right. And so that’s why I think we’re likely to see an
opinion that sort of ducks the underenforcement question, saves it for SB 1070
and really just sort of construes the statute as narrowly as possible because
Arizona did, really, what so few of the states have done, which is—at least in
this statute’s context—rely specifically on the licensing concept.
If that’s what the Court holds, and I think it is, it’ll be overnight that I think
we’ll see more and more states moving toward imposing certain kinds of
sanctions on employers in the guise of licensing practices. And I think the
question is going to be whether the Supreme Court says the sanction has to
be in some way related to the ability of the business to function, which I think
would still get you the Arizona law but which would not get you anything
about immigration in the guise of business licenses.
So I think that’s where we’ll see how it cashes out. But if I were a betting
man, I think it’s likely that the Arizona law is going to be upheld.
PETER ASAAD: Thank you so much. So it seems, Congressman Morrison,
was onto something when he actually said that it was well-crafted and wellwritten. And Professor Vladeck, who says, “Let’s look at how it’s written.
Let’s look at how the whole thing is going to be written, how narrow will it
be.” But we could end up then, in fact, with a template, if you will, for other
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (making employment of unauthorized noncitizens
unlawful).
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states and localities to pass successful legislation.
CONGRESSMAN MORRISON: And indeed, that may in itself provide it
if it’s just [for Congress to revisit the issue].
CARL HAMPE: Yes. Actually, I was just going to say that. Bruce, maybe
you’d agree that if the Supreme Court said, “OK, the Arizona statute is fine,”
ten other states rush to present those bills to their legislatures, that might
bring the Chamber and other groups aligned with them back to the Hill to say,
“Alright, let’s preempt this once and for all,” and then the question would be,
“OK, under what standards?” Because that kind of opens up the whole basis
upon which one has an E-Verify program.
CONGRESSMAN MORRISON: That would seem to make sense but I
spent four years making that argument on behalf of the Society for Human
Resources Management that this—I mean I said then, and it proved out, that
the Arizona law was going to be upheld because of the narrow tailoring of the
language. Nobody wanted to hear it at the time. Now I guess it’s conventional
wisdom.
But the fact is that NumbersUSA—to take one organization, for instance
—actually has built its grassroots base on advocating state laws and they’re
going to get a big boost out of this case if it goes the way Professor Vladeck
suggests and they’re going to do a lot of organizing, they’re going to get a lot
of members off of it. And it’s not entirely clear that the Republican majority
in the House will want to fix the problem once the states have the authority
to “fix the problem.” Because the state solution seems to be much easier to
achieve than the federal one and doesn’t come with any legalization baggage,
for instance. So it might play out quite the other way from what Carl suggests.
PROFESSOR VLADECK: It doesn’t come with legalization baggage. It
does come with litigation baggage. Because I think the real issue is the Arizona
law is about as close to a pure licensing requirement as I think you could get
without the added piece of actually being necessary to obtain a license versus
revoking a license. The question is going to be, when states start going further
afield . . .
PETER ASAAD: Alright, thank you so much to our panelists for all their
time. And thank you.
END TRANSCRIPT

PANEL
IMMIGRANT WORKERS’ RIGHTS:
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF TRADITIONAL
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW
This Article is an annotated transcript of a panel that took place on
October 25, 2010 at the American University Washington College of Law.
The podcast of the event can be found on the AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM’S website at http://aulaborlawforum.
org/events/immigrant-workers-rights/. The event was co-sponsored by the
Immigrants’ Rights Coalition Labor & Trafficking Committee as part of
Immigrants’ Rights Week.

Panelist Biographies ............................................................................329
Annotated Transcript ...........................................................................331
PANELIST BIOGRAPHIES
Sebastian Amar is an Attorney at the U.S. Department of Education, Office
for Civil Rights. At the time of the panel, he was a staff attorney for CASA de
Maryland. He is an American University Washington College of Law alumnus.
Seok H. “Daniel” Choi is an attorney with the Immigrant Advocacy Program
of the Legal Aid Justice Center in Virginia. He is fluent in both Korean and
Spanish, which is a critical component of his work with the Latino day laborer
population, as the liaison between Spanish-speaking workers and the Korean
business community in the Northern Virginia area. He is a graduate of SUNY
Binghamton, has his J.D. from New York Law School, and is the recipient of
an Equal Justice Works fellowship.

329

330

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1:3

Joseph Geevarghese is the Deputy Director of Strategic Organizing for
Change to Win. He discusses national strategies in organizing farm workers
with UFW (United Farm Workers). He received his J.D. from Georgetown
University Law Center.
Elizabeth Keyes is Practitioner-in-Residence with the WCL Immigrant
Justice Clinic. Prior to joining the faculty, she was a supervising attorney at
WEAVE (Women Empowered Against Violence), where she provided legal
services to immigrant survivors of domestic violence and assisted dozens of
immigrant domestic violence survivors with their protection order, divorce,
custody, and child support cases. Before WEAVE, Liz spent three years as
a Skadden fellow and staff attorney at CASA de Maryland, working on the
civil and immigration aspects of labor exploitation cases, and litigating in
state, federal, and immigration courts. She focused particularly on trafficked
domestic workers, and their exploitation by diplomats. Before law school, she
spent several years working on African policy and development issues with
Catholic Relief Services, the World Bank and the United Nations Development
Program throughout Africa. She received her law degree magna cum laude
from Georgetown University Law Center, a Masters in Public Affairs from
Princeton University, and a B.A. in African Development Studies from
Carleton College. She served as the moderator of the panel.

IMMIGRANT WORKERS’ RIGHTS:
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF TRADITIONAL
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW
ANNOTATED TRANSCRIPT

ELIZABETH KEYES: This is a wonderful panel of folks representing
different aspects of very challenging issues; namely, the set of issues facing
immigrant workers in 2010 . . . . And, I’m just going to throw a few questions
at them. Knowing them, that will be more than enough to get something lively
started, but I would like you all to feel free to ask a question as we go. So, I’m
going to start with Dan and Sebastian, who both work locally on this issue:
Dan in Virginia [and] Sebastian in Maryland. And, I’d like it if each of you
. . . could talk a little bit about the people that you’re working with at your
team organization, the characteristics of the immigrant workers that you are
representing, and what it is that you do with them. If you could describe, for
the folks here, the work that you’re doing and services [that accompany your
work].
DANIEL CHOI: [S]o I work at the Legal Aid Justice Center,1 which
[provides] . . . non-traditional legal aid [to individuals in Virginia]. Most of
my clients are people [who are] not citizen[s] or legal permanent residents,
[but are] undocumented people on various asylum, refugee, or temporary
protective status.
So, [these are] folks who normally can’t get help. And, the reason that we
[provide them with assistance] is because we’re the only non-LSC funded
1. LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER, About Us,http://www.justice4all.org/about_us (last
visited July 26, 2011) (“The Legal Aid Justice Center provides legal representation for lowincome individuals in Virginia. Our mission is to serve those in our communities who have
the least access to legal resources. The Legal Aid Justice Center is committed to providing
a full range of services to our clients, including services our federal and state governments
choose not to fund.”).
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organization in Northern Virginia that handles civil litigation. [T]he federal
government has a funding procedure called Legal Services Corporation,2
[which stipulates that] if you [take] federal money, you will have a nicer
office, but it also comes with restrictions like you can’t help people with
certain statuses, you can’t ask for attorney’s fees—although that’s recently
changed—you can’t do class actions and other restrictions. My organization,
a while ago, said, ‘screw that!’ And we started representing people of different
statuses, and that includes mostly, for me, restaurant workers, day laborers,
people in cleaning services—low-wage working folks. A large percent[age]
of our clients are mostly Latino and monolingual Spanish speaking, but that’s
changing as we increase our outreach into different sectors like Asian and
Middle Eastern, etc.
SEBASTIAN AMAR: [W]e do a lot of what they do at the Legal Aid Justice
Center at CASA [de Maryland],3 [but] just for Maryland residents. So, a lot of
what Dan mentioned [is true for CASA too]. [M]ost of my work focuses on the
representation of day laborers and domestic workers. As for our day laborers,
we have maybe twenty percent [that] are in the . . . cleaning industry. A lot
of hotels have gone up, especially in National Harbor and in Prince George’s
County [Maryland], so you’ve got a lot of casinos and hotels there looking for
cleaning staff. But, beyond that, it’s mostly general construction-based labor.
So, [we’re talking about] folks that go out to do anything from sheetrock and
drywall to [the] more sophisticated laying of fiber optic cables for Verizon . .
. and things like that.
One of the big misconceptions about CASA, in particular, is that folks
come to us under the impression that we represent folks in immigration cases.
Obviously, because we work with 100 percent immigrants, [people think]
we must do asylum and other types of deportation defense. The answer is
that we do not, and the reason for that is because CASA, twenty-five years
ago, realized that there are some areas of law that the private bar and other
non-profits have specialized in—asylum and deportation defense being twoof
those [specializations]. Asylum cases are very sexy for law firms to put on
their annual prospectus and so a lot of their pro bono hours go towards those
types of cases. The not so sexy case is that of the undocumented worker who

2. About LSC, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about/lsc.php (last visited
July 16, 2011).
3. About, CASA DE MARYLAND, http://www.casademaryland.org/aboutmainmenu-26 (last visited July 16, 2011) (“CASA’s primary mission is to work with the
community to improve the quality of life and fight for equal treatment and full access to
resources and opportunities for low-income Latinos and their families. CASA also works
with other low-income immigrant communities and organizations, makes its programs and
activities available to them, and advocates for social, political, and economic justice for all
low-income communities.”).
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is owed $150.00. It’s not a huge amount and doesn’t really mean a lot to a
lot of people, but it means a great deal to the person who needs [it] to make
rent. So, that’s why we focus on the employment side, on issues that are just
tangentially related to immigration issues that these folks may face.
ELIZABETH KEYES: Joseph, could you take us now to the national level,
and talk about how Change to Win4 is working?
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: Sure. Just by way of a little bit of history: I
think people probably [have] heard about the [American Federation of Labor
and the Congress of International Organizations (“AFL-CIO”)],5 which is
a coalition of unions that was . . . formed in the 1920’s and [19]30’s at the
moment [when] the industrial revolution really kicked into gear [and] our
economy moved into [a] factory-based economy. [W]hen you think about steel
workers and auto workers, you think about high-paid workers. [At least] that’s
what you hear [about] in the news. At the turn of the century and into the
[19]20’s and [19]30’s, those were pretty desperate jobs. Those would be akin
to Wal-Mart jobs today. And a lot of those jobs were filled by Eastern European
immigrants, and what happened was workers rose up and organized—to make
sure that they had a fair share of the profits they were generating for the steel
barons and the auto barons, like Henry Ford.
Change to Win unions are actually . . . a set of service employee unions—
[Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”)],6 [United] Farm Workers,7
United Food and Commercial Workers,8 [and the] [International Brotherhood
of] Teamsters9—who broke off from the AFL about five years ago10 . . . because

4. About Us, CHANGE TO WIN, http://www.changetowin.org/about (last visited July
16, 2011).
5. About Us, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/ (last visited July 16, 2011).
6. About SEIU, SEIU, http://www.seiu.org/our-union/ (last visited July 16, 2011)
(“We are the Service Employees International Union, an organization of 2.1 million
members united by the belief in the dignity and worth of workers and the services they
provide and dedicated to improving the lives of workers and their families and creating a
more just and humane society.”).
7. About
Us,
UNITED
FARM
WORKERS,
http://www.ufw.org/_page.
php?menu=about&inc=about_vision.html (last visited July 16, 2011) (“Founded in 1962
by Cesar Chavez, the United Farm Workers of America is the nation’s first successful and
largest farm workers union currently active in 10 states.”)
8. About UFCW, UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS, http://www.ufcw.
org/about_ufcw/ (last visited July 16, 2011).
9. About Us, INT’L BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, http://www.teamster.org/content
(last visited July 16, 2011).
10. See Thomas E. Edsall, Two Top Unions Split from AFL-CIO, WASHINGTON POST
(July 25, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/25/
AR2005072500251.html (reporting on the resignation of the Service Employees
International Union and International Brotherhood of the Teamsters from the AFL-CIO on
July 25, 2005).
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we’re now in a service economy. [W]here the factory workers of seventy or
eighty years ago are the hotel workers, the restaurant workers, the janitors,
and the security guards [of today]. By and large, a lot of those workers are
immigrants, and these are workers who are struggling to make it into the
middle class. And right now, because large groups of these workers are all
unorganized, there isn’t a path for these folks. And what our unions are trying
to do is create a pathway, [to] give these workers, whether it’s farm workers or
truck drivers, a right to have a voice in the workplace, so they can bargain over
their working conditions.
And that’s really . . . the primary goal of [Change to Win]. And, in a larger
context, [the reason] why . . . it’s significant right now is [because] . . . the labor
movement has been in decline for about thirty to forty years . . . [and] [a] smaller
and smaller percentage of workers are organized. Why is that important?
It’s important for . . . one fundamental reason, which is we’re in danger of
not having a middle class. We’re in danger of [losing] the American dream.
[W]e’re in the moment of [one of the] greatest economic inequality[ies] [in]
our nation’s history—[where the] greatest concentration of wealth is squeezed
from the top and there’s less for everybody else . . . and that has wide-ranging
consequences. It has consequences right now for education, for crime, for
healthcare outcomes, [and] for kids making it to college. And, fundamentally,
that’s what we’re trying to figure out: how do we organize workers, the least of
these, the poorest of the poor in this new economic moment?
ELIZABETH KEYES: Dan, I’m wondering if you could give us a picture
of a typical case that you [get]. A restaurant worker comes to you, what [harm]
has been done? Give us a picture of . . . [what has] been done and what you’re
able to do about it.
DAN CHOI: Oh, Sebastian and I probably have the same answer to this.
We work on the same thing. But what usually happens is [that] it comes to
us [at the] second stage— [where a] worker [hasn’t been] paid. It could be a
restaurant worker [or] someone in construction, but they don’t get paid, and
they’ll try [futilely] for maybe weeks, sometimes even months, trying to get
their wages. Basically, calling their employer, visiting their worksite, doing
everything [they can] to get a couple hundred or a couple thousand dollars
back. When they come to us [their efforts didn’t] work out, and they somehow
were fortunate enough to learn that there could be additional things that could
be done. [W]e actually don’t take most of the cases that come to our office,
because . . . [the] need for unpaid wage services is actually much greater than
the number of lawyers that are available. Just to put it into perspective . . . after
our other attorney left, I could safely say that if you want free legal help after
you didn’t get paid, I’m the only lawyer in northern Virginia who will take
your case . . . for free.
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ELIZABETH KEYES: [Sebastian,] I was thinking about how both you
and Mr. Choi said you represent a lot of people that work in the restaurant
industry and then construction. In these industries, many people are . . . being
paid in cash. How is there a way that you can verify how much cash they’re
actually owed?
SEBASTIAN AMAR: Sure, so this is one of my favorite types of cases
for the reason that it’s the employer’s responsibility under the law to keep
records of all the workers and how many hours they’ve worked. And so, in
cases—especially with big construction [companies], and a restaurant that has
more than one employee—you’ve got witnesses that can attest to the fact that
somebody has come to work, and he’s worked “x” number of days and weeks
and months, and if you paid this guy under the table, your defense in court
is, ‘Your Honor, I’m in violation of my responsibilities under the law as an
employer because I’m not reporting this guy on my taxes. I’m not withholding
anything, but I don’t have any receipts for that, either, but I promise that I
paid.’
DAN CHOI: [W]hat it actually comes down to is [that] places like Virginia
don’t really have good labor laws. But the Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA],11
which is a federal law that deals with wage[s] and hour[s], [has] a recordkeeping
requirement—so if you actually bring a lawsuit and if it survives . . . [in] the
initial stages the burden shifts, so that the employer actually has to show that
[it] kept records . . . so it’s not as difficult [of a case].
ELIZABETH KEYES: You both have talked about the need [for
representation] far outstripping the supply. So, Sebastian, could you talk a little
bit about something that makes CASA fairly special, which is the organizing
component. [Can you speak about some] of the wage and hour work and how
that amplifies what you individually do?
SEBASTIAN AMAR: [S]o, I think one of the good things about working at
CASA is that every CASA attorney is outnumbered now . . . [approximately]
forty to one by organizers. And so, you’ve got this army of people whose
entire job it is to go out into the community, to educate folks about what their
rights are, to get a feel for what the cost to the community is, what the issues
that they’re facing are, and then bring them back to us, and say, ‘Hey, listen,
this is a problem, what can we do from a legal perspective, as far as trying to
address it and provide some relief?’ And I think that that helps us, because
we are outnumbered greatly, as far as the need—it gives you an added tool—
another weapon as an attorney. [This is] because the reality is [that] if you are
an employer and you care about your license to work, if you care about the
11. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).

336

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1:3

reputation of your company—which, in a lot of these industries your reputation
is everything—what you don’t want is for me to call a bunch of organizers,
and say, ‘Hey, listen, we need to rally the troops. Get 500 people over to your
headquarters. I’ll call every news ally that I have and we’ll have cameras and
500 people in front of your office talking about how you’re cheating workers
out of their wages.’
[S]o, in certain instances, that’s prove[n] to be infinitely more useful
than any litigation that we could have undertaken in those cases, especially
for folks who don’t have the luxury of waiting six, eight, ten months, two
years, three years on appeal for something to go through. And then the
collections process. And so . . . the ability to lean on organizers is what
makes the job as fulfilling as it is, because—without the organizer component
to it—[we] would just be running into a brick wall over and over again.
ELIZABETH KEYES: [This segues] nicely to Joseph. I wonder if you
could talk about . . . how [organzing] has helped, in particular, industries where
immigrants are dominant and what some of the challenges have been [in]
organizing those groups?
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: Well, to talk specifically about the farm
work . . . United Farm Workers is a union in California. Some of you may
be familiar with Cesar Chavez, who marched in the fields in the [19]60’s,
organized tens of thousands of farm workers,12 [and] gave them a path to selforganize. The fundamental challenge, for example, with this group of workers,
is that they are excluded from federal labor law, and what that means is, you’ve
got an entire group that’s excluded from having the right to organize under
federal law. [S]o, in 1935, when Congress passed the Wagner Act, or the
National Labor Relations Act,13 it excluded domestic workers, farm workers,
[and] a few other categories. Does anyone want to venture a guess why?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Because everybody is an immigrant in those
industries.
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: Okay, immigrant. Other guesses? Who were
the work[ers] . . . what was the work force in 1935?

12. See Mara Elena Durazo, Making Movement: Communities of Color and New
Models of Organizing Labor, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 235, 242 (2006) (discussing
the role that Cesar Chavez, among others, has played in the labor movement).
13. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-53, 157, 159–61, 163, 165-67 (2006)).
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, they didn’t want to apply federal laws to
family farms.
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: So, when Congress considered the law, there
was incredible opposition, but when President Roosevelt moved it through
Congress, in order to get the southern senators to vote for the law, he had to
remove all of the protections for farm workers, or domestics, who were largely
African-Americans.14 And so, they wrote them out of the law, and for seventy
years we’ve been laboring under that set of restrictions. And so what we’re
trying to figure out is . . . how do you lift [up] this group of workers? Stephen
Colbert testified in front of Congress15 a month ago, some of you may have
seen the testimony. He was there with Arty Rodriguez, the President of the
United Farm Workers, and Colbert, he said it better than anyone else. [Colbert
was asked] ‘Why are you interested in this group of workers? Why are you
interested in not only the immigration issue, but the organizing issue? Why
are you sitting here with Arty Rodriguez?’ And Colbert said, ‘Well, it’s about
power. This is a group of people who are the least of these, they come here and
do our work, and they have no rights whatsoever.’
So, the challenge we’ve got in this moment is . . . what do you do if federal
law doesn’t give folks the right to organize? [W]hat do you do? So, seventy
years ago . . . Congress said, ‘Farm workers are not protected under federal
law to organize.’ And you’re an activist, you’ve got a law degree, you’re an
organizer, [y]ou’re going to get creative. Come hell or high water, you’re
going to figure out how to lift farm workers out of poverty. What do you do?
Think big.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Organize anyway.
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: You organize anyway. Absolutely. What else?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: You lobby to change the law.
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: Okay, you do. And at which level?
14. See Michael H. LeRoy & Wallace Hendricks, Should “Agricultural Laborers”
Continue to Be Excluded from the National Labor Relations Act?, 48 EMORY L.J. 489, 506
(1999) (explaining that the exclusion of domestic workers and farmworkers was the result
of harsh criticisms of the original drafting of the bill, which broadly covered all privatesector employees).
15. See Protecting America’s Harvest: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law, of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 32 (2010) (statement of Stephen Colbert, Host, The Colbert Report, Comedy Central
Studios), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_
house_hearings&docid=f:58410.pdf (text); Stephen Colbert Testifies in Front of Congress
(NECN broadcast Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.necn.com/09/24/10/Stephen-Colberttestifies-in-front-of-co/landing_arts.html?BlockID=317523&feedID=4214 (video).
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AUDIENCE MEMBER: At the state level.
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: [S]o . . . there’s a couple of different things . .
. that have been out there. [F]or the last seventy years, farm worker advocates
[and] civil rights advocates have been trying to get Congress to write farm
workers [into the NLRA and] it hasn’t worked.16
And then there’s been a concerted effort in several states, and really, after
seventy years, it’s really California, that one state, [that has] enshrined the
right to organize. Let me tell you a little bit about what we’re doing just very
briefly. So, recognizing the difficulty of moving legislation either at the federal
level or the state level—before the election of Barack Obama, we decided
what are the things that President Obama can do to help this group of workers.
[W]e realized [that] the federal government purchases over a billion dollars
worth of fruits and vegetables . . . that feed our troops [and] that are on school
lunch plates. And the federal government, specifically the President—had the
procurement authority right to say, ‘Well, the federal government is going
to only do business with those vendors who say no to child labor, say no
to slavery, provide overtime, provide rest breaks, provide minimum wage
protections, and the right to organize.’
Actually, the same day that Stephen Colbert testified [before] Congress and
really elevated the issue of migrant farm workers, Arty and I met with the
Secretary of Agriculture, and told him that ‘We think you should use your
federal procurement power to extend the law, to give workers the rights they’ve
been denied for almost seventy years.’ We fundamentally believe there’s no
better way to organize or no better thing that you can do for workers than to
give them a path to self-organize, to self-police their own workplaces. And so,
that’s some of the creative type stuff that we’re trying to figure out how to do.
ELIZABETH KEYES: It’s creative. Can you talk about the special
challenges of organizing immigrant women? What industries they’re found
in and how they make their . . . what kinds of cases make their way to your
attention.
SEBASTIAN AMAR: Sure, like I mentioned before, we do a significant
amount of representation of domestic workers, so that can mean pretty much
anything, but, most specifically, it means folks hired to do cleaning of homes,
preparing dinners, child care, elder care, and things like that. And actually, I’d
say that our women’s group at CASA is, without a doubt, the best organized
and most effective of all the groups of workers that we organize. I’m not
exactly sure why that is except that they seem to be the most upset. They do a
16. See, e.g., Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong.
(1969) (statement of Cesar E. Chavez) (lobbying for the removal of the agricultural labor
exclusion from § 2(3) of the NLRA).
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tremendous job of not only supporting each other, but a lot of the work on the
ground to get people out of really dangerous situations. A lot of the domestic
workers that we are present[ed with] . . . because of our proximity to the
District, come over to us through diplomats. Somebody brings them through
some country in Africa, they don’t speak the language, they don’t have family,
they have no phone, no Internet. They have no idea what to do once [their
situation] turns sour, and somehow, they get word out to CASA and we’ll . . .
send folks out to the site to confront the employer and to extract the worker.
And so the women organize . . . for whatever period of time is necessary, to
provide housing and help the worker(s) get back on their feet, contact family
or friends back home and do whatever we can do to recover wages. And so, the
majority of the women that we organize are domestic workers. I’m not sure,
beyond our proximity to the District, why that is.
But I’d say the other side of that coin is that we have a significant number
of women who work in the cleaning industry. [I believe] that the reason that
they organize so well is because when there’s a violation, there seems to be a
wholesale violation of everybody that’s working on that particular site—and
when you and all of your colleagues that are similarly [situated and] suffer the
same harm, it’s a lot easier to find your voice—it’s not just you. It’s not just
you having to convince an attorney at CASA de Maryland, or an organizer
who[m] you’ve never met. You’re coming with, literally, ten, fifteen, twenty
people who have suffered the same harm, to seek help. And so, I think that
that’s empowering. And I think that they’re just very much outspoken. They’re
a very effective group before the media. They’re not afraid to tell their story,
which is a common problem that we find among immigrant workers, [who
usually say] “It’s fine if you want to file my case, but I don’t want to talk to the
press, I don’t want my picture in the newspaper, I don’t want anybody to know
who I am.” These ladies are the exact opposite. You almost have to fight off
their demands that we go to the press immediately every time there’s an issue.
It’s great to have to tell someone, “Listen, just take a second, step back for a
minute,” and, “we’ll call you as soon as we have a plan of action.” But they’re
always there and they’re always ready. That’s been a very effective tool for
us, particularly with the folks who work for diplomats because of the issue of
diplomatic immunity that, in many cases, keeps us out of court, and so you got
to find another way. And I’ll tell you, they really don’t like people showing up
[at an embassy] to [tell them] that [they are] violating human rights.
DAN CHOI: We actually also organize, but we don’t have a women’s
group, so I’ll talk about the challenge side of things. [First,] I think immigrant
women still fulfill traditional roles. So, I mean, if you think of traditional roles,
men go to work, and women stay at home. When they come to the United
States, man goes to work, woman goes to work, but she still takes care of the
children, so a lot of times after work, women are taking care of children, which
puts less time for them to actually come out and be organized. Second[,] is that
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they tend to work in a lot of sectors that are much more hidden, like domestic
work. If you are at a house serving a family or if you’re in a dry cleaners . .
. it’s harder for someone to go out there and do outreach as opposed to, at [a
construction site where] there are 500 guys [at] any time. So that’s been our
challenge—working with immigrant women, or organizing them.
ELIZABETH KEYES: Dan, can you talk about how Virginia has its [own]
special challenges? [Y]ou mentioned the absence of a good labor law, but
politically it’s an even trickier environment than most to work with immigrant
clients. [C]an you talk about how you connect to advocacy or coalition work to
try to handle some of the state problems that are making your job of litigating
difficult?
DAN CHOI: So, northern Virginia is a separate creature from the rest of
Virginia. The rest of Virginia is still very conservative, and when you think
Tea Party, you think [of] Virginia. [It was the] capitol of the Confedera[cy],
and a lot of things that go on are not very pro-immigrant, so we are always
on a defensive posture. Our General Assembly is usually in January and
February, and [two years ago] we had 150 or so . . . what we would consider
anti-immigrant measures presented. It went down slightly last year when they
found out the economy was bad and all that immigrant stuff [wasn’t] going
to work. [B]ut we expect it to rise again because of all the successes [in other
states]—and I use that term success in a cynical manner. For example, [in]
Arizona, where politicians have now found out that you can profit by making
life harder for immigrants.
Some of the things that have recently gone on [in the] General Assembly
are simply that you can’t have anything [except] in English. You can’t have
any government literature [except] in English. Imagine if you’re a tourist from
Finland or Argentina, coming through Virginia, and trying to look at a tourist
brochure, and you can’t print that in some of the other language, because it’s
required that it will only be in English.
You have things like arrest[ing] folks . . . the big thing is [that] you can’t get
your driver’s license or renew your driver’s license using your employment
card. So basically, a lot of people in the D.C. metro area, especially Salvadorans,
came here on what was previously mentioned, temporary protected status.
That means that you’re here legally, but you don’t have a green card. To get a
driver’s license in Virginia, you practically need a green card or a U.S. passport.
This immigration—employment verification card—the IEP, you can’t use it to
do [it].
Basically . . . you’re here legally, and the federal government said, “You
can work here legally, but you can’t drive to get to your work or pick up
your children.” So that’s the situation that we have right now and that was
spurred on by one immigrant—one immigrant on that kind of status—who got
drunk and killed a nun somewhere else. So the government made this a big
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deal, and even though the monastery said, “We don’t want this to become a
political issue,” it became a political issue and now you have literally hundreds
of people [in this situation]. We’ve been getting hundreds of phone calls of
people saying, “I’ve been here for years. I haven’t committed any crime. I
just want to get to my work, but they won’t let me renew my driver’s license.”
ELIZABETH KEYES: Our time is winding down . . . but I’d like to leave
time for questions.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: With the acknowledgement that there tens of
millions of immigrant workers in this country, why do you think the laws are
so slow to change, to be modernized. You talk about the issue being like this
for seventy years. So, what’s the hold-up, basically?
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: I think, in my experience, at least the last
two years, working at the federal [level]—even with the Administration, even
when you have a President of goodwill, who in his heart of hearts wants to do
the right thing—there’s an incredible amount of inertia and opposition. And,
just as an example, when we met with the Secretary of Agriculture, and we
said, “Well, farm workers should have a bill of rights. They’ve been excluded
from legal protections for seventy years.” I can’t think of a more sympathetic
group of workers to be a champion for. We had done polling that said, “This
will make you look good with Latino voters, etc.” He’s open to it, but he said,
“Well, I’m concerned about, Republican opposition. I am concerned that the
existing bureaucracy in the Department of Agriculture isn’t going to adapt
quickly enough.” So, it’s frustrating for folks like us who want change to come
very quickly.
[O]ther examples over the last two years . . . we’re working on a campaign in the
Inland Empire in California, where [ ] the goods come in on ships. They get out
at the Port of Long Beach, near Los Angeles, California—this is stuff that goes
on the shelves of Wal-Mart or Home Depot. They’re then trucked from the coast,
about 100 miles [to] the Inland Empire, which is just a sea of warehouses. It’s a
third world country, [in] Riverside County. Walking around, there’s no running
water. Streets are unpaved. And, [there] are low-wage Latino workers or temp
workers. We’ve done multiple meetings with the Department of Labor to say,
“Look, you should do concentrated enforcement. You actually have power of
the FLSA to invoke hot cargo.”17 Which means, that if Wal-Mart is violating

17 See, e.g., DEP’T OF LABOR, Improving Workplace Conditions Through Strategic
Enforcement: A Report to the Wage and Hour Division 29–30 (David Weil ed., May 2010),
available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf (explaining that
the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has the power, under section 15(a)
of the FLSA, to embargo goods that have been manufactured in violation of any provision
of the FLSA—including non-payment of wages).
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the law the Department of Labor could say, “alright, we are going to hold these
goods, Wal-Mart. We’re not going to let you put them on the shelves, until you
clean up your act, until the hundreds of thousands of workers in your supply
chain get the rights they deserve.”
But again, it’s two years into it. We’re still negotiating with the Administration,
so there’s inertia. And I think people have to rise up and get a little bit angrier
for more radical change to happen.
DAN CHOI: It’s definitely politics. It’s polarized. They say the country is
getting very polarized, and whenever you make any move ahead, it kind of
means working together and when you say “comprehensive immigration,” it
encompasses all. And so, for example, pass legalization as well as strengthening
the borders. Unfortunately, whenever those words come up, there’s a large
faction on both sides [of people] who will not work together. Hearing, pass
legalization, you call it “amnesty,” and people don’t want to [allow amnesty] .
. . and the same thing on our side, too. But I mean, the reason it doesn’t happen
is it’s a very political issue and people really aren’t willing to work together.
And it’s just politics. It’s not common sense. It’s just politics, and that’s what
we’ve seen over and over.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How do you feel about strikes and
walkouts, specifically, restaurants having walkouts on a Friday
night? Do you think those modes of organizing are outdated?
DAN CHOI: Oh, it works. It still works. So, I’m actually on the Advisory
Board for the Restaurant Opportunities [Center]18 . . . I’m on the board, but
[on the] D.C. side. [T]hey’ve been around the country and what they’ve done
is, whenever there are problems, they’ve organized . . . [they’ve] had people
strike, and they brought attention to the fact that workers at these—even [at]
the fanciest, and we’re talking about the $100.00 [a] plate places, are still
getting exploited in so many ways. So it still works. It’s not the only answer,
but it definitely works.
ELIZABETH KEYES: I agree on that. More questions?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So, the threats, when someone threatens that
they’re going to report someone to Immigration . . . is that [an empty threat]?

18. See generally REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTRS. UNITED, What We Do, http://www.
rocunited.org/what-we-do (last visited July 16, 2011) (explaining that the Restaurant
Opportunities Center model builds power for restaurant workers by organizing the
workers to “demonstrate public consquences for employers who take the ‘low-road’ to
profitablity.”).
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DAN CHOI: Yes and no. I mean, they could call Immigration and Customs
Enforcement [ICE]19 and, potentially, I don’t know what ICE would do with
that information. So, they might actually go after somebody. That said, a lot of
times, ICE has better things to do than go after workers who didn’t get paid and
[who are] trying to get their rights. Also, depending on their jurisdiction, there
[are] protections. Unfortunately, the circuit courts are somewhat conservative,
so it’s actually after you file a lawsuit, but it might be considered retaliation,
and illegal, if you make any threats after a lawsuit is filed.
ELIZABETH KEYES: Going on that . . . will there often be sanctions for
the employer, so it’s kind of like if they make that threat, it’s more of an empty
threat because they could get in trouble? Couldn’t they get in trouble, too, if
they’re hiring undocumented [immigrants]?
DAN CHOI: Yes, and I remind them that every time they call and say,
“That guy is illegal, right?” And then I ask them, “Well, if he is, you hired
him.” That usually shuts it up.
SEBASTIAN AMAR: [A]nd I’ll just add onto that, [that] the Department
of Labor is . . . making a push now to revamp their wage theft, wage recovery,
and bad employer . . . practices. And so, we’ve had some meetings with them
where they stress, to a very high degree, that “Listen, whoever you send to us,
we’re absolutely not entering into any memorandum of understanding with
ICE or anything like that to pass them over, [or] to give any type of information
to folks.” And, I think that probably part of your question was spurred because
of my comment, saying “I can’t really guarantee to anybody that I represent
that if we go to court that that’s not going to come up,” and we can object to it
all we want, but if there’s somebody in the courtroom that we didn’t anticipate
being there, and you get on the stand and you’ve said it anyway . . .
The reason that I say that, although I haven’t seen that, personally, [is that]
I have heard, particularly in the District of Columbia, folks who have objected
[un]til their face turned blue, and the judge still allowed that information—
which you can appeal—but throughout that process, folks that have actually
caught the attention of [ICE]. So, a lot of those instances haven’t been resolved
yet, and I’m sure that there [are] significant constitutional and other arguments
that folks should be able to make to get that quashed. But it’s nonetheless a
concern. So, I don’t think that we can ever say it’s a totally empty threat. Just
like Dan said—also—we never know who’s going to answer the phone at ICE.
And, if it’s somebody that just didn’t have a lot to do that day, or felt like going
to [a] favorite Chinese restaurant, maybe they’ll show up. But it is a very

19. ICE Overview, U.S. IMMIGRATIONS AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.
ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited July 26, 2011).
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useful response to say, ‘Well, that’s fine—if you call ICE, you’re calling ICE
on yourself, too, basically because somebody is going to have to investigate
that you’re hiring all these undocumented workers.” So, at the end of the day,
that’s the big problem. There’s just not enough accountability for employers.
ELIZABETH KEYES: I’m going to take moderator’s privilege for the last
question. I think it’s striking that all three speakers have talked about lawyering
far beyond litigation. There’s nobody up here who said that this case, those
cases are in the context, the context and we’ve heard about local advocacy,
state advocacy, federal advocacy, legislation, agency work, [and] organization
in general. And any of you are welcome to talk about this. I’m going to ask
Joseph if he could talk about it. Joseph was an organizer before law school and
then obviously, has continued with his motivation to be very heavily involved
in organization. Can you talk about what the law adds to organizing . . . ?
JOSEPH GEEVARGHESE: [T]he truth is the law as it is, isn’t [how] the
law as it should be. And . . . we organize in a context where there are perimeters
set down and I think the worst thing you can do is go through law school and
then operate within those perimeters. I went to law school. I was an organizer
with the Steelworker’s Union in the South, and a defining experience [was
when] I had organized a small steel finishing plant in rural Tennessee, and I
was young—I was excited—I was a young organizer, [and I had] one of my
first wins. [A]nd after you organize, you then give it to a union negotiator to
work on the first contract. I called up the negotiator a month later and I said,
‘How’s the bargaining going?’
And he said, ‘Well, they’ve shut down the place and moved it.’ [A]nd all
those men and women that stood up and decided to act in concert . . . it just
kind of hit me in the gut, and at that moment, I realized, well, I do need to
organize, but I also need to know what the law is more effective[ly], [in order]
to try to move both in a more effective direction. So, a lot of the work that
I’ve done, especially at Change to Win, has been trying to figure out what is
the intersection of existing law and how can you kind of operate in the gray
spaces. How can you bring creativity, to try to do things that have never been
done, or that get stalled in Congress? But, I think there’s a mixture of both.
Being a good lawyer, by itself, isn’t enough. I think you got to be a strategic
organizer, if you want to really facilitate social change. And, I passed out . . .
the latest issue of The American Prospect Magazine.20 This is actually . . . an

20 See generally About The American Prospect, AM. PROSPECT, http://www.prospect.
org/cs/about_tap/our_mission (“The magazine’s founding purpose was to demonstrate that
progressive ideas could animate a majority politics; to restore to intellectual and political
respectability the case for social investment; to energize civic democracy and give voice to
the disenfranchised; and to counteract the growing influence of conservative media.”) (last
visited July 16, 2011).
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example of the intersection of law and advocacy. So, there’s a lot of projects
here where workers are organizing in California, in the fields, in warehouses,
and, at the same time, we’re trying to use creative [tactics], like to get the
biggest bang for the buck at the federal level, whether it’s DOL, Agriculture,
or the White House.
ELIZABETH KEYES: Great . . . Big round of applause for our panel.
END TRANSCRIPT

* * *
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, National Basketball Association (“NBA”) commissioner David
Stern grew a “lockout beard” for nearly half a year, declaring that it would
remain intact until the league and union came to an agreement and resumed
the basketball season.1 Currently, the threat of yet another beard, in addition to
another truncated or cancelled season, looms over the NBA and up until very
recently, lingered over the National Football League (“NFL”).2
Within the last several months, the NBA and NFL’s collective bargaining
agreements (“CBA”) have expired, leaving both leagues with serious doubt
regarding the cancellation or delay of their 2011 seasons due to disagreements
about several mandatory subjects of collective bargaining between their front
offices and unions.3
As of the date of this article, the NBA has instituted a lockout of its players,
and the NFL ratified a new ten-year CBA with the National Football League
Players Association (“NFLPA”) on July 25, 2011 following a five-month long
lockout.4
Decertification, or dissolution, of a labor union, is one option available
to labor organizations—including players’ associations—during collective
bargaining negotiations.5 With the owners seemingly holding so much power
and with the longstanding history of lockouts present in both leagues, the
possibility of decertifying the union with the National Labor Relations Board

1. See Steve Aschburner, Lockout Revisited, 10 Years Later, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(July 8, 2008), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/steve_aschburner/07/08/
lockout.revisited/ (“But the way most people remember it, the league’s angry and newly
vulnerable chief executive let his retro whiskers grow symbolically from bitter start to
exhausting finish . . . .”).
2. See Laura Clawson, NFL Lockout Ends, DAILY KOS (July 25, 2011, 11:36 A.M.),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/07/25/998457/-NFL-lockout-ends (allowing for
current players to remain in the NFL’s medical plan for life a provision which was hotly
debated in prior negotiations).
3. See Larry Coon, Lockout Looms Over 2010-11 Season, ESPN.COM
(Sept.
22,
2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=coon_
larry&page=lockout-100922 (explaining that if a new CBA is not agreed upon by the NBA
and players’ union prior to the expiration of the current CBA a league-imposed lockout will
likely ensue, threatening cancellation of 2011–12 season); Union Head Says Owners Set for
Lockout, ESPN.COM (Oct. 5, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5652700
(explaining that a stumbling block for negotiation of a new CBA is that the NFL, although
claiming financial difficulties, will not share its books with the union).
4
See generally, CBA Expires, NBA Locks Out Its Players, ESPN.COM (July 1,
2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=6723645 (detailing both sides of
the labor dispute which erupted on Friday, July 1, 2011, when its CBA expired); Judy
Battista, As the Lockout Ends, the Scrambling Begins, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2011), at
B10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/26/sports/football/NFL-Union-LaborDeal.html?pagewanted=all (“After nearly five months of inactivity by all but a handful of
negotiators, the NFL sprang to life again Monday when [thirty-two] player representatives
voted unanimously to recommend approval of a [ten]-year labor deal that owners largely
approved last Thursday.”).
5. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 528–29 (4th ed. 2010)
(explaining that if a union votes to decertify, players would no longer have any “affiliation
with the union and no collective bargaining agreement would be in place”).
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(“NLRB” or “Board”) may appear to be the best option for players.6 Based
on the likelihood of the owners instituting a lockout following the expiration
of the CBA, a decertification of the NBA Players Association (“NBPA”) is
arguably the only tool left to ensure a 2011 season.7 Recent decertification
efforts in both leagues reveal, however, that such a move can result in a negative
economic impact on players’ salaries and free agency status.8 Thus, the legal
options available to a players’ union via the NLRB and provide a more stable
and successful alternative in dealing with the current labor situations in the
NBA and the NFL.
This Article will examine, analyze, and propose a solution for the NBPA
by considering the interplay between the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA” or “Act”), the NLRB, and the history of labor disputes in the NBA
and the recently revived NFL. Part II will provide a background on collective
bargaining under the Act, the jurisdiction of the NLRB, and how it applies to
the unique circumstances of the sports industry.9 Part III will outline the labor
histories of the NBPA and the NFLPA, including important legal challenges to
collective bargaining and antitrust restraint claims, and will discuss the current
situation facing the NBA and NBPA.10 Part IV will analyze the likely negative
results of decertification in comparison to the strength of a certified players’
association, as well as illustrate the disadvantaged position that a union inhabits
in today’s economy after decertification.11
II. BACKGROUND
To safeguard both employers and employees, and to “promote[ ] the flow of
commerce,” the NLRA regulates collective bargaining relationships between
employers and designated employee unions.12 The history of labor

6. See generally Eric R. McDonough, Escaping Antitrust Immunity—Decertification
of the National Basketball Players Association, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 821 (1997)
(proposing, in the context of the late 1990s dispute between the NBA and NBPA, that
decertification of the NBPA, following the expiration of the then-current CBA, would
allow players to compete in a more free market and receive fair market value wages).
7. Cf. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(explaining that decertification allows players to pursue new strategies, such as challenging
league practices through a strikes or through antitrust claims).
8. See Decertification: The NFLPA and NBPA’s Nuclear Option, LAW360
(January 18, 2011), www.constantinecannon.com/pdf_etc/complaw360art011811.pdf

(explaining that decertification would eliminate guaranteed salaries and pensions
for the players and the ability to negotiate and control their marketing and licensing
rights).
9. See infra Part II (discussing the application of the NLRA to professional sports
labor disputes).
10. See infra Part III (analyzing the effects of the most recent NFL decertification and
the future of the NBA lockout).
11. See infra Part IV (providing an accounting of the labor history and current labor
relations disputes present in the NBA and the NFL).
12. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)
(attempting to rectify the unequal bargaining power between employers and employees
through provision for collective bargaining).
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law, stemming from the Wagner Act,13 is based around the policy of bringing
employers and employees together to encourage negotiation and agreement.14
A. Collective Bargaining and the NLRA
In 1935, Congress passed the NLRA to protect the rights of employees and
employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain labor
and management practices deemed harmful to the workforce and economy of
the United States.15 In order to carry-out this process, Congress charged the
NLRB with administering the provisions of the Act.16 The Board has two main
functions: (1) to determine, through elections, whether a group of employees
wish to be represented by a union in dealing with their employers and if so,
by which union; and (2) to prevent “unfair labor practices by private sector
employers and unions.”17
The Board’s authority includes oversight of union representative elections
by employees,18 as well as the governing of elections when employees seek to
dissolve their labor organization as their exclusive bargaining representative.19
The Board is also empowered to regulate unfair labor practices by conducting
investigations, issuing complaints, and petitioning courts for relief.20 One of
the key aspects of labor practices between labor organizations and employers
is the mandatory obligation to bargain collectively when a labor unit has
elected an exclusive bargaining agent.21 This obligation exists “with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,” and requires
that both sides negotiate in “good faith.”22
The process of collective bargaining begins with the selection of an
13. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)).
14. See 1 PATRICK HARDIN ET AL., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 26–27 (4th ed.
2001) (providing Senator Wagner’s belief that, in an industrial era dominated by large
corporations, employees needed the ability to bargain together in order to assure their
rights, with regard to the need for the passage of the Wagner Act).
15. See id. (explaining that the “cornerstone” of the Wagner Act was Section 7, which
gave employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for . . . mutual aid and protection”).
16. See § 153 (creating the NLRB to adjudicate, investigate, and enforce the NLRA
to remedy historically lax enforcement that plagued previous labor laws).
17. What We Do, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do (last
visited Apr. 23, 2011).
18. § 159(c).
19. See § 159(e) (requiring that thirty percent of eligible employees must petition the
Board, no sooner than one year after a union had previously been certified, for an election
to decertify a previously-certified bargaining representative).
20. See § 160(e) (permitting the NLRB to seek relief in federal district court to enjoin
ongoing unfair labor practices).
21. See § 158(d) (specifying that the duty to bargain in good faith is aimed at the
consummation of a written collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the
bargaining representative).
22. See id. (explaining, however, that such an “obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession”).
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appropriate unit for the purpose of bargaining with the employer.23 The unit
representative is selected by a majority of all employees within an appropriate
unit at the employer’s facility or plant; after the representative collectively
bargains with an employer over several mandated conditions of employment.24
The Board’s statutorily-mandated determination of an “appropriate unit for
collective bargaining” is adjudicated before, and decided by the Board, and
cannot be overruled or interfered with by a court, unless the Board’s decision
is arbitrary or capricious.25 Additionally, the Board has the authority to decline
to exercise jurisdiction over an employment organization if the labor dispute
does not have a sufficiently substantial impact on interstate commerce.26
Once the selection of an exclusive bargaining unit is complete, the
collective bargaining process ensues. There is a duty for both the employer
and the unit representative to bargain in good faith, failure to do so is an unfair
labor practice.27 The language in the Act creates two subject matter categories
for collective bargaining—mandatory and permissive subjects.28 To be a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, a term must “settle an aspect of
the relationship between the employer and employees.”29

23. For instance, when an employer has two plants that manufacture different
product lines, the employer may ask the Board to segregate the two into two different
bargaining units. If the employer is successful, each plant would then have to separately
select a certified exclusive bargaining representative (union) and each representative would
have to bargain with the employer separately. See § 159(a)–(b); Ethan Lock, The Scope of
the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 382 (1989) (“When a
majority of employees designate a union to represent them, an employer must . . . bargain
in good faith with the employees’ representatives . . . .”).
24. See § 159(a) (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
a unit” regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining, including “rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment.”).
25. See NLRB v. Lettie Lee, Inc., 140 F.2d 243, 247–50 (9th Cir. 1944) (upholding
the Board’s determination that sloper and trimmer employees were also qualified cutters
and that all three could join in an appropriate bargaining unit together). A federal court
usually defers to an “administrative agency [like the NLRB] because of its own lack of
experience with issues or the need to protect the authority of the agency.” HARDIN ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 2282.
26. See § 164(c)(1); see also Sec. Guards & Watchmen Local No. 803 (Yonkers
Raceway, Inc.), 196 N.L.R.B. 373, 373 (1972) (declining jurisdiction over the horse racing
industry, even though racing had “some effect” on interstate commerce).
27. See § 158(a)(5) (prohibiting an employer from refusing to bargain collectively
with his employees’ chose representative); § 158(d) (“[T]o bargain collectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith . . . .”).
28. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348–49
(1958) (holding that an employer cannot insist on acceptance of non-mandatory terms
as a precondition to reaching an agreement, even when the employer otherwise agrees to
bargain over mandatory terms).
29. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971) (explaining that there is no penalty or repercussion if
parties refuse to negotiate with regard to permissive subjects).
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An unfair labor charge can be brought when one party refuses to bargain in
good faith over a mandatory subject.30 The good faith requirement to bargain
collectively, however, does not indicate a necessity for parties to reach an
agreement.31 The “good faith” requirement in collective bargaining is focused
on the standards of behavior in the bargaining process, not on results.32
A theory of judicial non-intervention supports the purpose of the NLRB
refereeing the collective bargaining process.33 While the Act establishes the
right of employees to join labor organizations and engage in collective action,
it also guarantees the right of employees to abstain from forming or joining a
labor union.34 Additionally, the Act provides a strict procedure for decertifying
a labor organization by a vote of the union’s members.35 Following a petition to
the NLRB for decertification signed by at least thirty percent of the employees,
the Board takes a secret ballot poll of the entire bargaining unit to determine
whether or not to decertify the unit.36 If the majority of employees vote against
the continuation of the union as the exclusive representative of the bargaining
unit, the Board then decertifies the union.37
B. The Labor Exemption
Because the union-employer relationship can often lead to accusations of
antitrust violations, courts have recognized a “non-statutory labor exemption”
from antitrust law in certain agreements reached in the course of collective

30. See § 158(a)(5) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees [over mandatory subjects
of bargaining].”).
31. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956) (“While Congress did
not compel agreement between employers and bargaining representatives, it did require
collective bargaining in the hope that agreements would result.”); H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 514, 525 (1941) (“It is true that the National Labor Relations Act, while requiring
the employer to bargain collectively, does not compel him to enter into an agreement.”).
32. Cf. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–36 (1967) (stressing that the
employer has an obligation to supply all relevant information necessary for the employees’
bargaining representative to perform its duties); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962)
(holding that the duty “may be violated without a general failure of subjective good faith”).
33. See generally Lock, supra note 23, at 381–83 (explaining the theory behind
restraint in judicial intervention during the bargaining process as being consistent with
congressional intent manifested in the text of the Act).
34. See § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment . . . .”).
35. See § 159(c)(1) (requiring an initial petition by employees); see also 29 C.F.R. §§
102.83–102.84 (2010) (regulating the form, content, and procedure for presentation to the
NLRB of decertification petitions).
36. § 159(e)(1).
37. Id.
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bargaining under the NLRA.38 The primary purpose of the labor exemption
is to protect labor organizations and their bargaining activities.39 Typically,
antitrust actions are brought under the Sherman Act, which condemns “[e]
very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce.”40 The Supreme Court has held, however,
that parties engaged in labor agreements can be immune from antitrust laws.41
The Court cited a “strong labor policy” favoring labor agreements, even in the
face of antitrust restraints.42 The labor exemption and antitrust immunity apply
when agreements at issue relate to mandatory subjects of bargaining such as
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.43
C. The NLRA and Collective Bargaining as Applied to the Sports Industry
In 1969 the Board established its jurisdiction over professional sports leagues,
holding in American League of Professional Baseball Clubs44 that Congress

38. See Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616,
622 (1975) (recognizing “the nonstatutory exemption” to federal antitrust law protects the
unions ability to “eliminate competition over wages and working competitions” and to
inevitably “affect price competition among employers”); Local No. 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965)
(“[T]he national labor policy expressed in the National Labor Relations Act places beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long,
employees must work.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) (“The labor of a human being
is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall
be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or
conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations,
or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.”); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) (preventing
federal courts from enjoining activity that would otherwise be considered “an unlawful
combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of [certain] acts” in the context
of a labor dispute).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229–33 (1941) (holding
that labor actions directed at an employer but due to “internecine” conflict between two
competing labor organizations did not violate the antitrust law); but cf. Allen Bradley Co.
v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 807–11 (1945) (noting,
however, that the exemption does not permit unions to combine with non-labor groups in
order “to create business monopolies and to control the marketing of goods and services”).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
41. See 312 U.S. at 229–33 (explaining that “whether trade union conduct constitutes
a violation of the Sherman Law is to be determined only by reading the Sherman Law and
[Section] 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of
outlawry of labor conduct”).
42. See 421 U.S. at 622 (“[T]he goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if
this effect on business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws.”).
43. See id. (“The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy
favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working
conditions.”).
44. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs & Ass’n of Nat’l Baseball League Umpires,
180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).
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intended for the Act to apply to Major League Baseball.45 And reasoned
that, based on its policy of encouraging collective bargaining, it should assert
its jurisdiction and subject any professional team sports labor dispute to the
Act.46 For the first time, the Board accepted the idea that professional baseball
affects interstate commerce, and thus ruled that professional baseball is subject
to the Act.47 The Supreme Court applied the Board’s holding in Radovich v.
Nat’l Football League to determine that both football48 and basketball49 affect
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and are, by extension, subject
to the NLRA.
Then, in 1980 the Fifth Circuit established that when facing a joint
employer relationship, such as a professional sports league, a league-wide,
multi-employer bargaining unit was appropriate because the unit had “common
labor problems and a high degree of centralized control over labor relations.”50
And rationalized that only a bargaining unit comprised of every league player
can wield enough bargaining power to challenge professional sports leagues.51
For multi–employer certification, the NLRB requires either such a joint
agreement between the parties or a controlling history of bargaining on a
45. See id. at 192 (“We can find, neither in the statute nor in its legislative history, any
expression of a Congressional intent that disputes between employers and employees in
[the] industry [of professional sports] should be removed from the scheme of the National
Labor Relations Act.”).
46. See JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORT § 6.03, at 788
(1979) (explaining that the Act is broad enough to permit the Board to exercise jurisdiction
over “all the employees” in professional team sports, “from bat boys to maintenance men”).
47. See id. at 190–91 (“Congressional deliberations regarding the relationship
of baseball and other professional team sports to the antitrust laws likewise reflect a
Congressional assumption that such sports are subject to regulation under the commerce
clause . . . [and] legal scholars have agreed . . . that professional sports are in or affect
interstate commerce, and as such are subject to the Board’s jurisdiction.” (footnotes
omitted)). See generally NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939) (establishing that that
the Board had authority under the NLRA to exert jurisdiction over an employer even when
a manufacturer was not directly involved in interstate commerce but instead, received and
shipped a small volume of manufactured goods through interstate commerce).
48. Cf. Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) (“[T]he volume
of interstate business involved in organized professional football places it within the
provisions of the [Sherman] Act.”).
49. Cf. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (C.D. Cal.
1971) (“The business of professional basketball as conducted by NBA and the NBA teams
on a multi-state basis, coupled with the sale of rights to televise and broadcast the games for
interstate transmission, is trade or commerce among the several States within the meaning
of the Sherman Act.”), stay granted, 1971 WL3015 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 1971), reinstated sub
nom. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204.
50. 613 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining that once a player is hired by
a team, his working conditions are controlled not only by that team, but by the league as
well).
51. Cf. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 302–03 (3d ed.
2004) (explaining that multi-employer bargaining is now a common feature, because “[b]
oth employers and unions in these industries find they have a complimentary long-term
interest in putting their relationship on that broader footing”); WEISTART & LOWELL, supra
note 46, at 794 (“Multi-employer bargaining is presently used in professional sports . . .
.”); see also WONG, supra note 5, at 530 (describing that today “players associations have
become a powerful tool” in collective bargaining).
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multi-employer basis.52 In the sports industry, the inclusion of all teams within
a league, along with the league commissioner’s office, constitutes a multiemployer unit for collective bargaining.53
In the context of a multi–employer unit, challenges often arise over the
issues of individual bargaining and the union’s right to fair representation.54
Professional sports contracts have historically been made between a player and
a single team or organization. Meanwhile, the relevant collective bargaining
agreement does not set salaries for contracts, but rather contains constraints
concerning wages and conditions of employment within which players and
teams are free to negotiate.55 Each league sets forth in its CBA the limitations
or parameters in which a player and team can negotiate a salary, but no matter
the system, any employer that individually bargains with a player outside of
those parameters is committing an unfair labor practice.56
The Supreme Court’s standard for such action comes from J.I. Case Co.
v. NLRB,57 when the Court conceded that in some situations, allowing for
individual employees to bargain may be beneficial for the purpose of collective
bargaining.58 The Southern District of New York’s decision in Morio v. North
American Soccer League59 best illustrates the issue of individual bargaining
in sports.60 The Morio court granted a temporary injunction on all individual
contracts due to a violation of the employers’ duty to bargain exclusively with
the bargaining representatives of the players.61 Thus, in sports there is more
individual freedom of contract for employees under typical league collective
bargaining agreements, so long as the employees and the individual teams act
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980)
(explaining that there is a joint employer relationship between the North American Soccer
League and the various clubs that have a “proportionate role in League management”).
54. See generally NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 499, 353 U.S. 87, 94–97 (1957)
(establishing the constitutionality of multi-employer bargaining).
55. See WONG, supra note 5 at 529–30 (explaining the difference between typical
sports contracts and those of other unions such as butchers, teachers, or grocery workers
who will negotiate specific salaries in collective bargaining).
56. Compare WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 305 (quoting Morio v. N. Am.
Soccer League, 501 F. Supp. 633, 638–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.
1980) (explaining that any individual bargaining outside of a CBA can be a violation under
the Act, because a union is entitled to conduct all bargaining with an employer), with
WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 808 (describing how it has “been common for
collective bargaining agreements in professional sports to cover only the minimum terms .
. . and to specifically provide that individual athletes may negotiate individually for better
terms” (emphasis added)).
57. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
58. See id. at 338 (noting that it may be wise for a CBA to set basic terms but to allow
further individualized bargaining, particularly when individual employees face different
work or personal circumstances).
59. 501 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1980).
60. See id. at 635, 637 (finding that the soccer league’s clubs continued to negotiate
with individual players after the NLRB named the league as a multi-employer unit).
61. See id. at 638–39, 640 (“The duty to bargain carries with it the obligation on the
part of the employer not to undercut the Union by entering into individual contracts with
the employees.”).
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in good faith and within the parameters of the CBA.62
The duty to bargain in good faith is best seen through the behaviors and
actions of parties involved in collective bargaining.63 In sports, bad faith
bargaining accusations are usually the result of one party refusing to start or
continue negotiations with the other party.64 Both players associations and
leagues have been found guilty of unfair labor practices for a bad faith refusal
to negotiate over mandatory subjects of bargaining.65
While the Act vaguely mandates that all negotiations must be in good faith
“with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,”66
several cases have explicitly held certain types of restraints and parameters
within collective bargaining to be mandatory subjects of bargaining in good
faith.67 Some of the most important bargaining issues are included in mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining, such as free agency,68

62. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 307 (discussing the free market
orientation of CBAs in sports and how such an orientation is different “than what one finds
in most unionized sectors.”).
63. See supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
64. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 805 (explaining that bad faith has
een found when there was a refusal to negotiate or an attempt to bypass the other party with
a unilateral change in a mandatory subject matter of collective bargaining).
65. Compare Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th
Cir. 1974) (“[B]y unilaterally promulgating and implementing a rule providing for an
automatic fine to be levied against any player who leaves the bench area while a fight or
an altercation is in progress on the football field, [employers] have engaged in unfair labor
practices.”), with WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 805 & n.217.1 (explaining that
in 1976 the NBPA was found to have bargained in bad faith when it refused to bargain over
player restraint mechanisms that were mandatory subjects of bargaining, but which the
NBPA contended were violations of antitrust law).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
67. Accord Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Powell
v. Nat’l Football League (“Powell II”), 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); Wood v. Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player
Relations Comm., Inc. (“Silverman II”), 880 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d
1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
68. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 (holding that the “Rozelle Rule,” which provides
guidelines on free agency for NFL players, constitutes a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining).
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player mobility restraints69 (including compensation systems),70 salary caps,
player drafts,71 and salary arbitration.72
Challenges to mandatory subjects of bargaining in sports have often been
presented as antitrust claims under Sherman Act.73 These challenges are
typically defended by the non-statutory labor exemption that allows for a
league to engage in behavior that would otherwise be an antitrust violation,
so long as the action or restriction relates to mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining.74 Mackey v. National Football League provides the accepted
requirements with which a subject of collective bargaining in sports may be
exempt from trade restraints claims.75 The Eighth Circuit designated a threepart test to determine whether the restraint receives the labor exemption.76 For
the labor exemption to apply, (1) the restraint on trade must primarily affect
only the parties to the collective bargaining agreement; (2) the agreement must
concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and (3) the agreement
must be the product of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.77

69. See id. (noting that the Rozelle Rule “operates to restrict a player’s ability to
move from one team to another and depresses player salaries”).
70. See Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1303 (“The First Refusal/Compensation system, a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, was twice set forth in collective bargaining
agreements negotiated in good faith . . . .”).
71. See, e.g., Wood, 809 F.2d at 961–62 (holding that the salary cap, entry draft,
minimum individual salaries, fringe benefits, minimum aggregate team salaries, guaranteed
revenue sharing, and first refusal provisions, “are mandatory subjects of bargaining . . .
[because] [e]ach of them clearly is intimately related to ‘wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment’”).
72. See, e.g., Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc.,
880 F. Supp. 246, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that the
“salary arbitration for reserve players is also a mandatory part of the collective bargaining
process between the Players and the Owners.”).
73. See Mackey, 543 F.2d 606, 609, 610 (challenging an NFL rule that allowed the
league commissioner to force a club receiving a free agent to compensate the player’s former
club); Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (reciting contentions by
a national basketball player that “[a] ‘salary cap,’ college draft, and prohibition of player
corporations violated Sherman Act”).
74. See supra Part II.B; see also Local Union No. 189 v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965) (holding
that a marketing-hours restriction was related to wages and hours, and obtained through
collective bargaining, and thus fell within the “protection of the national labor policy and
[was] therefore exempt from the Sherman Act”).
75. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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III. HISTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS IN THE NFL AND THE NBA
Both the NBA and the NFL have exclusive bargaining agents that were first
recognized in the 1960’s—the NFLPA and the NBPA.78 During their tenure,
both labor organizations have negotiated numerous collective bargaining
agreements with their respective leagues, yet both the NFL and the NBA
have had their share of strikes, work stoppages and even cancelled seasons.79
Currently after a four-and-half month lockout, the 2011 NFL season is back
on track, after a new ten-year CBA was executed on July 21, 2011. 80 But, the
NBA’s 2011 season appears to be in jeopardy after the league and the NBPA’s
negotiations failed on July 1, 2011 the NBA filed an unfair labor practice
complaint with the NLRB and a suit against the NBPA in Federal District
Court of New York.81
A. Labor History of the National Football League
The NFLPA was formed in 1956 and became the exclusive bargaining unit
to NFL players in 1968.82 While there were small work stoppages in 1968,
1970, and 197483 the NFLPA encountered its first serious issue in the case of
Mackey v. National Football League.84
In Mackey, a group of present and former players sued the NFL, arguing that
the “Rozelle Rule,” was an unfair restraint on trade under the Sherman Act.85
This rule provided that, upon the expiration of a player’s original team contract,
if a player switched teams and the two teams could not reach a satisfactory
78. Compare About the NBPA, NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.
nbpa.org/about-us (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (explaining that the National Basketball
Players Association was founded in 1954), and WONG, supra note 5, at 531 (stating that
the National Football League Players Association was founded in 1956), with Mackey
v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976) (pointing out that the NLRB
recognized the NFLPA in 1968 as the exclusive bargaining representative of all NFL
players), and Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams (“Williams II”), 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir.
1995) (referencing how the NBA and NBPA entered into their first collective bargaining
agreement in 1967).
79. See April Weiner, NFL and the CBA: Ranking the Worst Work Stoppages in
Pro Sports’ History, BLEACHER REPORT (March 10, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/
articles/631338-nfl-and-the-cba-ranking-the-worst-work-stoppages-in-pro-sports-history
(noting that the NFL has had five work stoppages since its inception—four strikes and one
lockout—and the NBA has had three work stoppages, all of which were lockouts).
80. See DeMaurice Smith, Interview with Michel Martin host of NPR’s Tell Me
More (July 27, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/2011/07/27/138738431/
nfls-longest-work-stoppage-ends).
81. See Nathan Koppel, NBA Takes Players Association to Court, WALL STREET
JOURNAL LAW BLOG (August 2, 2011, 12:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/08/02/
nba-takes-players-association-to-court/?mod=WSJBlog; Nat’l Basketball League, NBA
Files Unfair Labor Practice Charge, Lawsuit Against NBPA (August 2, 2011 10:38 AM),
http://www.nba.com/2011/news/08/02/nba-labor-lawsuit/.
82. Kapp v. Nat’l Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 83 (N.D. Cal. 1974), vacated in
part, No. 72-537, 1975 WL 959 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1975), aff’d, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir.
1978).
83. WONG, supra note 5, at 544 tbl.11.3.
84. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
85. Id. at 609.
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arrangement on compensation, the league commissioner could transfer
substitute players from the player’s new team to the old team.86 League players
complained that the rule limited their free agency and argued that they could not
freely contract out their services.87 The NFL argued that it was shielded from
antitrust liability under the nonstatutory labor exemption within the Sherman
Act, due to its participation in a CBA.88 The District Court of Minnesota held
that “[the NFL’s] enforcement of the Rozelle Rule constituted a concerted
refusal to deal . . . and therefore was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.”89
The Eighth Circuit upheld the District Court’s ruling that because the Rozelle
Rule was not the product of “bona-fide arms length bargaining,” the labor
exemption did not apply and the Rozelle Rule was subject to antitrust scrutiny
under the Sherman Act.90 In a victory for the players, the court held that the
Rozelle Rule was a violation of antitrust law because it was an unreasonable
restraint on trade, but the court also encouraged the two sides to resolve the
issue of player mobility restraints through a collective bargaining agreement.91
The two sides came to an agreement in March of 1977 that contained league
concessions on “union security” and the league’s pension plans, in return for
new and different restrictions on free agency.92
Then, in 1982 following the expiration of the CBA, the NFL players went
on strike; this strike lasted fifty-seven days and ended with a new agreement.93
Later, in 1987, the NFL experienced its most significant labor dispute after
the expiration of the 1982 CBA when the NFL owners found replacements for
the striking players and the NBPA was forced to call off the strike after many
players were close to crossing the picket line to receive a paycheck.94 After
twenty–four days the strike ended, and the players returned to work under
similar pre-strike conditions.95
86. Id. at 610–11.
87. Id. at 609.
88. Id at 620–21.
89. Id. at 609 (citing Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn.
.1975)).
90. See id. at 616 (observing that the clubs had unilaterally imposed the rule since
1963). See generally John Croke, An Examination of the Antitrust Issues Surrounding the
NBA Decertification Crisis, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 163, 177-79 (1998) (discussing the “per se”
and “rule of reason” antitrust analyses in the decertification context).
91. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623 (“The parties are far better situated to agreeably
resolve what rules governing player transfers are best suited for their mutual interests than
are the courts.”).
92. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 231 (observing that the new rules
“proved even more restrictive than the old Rozelle Rule” and that only one player “actually
changed teams for compensation” from 1977 to 1987).
93. See WONG, supra note 5, at 531 (noting that the union conceded on the issue of
player mobility in return for better player salaries and benefits).
94. See generally Paul D. Staudohar, The Football Strike of 1987: The Question of
Free Agency, 111 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26 (1988) (explaining the disputes over free agency
and player mobility in the 1987 strike). See id. at 29 (describing how two-thirds of the
league teams found replacement players, while the striking players, on the other hand, had
limited financial reserves and the union had no “strike fund” prepared).
95. See id. at 30 (stating that the strike ended October 15th).
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The fight was not over, and a group of players brought suit against the NFL
in the District Court of Minnesota for several restrictions contained in the
CBA and in the standard player contract—claiming that they were violations
of the Sherman Act.96 The court refused to order a preliminary injunction on
the issues and held that the labor exemption protected the NFL—as the parties
had not come yet to an impasse.97
The players appealed the district court’s decision that there was not yet
an impasse, but the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision and
held that the labor exemption applies for “as long as there is a possibility that
proceedings may be commenced before the Board, or until final resolution of
Board proceedings and appeals.”98 Noting, in the decision, that antitrust claims
were not appropriate because labor policy favors “negotiated settlements
rather than intervention by courts.”99
Following this ruling, and having played two seasons without a CBA in
place, the NFLPA elected to decertify itself as the exclusive bargaining unit
through a league-wide player vote.100 Following decertification, another lawsuit
was filed against the NFL in Powell v. National Football League & McNeil
v. National Football League (Powell III).101 The District Court of Minnesota
held that because of the decertification of the NFLPA, the labor exemption no
longer protected the NFL and the player restraints challenged in the suit were

96. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League (“Powell I”), 678 F. Supp. 777, 778–79 (D.
Minn. 1988) (stating that plaintiffs “[sought] to enjoin defendants from implementing or
continuing a system of alleged player restraints [set up to restrict player mobility]”), rev’d,
930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
97. See id. at 788 (“[P]roper accommodation of labor and antitrust interests requires
that a labor exemption relating to a mandatory bargaining subject survive expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach impasse as to that issue;
thereafter, the term or condition is no longer immune from scrutiny . . . .”) The NLRB
has ruled an “impasse” to be a “matter of judgment” in which the Board considers:
[the] bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of the
negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to to [sic] which there is disagreement,
the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations . . . . See
Taft Broad. Co. & Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists, 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967);
see also Wong, supra note 5, at 544 (listing seven factors to consider).
98. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League (Powell II), 930 F.2d 1293, 1303–04 (8th Cir.
1989) (“[T]he nonstatutory labor exemption protects agreements conceived in an ongoing
collective bargaining relationship . . . beyond impasse. . . . ”)
99. Id. at 1303.
100. See WONG, supra note 6, at 531. Without a CBA, the league was able to institute
unilateral changes so long as the bargaining relationship existed, and these changes could
not be challenged as unfair labor practices through NLRB jurisdiction.
101. 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
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now vulnerable to antitrust violation claims.102 This time, a jury found that the
NFL’s compensation rule was a violation of the Sherman Act.103
Another suit was filed less than two weeks after Powell: White v. National
Football League.104 In White a group of players brought a class action suit
seeking total or modified free agency.105 White eventually settled out of court,
and the NFL paid $195 million to the class of players and granted greater free
agency to the NFL players.106 Not long after the Powell verdict, the players
once again elected the NFLPA as their exclusive bargaining representative and
the NFLPA successfully executed a new CBA in 1993.107
The most recent CBA, signed in 2006, included a provision allowing
owners to opt out of the agreement in March, 2011—instead of its expiration
in 2012.108 Months before the CBA actually expired, NFLPA executive director
DeMaurice Smith expressed concerns about the NFL making plans for a
lockout,109 and stated that every team had taken individual votes to determine
whether the NFLPA should once again decertify as the exclusive bargaining
unit.110
On March 11, 2011, the owners opted out of the agreement and the league
locked out its players.111 The same day, the NFLPA officially
decertified and a group of individual players filed a lawsuit in

102. See id. at 1358–59 (reasoning that, without a certified collective bargaining
representative, no further remedy or action before the Board remained, and thus there was
no longer the “ongoing collective bargaining relationship”).
103. See McDonough, supra note 6, at 840 (describing how the jury found that Plan
B had “a substantially harmful effect on competition” and caused economic injury to the
players (quoting Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 229 n.2 (D. Minn.
1992))).
104. White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Minn. 1993), motion
for final approval of settlement granted, 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993), aff’d, 41 F.3d
402 (8th Cir. 1994).
105. Id. at 1394–95.
106. McDonough, supra note 6, at 842 (“But of greater importance is that the White
settlement, gained only after decertification of the players own union and subsequent court
victories, provided the most significant amount of free agency in the history of the NFL.”).
107. WONG, supra note 5, at 531.
108. See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006–2012 (Mar. 8, 2006) (unpublished
contract) (on file with author); see also WONG, supra note 5, at 546 (explaining that the “[o]
wners unanimously vote[d] to opt out of [the] collective bargaining agreement” on May
20, 2008, an act that resulted in the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement
moving to May 1, 2011).
109. See Associated Press, Union Head Says Owners Set for Lockout, ESPN (Oct.
5, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5652700 (explaining that Smith has
pointed to the NFL’s recently asking banks to extend loan periods for league teams in the
event of a lockout).
110. See Doug Farrar, Players, NFL Dig In For Pending Labor Fight, YAHOO! SPORTS
(Nov. 18, 2010) http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=ys-nfllabor111810/ (describing the
actions of the league and the NFLPA in preparing for a possible lockout at the end of the
current season).
111. See Nate Davis, NFLPA Decertifies, Pursues Lockout Injunction Against NFL,
USA TODAY, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/post/2011/03/report-nflplayers-association-applies-for-decertification/1 (Mar. 12, 2011).
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U.S. District Court, alleging antitrust violations and seeking an
injunction regarding the lockout.112 In the months since then, the
NFLPA has engaged in a series of court hearings, court-mandated mediation and
numerous negotiation meetings.113 Then, on July 25, 2011 NFL Commissioners
Roger Goodell and DeMaurice Smith announced that the league and the
NFLPA had reached a new ten-year CBA which would end the lockout and
that “[f]ootball [was] back.”114
B. Labor History of the National Basketball Association
The exclusive bargaining unit of the NBA is the NBPA, which was founded
in 1954.115 The NBA entered into its first CBA in 1967.116 Following the 1971
decision in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,117 which provided
that the NBA participated in interstate commerce,118 and thus, by extension,
would fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.119
Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n120 provided a major victory for the league in
the labor relationship. Leon Wood, a college basketball player drafted in the
first round of the NBA draft, brought suit against the league and argued that
the draft and salary cap were illegal restraints of trade.121 Despite finding that
the draft and salary cap actually injured Wood and others in the position of
drafted players, the Wood court held that all trade restraints were the product of
collective bargaining and thus could not be challenged on antitrust grounds.122

112. See id.
113. See generally Sal Paolantonio, Players, Owners Facing Tight Squeeze, ESPN.
COM (July 11, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=paolantonio_
sal&id=6756795 (describing the federal judge-mandated negotiations between the league
and NFL player representatives).
114. See Players Vote to Approve New Labor Deal, Put End to Extended Lockout,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 25, 2011 9:40 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/
football/nfl/07/25/nfl-labor-deal.ap/index.html.
115. See About the NBPA, supra note 78 (discussing how the NBA recognized the
NBPA as the exclusive union representative of all NBA players when the players threatened
not to play in the first televised All-Stars game).
116. Id.
117. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), stay granted, 1971 WL 3015 (9th Cir. Feb.
16, 1971), reinstated sub nom. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
118. See id. at 1062 (noting that the NBA operates in seventeen metropolitan areas,
schedules games in numerous states, and receives revenue from nationwide broadcasts).
119. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
120. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
121. Id. at 956–57.
122. Id. at 959, 960 (rebuffing a basketball player’s argument that his superior skills
vis-à-vis other players should permit him to insist on individual bargaining, because
“collective agreements routinely set standard wages for employees with differing
responsibilities, skills, and levels of efficiency”); see McDonough supra note 6, at 833–34
(highlighting the fact that Wood still lost the suit even though at the time he was not yet a
part of the bargaining unit but an in-coming college athlete, and explaining that the court
relied on the definition of “employee” in the NLRA in holding against Wood).
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Besides the Wood decision, the first major labor issue in the NBA arose
in 1995.123 Facing the imminent expiration of the CBA in 1994, the league
and players managed to reach a no-strike, no-lockout agreement to protect
the 1994–95 season; the players played under the regulations of the previous
agreement in hopes of striking a new deal during the season.124 However,
following the expiration of the CBA on June 23, 1994 the NBA and its teams
brought suit against the class of present and future NBA players seeking a
judgment stipulating:
(i) that the continued imposition of the disputed provisions of the CBA
[the college draft, the salary cap, and the right of first refusal for free
agents] would not violate the antitrust laws because that imposition is
“governed solely by the labor laws and is exempt from antitrust liability
under the nonstatutory exemption to the antitrust laws”; and (ii) that
the disputed provisions are lawful even if the antitrust laws apply.125
The Second Circuit ruled for the league and cited the labor exemption as
providing the league with immunity from possible antitrust challenges so long
as there was a collective bargaining relationship between the parties.126
After the 1995 season, the loss in Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams
(“Williams I”), and the failure to negotiate a new CBA, a group of NBA
players who were unhappy with the current league provisions signed a petition
to decertify the players association as their exclusive bargaining agent.127 The
association’s biggest stars, led by Michael Jordan and Patrick Ewing, also
brought an antitrust suit in District Court.128 Eventually, the NLRB conducted

123. See WONG, supra note 5, at 549 tbl.11.3 (noting that in 1995, the NBPA threatened
to decertify during an owners’ lockout).
124. Robert Bradley, Labor Pains Nothing New to NBA, ASS’N FOR PROF’L
BASKETBALL RES., http://www.apbr.org/labor.html (last visited May 30, 2010).
125. See Williams II, 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that the players had
refused to negotiate with the NBA until the 1988 CBA had expired); see also McDonough,
supra note 6, at 835 (indicating that the same restrictions had been challenged eight years
prior in Wood).
126. See 45 F.3d at 691, 693 (holding that even after the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement, where there is a collective bargaining relationship employers can
still bargain with a union, implement joint proposals, and use economic pressure to secure
agreement on proposals).
127. See 1 AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND
BUSINESS 95 (1997) (describing the 1995 negotiations and the resulting attempt to get rid
of the union leadership).
128. See id. (stating that the lawsuit alleged that any joint action by the NBA owners,
whether a lockout, the return of the old salary cap system, or a new system, “would violate
the antitrust laws in the absence of a union”).
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an election that would determine whether the players association would
be decertified.129 By a vote of 226–134 the union remained the exclusive
bargaining agent.130 Still without a CBA, the NBPA and the league continued to
negotiate and eventually created a new agreement in July 1996, all without any
significant work stoppages—either by a player strike or an owner lockout.131
The new six–year CBA, however, contained a provision allowing owners to
re–open negotiations after three years if player salaries rose too high relative
to league income, and in 1998, the NBA faced a work stoppage.132 During the
season, on March 23, 1998, the owners voted to reopen negotiations, and, after
nine negotiation sessions that produced little progress, the league announced
a lockout beginning July 1, 1998.133 The lockout lasted six months, and right
before the 1998–1999 season was set to be cancelled, the sides settled on a
new CBA and agreed to play a shortened season beginning in February.134 Both
sides made concessions in the settlement, with the players suffering a new cap
on individual salaries, while the owners lost in their efforts to institute a hard
team salary cap.135
The most recent CBA came into existence on July 1, 2005 and expired on
June 30, 2011.136 The owners made the decision to refuse an option to continue
the CBA until 2012, and the struggles in negotiation over the past six months
have resulted in both sides questioning whether there will be an NBA season
in 2011.137 Prior to the expiration of the CBA, the NBPA filed an unfair labor
charge against the league with the Board for unfair bargaining practices,

129. Id.; see Murray Chass, N.B.A. Taking a Timeout for Decertification Results, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1995, at B12 (“If the union wins, the players will continue to have a labor
relationship with the N.B.A., short-circuiting an antitrust suit . . . [if] the NLRB certifies
the results, Judge David Doty of United States District Court in Minneapolis will consider
the players’ request to issue a preliminary injunction ending the league’s lockout of the
players.”).
130. David Steele, NBA Players Vote for Union Decertification Fails; Lockout Could
End Friday, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 13, 1995, at B1.
131. See WISE & MEYER, supra note 127, at 95–96 (describing the tumultuous
relationship between the owners and union following the decertification election).
132. Paul D. Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball: The Lockout of 1998-99, 122
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4-5 (1999) [hereinafter, Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball].
133. Id. at 4–5 (explaining that the league claimed nearly half of its 29 teams were
losing money, and that players were receiving 57 percent of total revenue in salaries, a
number much greater than the threshold 51.8% that allowed owners to reopen negotiations).
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id.
136. 2005 [NBA] Collective Bargaining Agreement art. XXXIX (unpublished
contract) (on file with author), available at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2005.
137. See Coon, supra note 3 (“If the league and players’ union don’t come to terms
on a new agreement by then, the league will impose a lockout, a work stoppage that will
disrupt business and could possibly lead to the cancellation of the entire 2011-12 season.”);
see also Chris Mannix, As Two Sides Stand Firm, Lockout Seems Inevitable For NBA,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 12, 2010), http:// sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/chris_
mannix/07/12/stern.las.vegas/ (noting that the league’s current proposal and the players’
current proposal are “miles apart”).
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complaining the NBA’s goal was to avoid meaningful negotiation until a
lockout was in place.138 Following the expiration of the CBA, the owners
initiated a lockout,139 and the biggest issue the two sides are in disagreement
about is revenue sharing between owners and players.140 NBA commissioner
David Stern and NBPA executive director Billy Hunter have met for several
negotiations, but since expiration, progress has stalled and both sides appear
unafraid to discuss the possibility of a lengthy work stoppage.141
IV. ANALYSIS OF NLRB DECERTIFICATION AND ITS NEGATIVE EFFECTS
While the NFL players have decertified their union once before, both the
NFLPA and NBPA considered the option of Board–regulated decertification in
light of the threat of a lockout in 2011.142 However, decertification of a union
provides instability and it is unlikely to result in any large benefits—in contrast
to the advantages of continued negotiation through an exclusive bargaining
agent certified by the Board.
A. Legal Options of a Decertified Players’ Association to
Challenge Trade Restraints
The Eighth Circuit established that any trade restraint is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. Yet, today almost all salary caps, free agency
restrictions, and rookie drafts fall under the labor exemption—so long as a
collective bargaining relationship exists.143 Thus, a players’ association who
desires to pursue an antitrust claim against a league is presented with a many
number of options under the Sherman Act.
In Powell II, the court lists several choices for labor organizations faced
with possible restraints on trade, including exerting economic pressure and
presenting claims to the Board.144 Additionally, in Williams I, Judge Duffy
opined that the players union could decertify under Board regulations and
subsequently bring antitrust claims against the NBA, but did not advise the
players to pursue this course of action.145 As the Eighth Circuit explained:
138. See ESPN.COM, supra note 4.
139. See id.
140. See Coon, supra note 3 (“The players are guaranteed fifty-seven percent of the
league’s revenues . . . before expenses come out.”).
141. See Adrian Wojnarowski, NBA Lockout Threatens Entire Season, YAHOO SPORTS,
http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_nba_lockout_players_063011
(June 30, 2011) (“[T]here’s a real chance the NBA is gone for a full year now. This has the
makings of the NHL’s labor war of 2004-05, where the cost of instituting a hard salary cap
cost the sport a complete season.”).
142. See generally Coon, supra note 3 (noting that “fewer than ten percent of the
players who experienced the lockout in 1998-99 are still in the league”).
143. See Powell II, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the labor exemption
protects “agreements conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship . . .” from
antitrust liability). See also supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text (discussing the
“impasse” and “bargaining relationship” tests).
144. See id.
145. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams (Williams I), 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (aff’d, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
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[W]e are not compelled to look into the future and pick a
termination point for the labor exemption. The parties are now faced
with several choices. They may bargain further . . . [t]hey may resort
to economic force. And finally, if appropriate issues arise, they may
present claims to the [Board]. We are satisfied that as long as there is
a possibility that proceedings may be commenced before the Board,
or until final resolution of Board proceedings and appeals therefrom,
the labor relationship continues and the labor exemption applies.146
A decertified labor organization holds almost no actual power; instead, the
power to bring legal action lies in the hands of individual employees.147 Not
only will the players have to provide their own legal representation— instead of
relying on the union to bring suit or an unfair labor practices complaint against
the league—but the chances of winning such lawsuits are not a certainty for
the players.148
This theory is exemplified by Caldwell—where a player in the American
Basketball Association brought suit against the league and his team for a
suspension.149 The court ruled, however, that because the American Basketball
Association Players Association had received Board certification as the
exclusive bargaining unit, Caldwell’s proper pursuit of a claim was through
the NLRB by alleging unfair labor practices, rather than an antitrust suit.150
More recently a group of NBA players lost their antitrust counterclaims in
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams.151 In dicta, the court reasoned that there was
no per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and therefore considered
the reasonableness of the challenged restraints.152 Applying a “rule of reason”
analysis, the Williams court reasoned that the salary cap, the restrictions on
free agency, and the college draft were not anti–competitive.153

146. Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1303.
147. See Croke, supra note 90 at 177 (warning that decertification would leave the
individual players to “fend for themselves”).
148. Compare Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976)
(holding that the Rozelle Rule was a violation of antitrust law), with Williams I, 857 F.
Supp. 1069, 1078–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (deciding on exemption grounds but positing in
dicta that the challenged trade restraints were not violations of antitrust law), aff’d, 45 F.3d
684 (2d Cir. 1995).
149. See id. at 526 (explaining that Caldwell alleged that the team and league conspired
to “blacklist” him to ensure that he could never play in the league again).
150. See id. at 530 (“[I]f Caldwell is allowed to proceed with the present action,
employees in similar circumstances will either never resort to the NLRB or will
institute parallel administrative and antitrust proceedings with the risk of inconsistent
adjudications.”).
151. See Williams I, 857 F. Supp. at 1071, 1078, 1079 (characterizing professional
athletic associations as joint ventures, not as “competitors in any economic sense”
(quoting Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178–79 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (emphasis in
original))).
152. Id. at 1078–79.
153. See id. at 1079 (“The pro-competitive effects of these practices, in particular the
maintenance of competitive balance, may outweigh their restrictive consequences.”).
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Most recently, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Brady v. NFL154 may be
interpreted by other circuits as holding that lockouts are legal, even in the
face of decertified unions.155 This decision could greatly impact the strongest
weapon of decertified unions, the assurance that decertified unions can bring
antitrust claims against a league instituting a lockout. Even if such reading of
the June 8, 2011 decision is a stretch of the imagination, the Eighth Circuit’s
opinion solidifies the notion that lockouts cannot be enjoined, and as such,
any lockout would remain in place until the merits of the case are heard.156 For
example, the Brady case would not have been heard by a U.S. District Court
until 2012, thus ensuring that without a negotiated deal, the NFL could have
cancelled the upcoming season, despite whether or not the NFLPA elected to
decertify.
Thus, continuing the union as the certified exclusive bargaining unit under the
oversight of the NLRB is a more stable option in furthering the players’ efforts
to affect change in league provisions, as union lawsuits and unfair labor practice
claims are less expensive and will be possibly more successful than individual
antitrust lawsuits brought by players outside of the union.
Finally, there exists the possibility of NBA or NFL owners bringing a bad
faith bargaining charge against their respective players’ association concerning
the decision to decertify.157 Looking at the current status of the NFL, with every
team voting—most unanimously—for decertification more than four months
before the current CBA expires,158 the league could argue that the players had
no desire to reach an agreement.159 By decertifying immediately following the
CBA expiration, the NFL and the NBA players would be placing themselves in
a different situation from the 1989 NFLPA, which only decertified following a
failed court challenge and two seasons of play without an agreement in place.160

154. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, Docket No. 11-1898 (8th Cir. 2011).
155 See Michael McCann, Burning Questions From Eighth Circuit Ruling To Extend
NFL Lockout, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 16, 2011) http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/
writers/michael_mccann/05/16/nfl.lockout/index.html.
156 See Brady (“[W]e conclude that § 4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives a
federal court of power to issue an injunction prohibiting a party to a labor dispute from
implementing a lockout of its employees.”).
157. Cf. HARDIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 803 (explaining that the Board can find bad
faith even if a party is willing to meet, so long as the Bard finds that the party “is merely
going through the motions of bargaining”).
158. See supra note 110.
159. See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943)
(holding that the duty of good faith is an obligation “to participate actively . . . as to indicate
a present intention to find a basis for agreement . . . ‘[with] an open mind and sincere desire
to reach an agreement’” (quoting NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 885 (1st
Cir. 1941)).
160. See generally WONG, supra note 5 at 544–45 & tbl.11.3 (describing the history of
the 1989 NFLPA decertification struggle).
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B. NLRB-Provided Oversight for Players Associations as Certified Exclusive
Bargaining Agents
Unlike the uncertainty of antitrust lawsuits, any certified bargaining
agent has the ability to use NLRB regulations to challenge their employer.161
Congress adopted the NLRA and its amendments in order to provide “a[n]
array of rules and remedies” for employee unions to challenge their employers
outside the scope of antitrust law.162 The original Wagner Act, passed in 1935,
sought to significantly change labor law through providing additional rights
to employees and additional outlets for employee-management disputes.163
Congress recognized that the only way to successfully implement the new labor
rights was to establish “the type of administrative agency that had become a
hallmark for much of the New Deal legislation.”164 With strict procedures and
clear jurisdiction, the NLRB-regulated claims of unfair labor practices and bad
faith negotiations provide labor unions with the stability necessary to challenge
groups as powerful as sports leagues and team owners.165 Finally, the presence
of a collective bargaining unit and subsequent bargaining relationship do not
exclude a union from bringing a successful antitrust suit against its employer,
while the decertification of such union does preclude any unfair labor practice
challenge under the Act.166
The presence of an exclusive bargaining agent and a collective bargaining
relationship allow for parties to use economic sanctions. The players have the
ability to strike, as set forth in the Act.167 However, even during a strike, a union
161. See HARDIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 27 (observing that the NLRA Act conferred
a triad of essential rights: “(1) the right to organize; (2) the right to bargain collectively; and
(3) the right to engage in strikes [and other concerted activities]”).
162. Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, 66 F.3d 523, 530 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Williams II, 45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995)) (“Every employee who is locked out by
a multiemployer group, every striker who is not reinstated, and every employee who is
discharged could bring an antitrust action . . . Clearly, Congress had no such intention. As
noted, the NLRA offers ‘a[n] array of rules and remedies . . . and . . . application of antitrust
principles to a collective bargaining relationship would disrupt collective bargaining as we
know it.’”).
163. See HARDIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 26-27 (“Caught in the labyrinth of modern
industrialism . . . the employee can attain freedom and dignity only by cooperation
with other employees.” (quoting 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Robert
Wagner)).
164. See id. at 28 (creating the Board).
165. See generally WONG, supra note 5, at 520 (outlining the procedural process of
filing an unfair labor charge with the Board).
166. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (“[A]n agreement among
employers could be sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collectivebargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly
interfere with that process.”). The Brown decision also noted that investigation into the
requirements of insulation from antitrust law should come from the Board “to whose
‘specialized judgment’ Congress ‘intended to leave’ many of the ‘inevitable questions
concerning multiemployer bargaining bound to arise in the future’.” See id. (quoting
NLRB v. Truck Divers Local 499, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)).
167. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (“Employees shall have the right . . . to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection . . . .”).
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is still bound to bargain in good faith.168 Employers, on the other hand, have
the ability to “lockout” their employees as a negotiation tactic in collective
bargaining.169 A likely provision in any CBA is a “no strike, no lockout” clause
during the term of the CBA, which ensures that these economic sanctions will
only be used if the agreement expires before a new one is signed.170 If there
is no exclusive bargaining unit, and thus no bargaining relationship, players
would not have the statutory authority to strike,171 yet it remains unclear
whether owners could lock out their employees.172
From 1987–1989, the NFL played for two seasons without a collective
bargaining agreement, with only a minor three-week strike in 1987.173 However,
when the NFLPA decertified in 1989, the owners lost their ability to lock out
the players, but the players were also unable to bargain for any sort of benefits
and were forced to play under the league’s unilateral provisions concerning
free agency and salary caps.174 Thus, while a Board decertification may ensure
that the NBA will play the 2011 season, if the season occurs, the league and
owners could attempt to unilaterally decide upon the provisions surrounding
every season played where the players do not have an exclusive bargaining
unit.175

168. See § 158(b)(3) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice . . . to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to
the provisions of section 159(a) . . . .”).
169. See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965) (holding “an employer
violates neither § 8(a) (1) nor § 8(a)(3) [of the Act] when, after a bargaining impasse
has been reached, he temporarily shuts down his plant and lays off his employees for the
sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining
position.”).
170. See generally WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 823–29 (discussing the
economic uses of strikes and lockouts by bargaining parties).
171. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (granting employees the right to engage in concerted
activities “for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”).
172. Compare WISE & MEYER, supra note 127, at 95 (“[M]ultiple employers cannot
conduct a lockout if there is no union”), with WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 827
(stating that economic sanctions can only be used “so long as bargaining is pursued in good
faith and the lockout is utilized only after the bargaining process has reached stalemate or
impasse.”).
173. See id. at 545–46 (charting the NFL collective bargaining history from 1968 to
2008, and including the 1987 player strike and the 1993 CBA signing).
174. See generally Thomas George, N.F.L.’s 7-Year Plan Was Really 5 Years of
Cheating History, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at B15 (arguing that, prior to the 1993 NFL
CBA, the league had instituted “a heavy-handed, one-sided free agency system” that
produced only two free agent moves over five years).
175. See Coon, supra note 3 (noting that players not represented by a collective
bargaining unit lose key protections and benefits).
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Collective bargaining relationships in sports often produce benefits to the
players in return for sacrificing much of their “free market” abilities through
restraints like the draft or salary cap.176 Both the NFL and NBA’s current
agreements contain explicit sections concerning health care, as well as
retirement and pension plans, which are all benefits the union has accrued
in negotiations with their respective leagues.177 There will be little, if any
incentive for the NBA to continue providing these benefits to the players in the
event of union decertification.178 As professional basketball can lead to long–
sustaining and career–ending injuries, the presence of a retirement and pension
plan is something of great value to all current, past, and future players in either
league. Without a CBA—indeed—without a bargaining agent in general, it is
unclear whether a pension plan would be as strong as the current plans are or
if they the plans would exist at all.
Concerning player retirement, the short nature of professional athletic
careers plays a role in pursuing actions against a league, as well as negotiations
with leagues and owners. Between the lack of job security and the short length
of a players’ career (as well as his earnings peak), the possibility of playing
under unilateral salary restraints for any amount of time can jeopardize the
earning capacity of NBA athletes.179 While the NFL players were ultimately
successful in their lawsuits against the league in Powell–McNeil and White,
the process from the 1987 strike to the 1993 court decisions lasted longer than
an average NFL player’s career.180 Clearly, the success of these lawsuits comes
at a price, while the ability to consistently play under mutually agreed-upon
CBAs provides a more stable economic scheme for professional athletes.
Therefore, the abilities of a decertified union and its members to exact any
change or to succeed in obtaining any beneficial economic provisions pales
in comparison to both the powers of a certified union, as well as the limited
capabilities of leagues who are obligated to negotiate with such unions under
the NLRA.

176. See Croke, supra note 90, at 176 (noting that collective bargaining negotiations
produce benefits such as minimum team salaries, which would most likely be eliminated
if a union decertified); Union: NFL Will Cut Off Health Benefits in Event of a Lockout,
SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/142994
(explaining that the NFL league office stated that if the two sides do not agree on a new
CBA, the NFL would stop providing health care to NFL players and their families).
177. See, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-2012, supra note 178, at
arts. XLVI, XLVII (explaining the responsibilities of the team owners to provide health
coverage and retirement benefits); 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 108,
at arts. III, IV (same).
178. See, e.g., Union: NFL Will Cut Off Health Benefits in Event of a Lockout, supra
note 192 (illustrating that without a CBA, leagues will cut the costs of providing benefits
for their players).
179. See Lock, supra note 23, at 385 (arguing that because of a lack of job scurity and
a short average career length, NFL players are unlikely to reach their earning potential if
they strike or play without a CBA).
180. See generally How Long is the Average NFL Career?, LIVESTRONG, http://www.
livestrong.com/article/15527-long-average-career-nfl-player/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011)
(explaining that an average career in the NFL is 3.3 years).
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C. Economic Realities of Salary Negotiations and the Failure of the Free
Market Argument in Today’s Economy
One of the statutorily imposed mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
is wages,181 and the collective bargaining unit makes a significant difference
in players’ wages today. In professional sports, there is a large disparity in the
salaries of top players and the players who receive the minimum contract.182
While it is possible to argue that the decertification of a union and removal of
a collective bargaining relationship would allow all players to receive their
“free market worth,”183 this thought process is severely shortsighted.184 When
the NBA attempted to decertify in 1995, it was led by superstars Michael
Jordan and Patrick Ewing, who fought hard against the institution of a hard
salary cap and received record-breaking salaries.185 Thus, the benefit felt from
the presence of a free market, or even the ability to circumvent certain salary
restrictions, rises to the top.
This, in contrast to the anticompetitive nature of unions under the Board,
seeks uniformity within the ranks of the union.186 While the superstars of the
NBA would probably see their contracts rise in a free market, there would be
little, if any beneficial effect for the majority of the league.187 Additionally, while
players like Michael Jordan argued that there is a competitive disadvantage
for “highly skilled” employees, much of the trade provisions in sports extend
beyond specific salaries.188 While opponents of certification may argue that
the players associations would be committing unfair employee representation
practices, such a claim is short sighted in light of Steele v. Louisville &
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) (specifying that collective bargaining units are the
exclusive employee representatives allowed to collectively bargain for employees’ wages).
182. See Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball, supra note 132, at 6 (explaining
that, while the mean salary is $2.6 million, half of players make less than $1.4 million).
183. See McDonough supra note 6, at 859 (noting that the “non-statutory” labor
exemption protects salary caps from antitrust claims).
184. But cf. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 813 (conceding how difficult it
would be for “star” players to complain of a CBA that would benefit the majority of players
to the star players’ detriment).
185. See Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball, supra note 132, at 4, 5, 6
(explaining that when the 1996 CBA retained the salary cap, it also had a “Larry Bird”
exception, under which Jordan was able to sign a one-year, $30 million contract). In Major
League Baseball, when there was no salary cap, but only a “luxury tax,” the top salary was
over $20 million more than the league minimum. See WEILER & ROBERTS , supra note 51,
at 307 (explaining that in 2003, Alex Rodriguez of the New York Yankees received $22
million salary in comparison to the league minimum of $300,00).
186. See Robert A. McCormick, Interference on Both Sides: The Case Against the
NFL-NFLPA Contract, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397, 406-07 (1996) (explaining that the
union’s goal of reducing competition among employees regarding wages and conditions is
accomplished when employers agree to establish uniform terms of employment).
187. See generally Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball, supra note 132, at 6–7
(discussing how, even with salary caps, bottom players tend to have little in the way of
payouts compared to stars).
188. See, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-2012, supra note 108,
at arts. VII, X, XXVIII (regulating issues such discrimination, personal appearance, and
injury grievances); 2005 [NBA] Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 136, at arts.
VI, XXVIII (incorporating attendance rules and telecom rights).
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Nashville Railroad, which allows a union to make provisions for differing
treatment among its members based on “competence and skill.”189
Uncertainty of decertification extends additionally to the protections that a
collective bargaining relationship provides to the union group as a whole in
terms of wages, and that protection is vital in the economic realities of 2011.190
The NBA’s current salary situation illustrates the problematic possibilities of
employees working without the protections of Board-regulated negotiations.191
With teams acting more conservative economically, either the disparity in
salary will skyrocket between the best players and the rest of the league, or the
lack of salary cap could result in a decrease in salaries in general.192
Finally, the players may have a viable claim of bad faith bargaining against
the owners due to the owners’ refusal to turn over financial documents.193 The
NBPA has questioned the league’s claims that teams are losing money in recent
years, and the leagues and teams in general have not sufficiently opened their

189. 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944); see, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 20062012, supra note 108, at art. XXIV, § 1(c) (listing several instances in which compensation
can differ amongst players with different competency levels); 2005 [NBA] Collective
Bargaining Agreement, supra note 136, at art. VII, § 4 (same).
190. But see Liz Mullen, Hunter: Talk of $400M NBA Loss ‘Baloney’, SPORTS BUS.
J. (May 31, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2010/05/20100531/
This-Weeks-News/Hunter-Talk-Of-$400M-NBA-Loss-Baloney.aspx (expressing the view
that while NBPA Executive Director Billy Hunter does not believe that the NBA is losing
$400 million, the NBA has already provided the union with boxes of financial records in
support of that claim).
191. Compare 2010 NBA Free Agents and Signings, BACKSEAT FAN, http://
backseatfan.com/2010/07/2010-nba-free-agents-and-signings/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011)
(charting how, in the summer of 2010, 9 NBA players signed a maximum or near-maximum
allowable contract despite owners’ claims of financial hardship), with WONG, supra note
5, at 532 (noting that the removal of the salary floor would result in “tremendous cost
savings at the players’ expense”). See generally Michael J. Redding, Third and Long:
The Issues Facing the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Negotiations and the Effect
of an Uncapped Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95, 102 (2009) (“Operating without a
minimum salary requirement would allow the owners to set the market for free agents and
rookies without any artificial salary floors.”).
192. See Redding, supra note 109, at 102 (noting how the NFL owners believe that
“the current financial model is harming them by providing the players with too large of a
revenue share”).
193. Compare NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 755–56 (1956) (“Good faith
bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer should be honest
claims . . . [if] . . . an argument is important enough to present in the give and take of
bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy.”), with
WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 805 (stating that furnishing information to a union
has been found to be an element of the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith, but that
first a union must make a “good faith request for the information to be furnished” and that
such information has to be relevant).
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books to the players’ association.194 While the law only requires an employer
to disclose financial documents when there is a stated “inability to pay,” the
economic claims of the league may warrant an order to disclose financial
information.195 Even if a bad faith bargaining claim would be unsuccessful,
forcing the NBA to claim that it could pay wages, but simply desires to lower
them, would be a valuable bargaining chip in collective bargaining negotiations.
The NBPA should remain certified as the exclusive bargaining agent under
the Board. Based on the stable options available to Board–certified unions in
collective bargaining and the benefits of administrative oversight, as well as
the recent legal challenges in the NFL labor dispute, decertifying either union
and attempting to individually bargain for contracts without a CBA in place
will ultimately hurt the players as a group.

194. See Union Head Smith: NFL Owners Gearing Up for Lockout in 2011, NAT’L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81b1858f/article/unionhead-smith-nfl-owners-gearing-up-for-lockout-in-2011 (last visited Oct. 5, 2010)
(describing the union representative’s complaints about the league’s willingness to turn
over financial documents). Billy Hunter has repeatedly questioned David Stern’s claims
of financial loss and has requested additional documents. See Mullen, supra note 190
(explaining that Hunter has requested “the sales prospectuses NBA teams have shown
to buyers and would-be buyers of franchises in the last few years” to illustrate that teams
are advertising themselves as profitable to potential buyers, while claiming losses to the
union).
195. See Nielsen Lithographing Co. & Graphic Comms. Int’l Union, 305 N.L.R.B.
697, 701 (1991) (holding that an employer also need not disclose its “projection of its future
ability to compete” but that such estimation of its ability to compete is not “equate[d]” with
its ability to pay).
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